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PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND THE ROLE OF
THE ATTORNEY IN ADR
RESOLVING DISPUTES OVER ATTORNEYS'
FEES: THE ROLE OF ADR
Alan Scott Rau*
I. FEE DISPUTES TODAY
A. THE EXTENT OF DISPUTING OVER FEES
UST how often "disputes over fees" arise between attorneys and clients
is a subject as to which we have little or no reliable information. At the
very outset, of course, we encounter a problem of characterization; a
neat dichotomy between, for example, "fee disputes" and disputes involving
attorney "misconduct"' hardly accounts for the messiness of human reali-
ties. In some cases, attorney-client disputes do immediately appear to be
about the size of the attorney's bill. They may, for example, involve claims
that the fee was not in accord with the client's original understanding as to
the basis of billing. They may involve disagreements about the reasonable-
ness of hourly charges, or the propriety of charges for particular disburse-
ments or services (such as work devoted to the preparation of the bill
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itself!). 2 They may involve claims of "bill padding,"' 3 or of "overlawyering" 4
- or they may involve assertions that the fee was simply excessive in light of
the result obtained. 5 Other disputes, in contrast, are nominally about "other
things": they may involve claims of attorney delay, neglect, conflict of inter-
est, or incompetence, or may focus on misuse of client property, or improper
attempts to collect or secure payment of fees. They may also, however, in-
volve claims that the attorney has been billing for work that has simply not
been performed, or they may involve assertions that the attorney's perform-
ance was substandard - that is, that the result obtained was simply inade-
quate in light of the size of the fee. Payment of fees, then, is often
intertwined with other subjects of contention. But even where disputes ap-
pear to be about "something else"-both where allegations of misconduct
are colorable and when they are inserted for rhetorical effort or leverage-it
seems plausible to suggest that such disputes may frequently be triggered by
the attorney's demand for payment of his fee and fueled by the attorney's
continuing attempts to collect it.
However defined, the suspicion persists that disputes over fees constitute a
major and particularly intractable share of all attorney-client conflict. A
1976 study by Steele and Nimmer, based on in-depth interviews with 45
persons who had experienced "serious problems" with their attorneys, iden-
tified reports of excessive fees and of delay in performance as the two most
common complaints:
[T]here were concerns about attorney demands for, and exercise of, uni-
lateral control of fees, with negotiation about fees and even itemization
of billable services often lacking. Another area of dispute involved in-
stances in which actual costs substantially exceeded those initially dis-
cussed and either estimated or agreed to, even though no special
problems had been encountered in the case. 6
2. See In re Disciplinary Action Against Simmonds, 415 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Minn. 1987)
(attorney's fee included time spent in preparing billing records, as well as time spent in answer-
ing ethics complaint); see also Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 801 F. Supp.
804, 828 n.70 (D. Me. 1992) (attorney sought reimbursement "for as many as four meals in
one day").
What appears to be an increasingly controversial subject is the propriety of charging clients
for costs that might more properly be considered the overhead of the law firm, such as the time
of paralegals or time charges for computerized research. See id. at 827-28. A rich source of
anecdotes on the subject is Susan Beck & Michael Orey, Skaddenomics, AM. J. LAW, Sept.
1991, at 3.
3. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 341 (4th Cir.
1992 (unpublished disposition)) (attorney billed "outlandish" numbers of hours in order to
"charge the client what the billing partner thought the services rendered were worth"; associ-
ate billed 24 hours or more in a single day on nine occasions, on one day billing over 32 hours).
4. See Weinberger, 801 F. Supp. at 815 (hours charged by plaintiffs' attorneys were "ex-
cessive, duplicative, or otherwise redundant .... It appears they were shooting mice with a
cannon.").
5. "[Even] [a] Michelangelo should not charge Sistine Chapel rates for painting a
farmer's barn." Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 677 (3d Cir. 1983).
6. Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional Regulation,
1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 917, 952. A table giving the frequency of various reported
problems appears id. at 1018. A Canadian survey conducted in 1978 found that 53% of the
respondents listed "overcharging" as their main complaint against the legal profession. Alvin
Esau, Excessive Fees & Lawyer Discipline, 13 MANITOBA L.J. 287, 287 (1983).
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On the attorney's side, our survey of the Texas bar suggests a similar pat-
tern: 61.2% of our respondents reported that their firms had experienced fee
disputes with clients over the preceding five years, and 31.1% of these re-
ported that five or more fee disputes had occurred during that period. 7
A number of structural factors combine to make differences over fees both
widespread and hard to resolve satisfactorily. To begin with, it is notori-
ously difficult even for cognoscenti to value legal services with any objectivity
and uniformity." And the difficulties from the client's perspective are even
greater. The services of the attorney - unlike those of the automobile
mechanic, the plumber, or even the physician - are often intangible; they
are commonly performed out of the client's sight; they involve the manipula-
tion of recondite forms and practices and of official agencies to which the
lawyer's training and experience give him privileged access. Even for clients
who are "repeat players," there may be no suitable standard of comparison
to assess the reasonableness of a fee, since all but the most routine legal
problems, as well as the skills, experience, training, prestige, track record,
and connections of different attorneys, are likely to be incommensurables. 9
7. Of firms with more than 10 attorneys, 85.6% reported that they had experienced at
least some fee disputes over the past five years, and of these, 69.9% reported an incidence of
five or more such disputes. The survey defined a fee dispute as "a refusalto pay a fee or at
least a demand by a client that a fee be reduced or returned," cautioning that the client's "mere
expression of concern over a fee or a question about how a fee was calculated" should not be
considered such a dispute.
Our total sample included 3,379 Texas law firms, drawn from a database of law firms in
IOLTA (Interest on Lawyer's Trust Account) records. Participation in the IOLTA program
is mandatory for Texas attorneys. See SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS STATE BAR RULES art.
XI and app. (1988) (governing the operation of the Texas Equal Access to Justice program,
amendment effective July 1, 1989). All of the firms in the database with two or more attorneys
were surveyed. The remainder of the sample (making up approximately 42% of the sample)
consisted of solo practitioners; we surveyed approximately 15% of all solo practitioner firms in
the database. 1,794 responses were received, for an overall response rate of 53% (for solo
practitioners, the response rate was 40%; for firms with two or more attorneys, the response
rate was 63%). The responses reported here have been weighted to correct for undersampling
of solo practitioners [hereinafter Survey of the Texas Bar].
8. See ROBERT H. ARONSON, FED. JUD. CENTER ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE ARRANGE-
MENTS: REGULATION AND REVIEW (1980). Rule 1.5(a) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct contain a laundry list (apparently nonexclusive) of "factors to be considered in deter-
mining the reasonableness of a fee:"
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the partic-
ular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers perform-
ing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1992).
9. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1992). In billing for its
merger and acquisition work the New York firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
factors in, according to its chief administrative officer "how well we perform, what kind of
pressures we have to work under, and the unique skills we bring to a case" as well as the
number of billable hours. MARK STEVENS, POWER OF ATTORNEY: THE RISE OF THE GIANT
1993] 2007
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Comparison is made even more problematic by the restrictions - attributa-
ble both to professional discipline and to professional custom - that con-
tinue to limit the free flow of information about legal fees and services.' 0
This low level of visibility and accountability can often make the practice of
law resemble what has been called a "confidence game," in which a principal
goal of the attorney is to "stage manage" the client relationship in order to
create an "appearance of help and service" justifying the fee charged."
A client who finds an attorney's fee excessive is likely to grumble and then
to pay the bill anyway.' 2 Where the client refuses to pay - or makes an
unsuccessful demand for a reduction in the fee charged, or for the return of a
fee already paid - then we can say that a true "dispute" has surfaced be-
tween attorney and client.' 3  However, the mechanisms available to resolve
this dispute are not likely to lead to solutions that commend themselves to
either of the parties as particularly fair or efficient.
LAW FIRMS 107 (1987). The firm's fee-setting practice has been less charitably described as "a
little art, a little science .... Their objective is to come in with a number that'll get paid sans
any embarrassing objections from the client." Id.
10. See generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs 775-90 (1986); see
also Lauren R. Reskin, Lawyer Advertising Levels Off: P.R. Use Growing, 70 A.B.A. J., June
1984, at 48, 49 (58% of lawyer respondents expressed concern that advertising is
"unprofessional").
11. See Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organiza-
tional Coaptation of a Profession, 1 L. & Soc'y. REV. 15, 24-26 (1967). It also helps to make
possible a variety of unseemly billing practices, from the universally condemned (fictional bill-
ing or "padding bills") to the easily rationalized (doing unnecessary work or "running the
meter," sometimes excused as "leaving no stone unturned"). See generally Lisa Lerman, Lying
to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 705-20 (1990).
12. Almost all of the respondents in the Steele & Nimmer survey simply acquiesced in the
fee demanded by the attorney. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 6, at 957-60 ("I simply paid
the bill. What could I do?").
Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests an increasing willingness on the part of at least so-
phisticated clients to challenge fees perceived as excessive. See Ellen J. Pollock, In a Bid to
Trim Costs, Many Companies Are Forcing Law Firms to Reduce Fees, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4,
1991, at BI; Sharon Walsh, Lawyers' Clients Get a Little Cross Examining Bills, WASH. POST,
June 8, 1992, at Fl; David Margolick, At the Bar: Keeping Tabs on Legal Fees Means Going
After the People Who Are Hired to Go After People, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 1992, at B16
("[fQor a fee, a number of companies will now monitor legal bills" received by clients); John W.
Bickel & William A. Brewer, The Demise of the Billable Hour, TEX. LAW., Sept. 14, 1992, at
26 ("shift in the balance of power" between clients and attorneys resulting from the "realities
of the post 1980s business environment, coupled with increased competition and the oversup-
ply of lawyers"). Increased client attention to legal costs is clearly "in the air," and this may
contribute not only to a greater willingness to challenge fees, but also to a greater reliance on
in-house counsel, and to a greater insistence that attorneys be familiar with and consider the
use of alternatives to litigation such as mediation and arbitration.
13. This is of course the terminology of Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances,
Claims, and Disputes. Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 525, 527 (1981):
If the other party accepts the claim in full and actually delivers the resource in
question in a routine manner ("Yes, we'll repair your new car; just bring it in."),
there is no dispute. Outright rejection of a claim ("The car was not defective; it
broke down because of your misuse.") establishes an unambiguous dispute; there
are now two (or more) parties with conflicting claims to the same resource. A
compromise offer ("We'll supply the parts if you will pay for the labor.") is a
partial rejection of the claim, which initiates negotiation, however brief, and
thus constitutes a dispute .... A dispute exists when a claim based on a griev-
ance is rejected either in whole or in part.
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B. FEE DISPUTES AND THE DISCIPLINARY MECHANISM
We are all aware that a contract between individuals can never be re-
garded as entirely a matter of private agreement, "not restrained by law."' 14
Fee arrangements between lawyers and clients, however, are to an excep-
tional degree subject to public regulation and supervision. 15 The attorney
who has overcharged a client may in theory have committed an ethical viola-
tion: disciplinary rules commonly proscribe the charging of "excessive" or
"unreasonable" fees,16 and fee-related grievances may arise out of other ethi-
cal prohibitions as well. 17 In theory, then, the client who has been
overcharged may resort to the formal grievance machinery operated by the
organized bar. The overwhelming majority of attorney disciplinary proceed-
14. A Missouri statute does curiously provide that the "compensation of an attorney.., is
governed by agreement, express or implied, which is not restrained by law." Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 484.130 (Vernon 1987). This of course has never been taken literally. See In re Kinghorn,
764 S.W.2d 939 (Mo. 1989) (client consulted attorney for help in collecting child support, and
signed a retainer agreement and promissory note for $2,350, which was more than the amount
then owed; held, discipline imposed; attorney "should have known that he had collected far
too much money"); Lauer, Limitations on Attorney Fees, 21 J. Mo. BAR 297 (1965).
15. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 10, at 495-542.
16. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1992). The rule mandates
simply that "[a] lawyer's fee shall be reasonable," although the rule includes a laundry list of
"factors to be considered" in determining a fee's reasonableness. See supra note 8. Wolfram
writes that the "austere and virtually indecipherable" standard of the Model Rules was proba-
bly intended to be "at least as strict" as that found in the 1969 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, that "[a] lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an
illegal or clearly excessive fee." See WOLFRAM, supra note 10, at 517. For the view that this
semantic difference between the Model Rules and the Model Code is of no substantive signifi-
cance, see OREGON STATE BAR, THE ETHICAL OREGON LAWYER § 4.2 at 4-4 (1991) ("While
[Oregon Disciplinary Rule 2-106(A)] proscribes a 'clearly excessive' fee rather than an 'unrea-
sonable' fee, the terms are synonymous.").
Absent from the laundry list of the Model Rules is any mention of the sophistication of the
client or the client's informed consent to any fee arrangement, although these factors have an
obvious (if usually covert) impact in fee cases. But see CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 4-200(B)(2) (1992) (forbidding "unconscionable" fees, and adding the "rela-
tive sophistication" of attorney and client to the list of factors to be considered "in determining
the conscionability of a fee"); SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, STATE BAR RULES, art. X, § 9,
Rule 1.04, cmt. 8 (1991) ("[A] fee arrangement negotiated at arm's length with an experienced
business client would rarely be subject to question .... [AIpplication of the disciplinary test
may require some consideration of the personal circumstances of the individuals involved.");
cf Kipper v. Kipper, 542 N.Y.S. 2d 617, (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (suit by law firm to recover
fee; court "would be unable to countenance" the fee charged if not for fact that client's father
"was a sophisticated businessman versed in legal matters" and "fully involved" in determining
course of litigation).
17. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8 (1992) ("Conflict of Inter-
est: Prohibited Transactions"); Rule 1.15 ("Safeguarding Property"); see also Rule 8.4(c) (the
attorney shall not "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresenta-
tion"). Consider the relatively efficient attorney who is able to complete in five hours a task to
which most other lawyers would need to devote ten hours - and who then proceeds to "pad"
his bill so as to charge for seven hours of work. Such conduct would presumably run afoul of
Rule 8.4(c), although the total dollar amount of the bill is by hypothesis "reasonable" with
respect to the customary charge in the locality. In re Farmer, 747 P.2d 97 (Kan. 1987) (in a
personal injury case, attorney withheld funds from settlement proceeds for the purpose of
paying medical bills; he then negotiated reduction with doctors and hospital by representing
the settlement was not adequate to pay all expenses, and retained the difference for himself;
one year suspension from practice ordered); see Lerman, supra note 1l, at 687-96, 709-13.
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ings are in fact triggered by client complaints.' 8
Of course, bringing the disciplinary mechanism into play requires certain
cognitive resources that a client may lack - including, at the very least,
knowledge that such a mechanism exists. 19 But there are more fundamental
problems that make the existing mechanism for the discipline of attorneys
illsuited - to put it mildy - to handle the typical fee dispute.
In many, if not most, cases disagreements over fees will in fact turn on
such matters as an interpretation of the parties' contractual arrangement -
the client's original understanding, for example, with respect to the basis for
billing, the services to be rendered, or the likely extent of necessary "lawyer-
ing."'20 By contrast, existing disciplinary mechanisms are based on a law
enforcement model, principally designed to deter deviant conduct and to
weed out wrongdoers from the profession. 21 The traditional focus of disci-
plinary agencies has thus been on the possible "misconduct, moral guilt, and
18. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 6, at 973. The ABA's Center for Professional Re-
sponsibility conducted a survey of disciplinary agencies in 1989 inquiring: "In how many of
your disciplinary cases are the complainants lawyers?" The average percentage estimate given
was around 7%; only two jurisdictions estimated the percentage of lawyer complainants as
high as 20%. ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDING COMM. ON
PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS, 1988 DATA 41-45
(1989) [hereinafter ABA SURVEY].
19. Of the 45 respondents in the Steele and Nimmer survey who had experienced "serious
problems" with their attorneys, not one brought the problem to the attention of the state
disciplinary system. Thirty-five did not even know of the existence of the disciplinary agency.
Even those who know of the agency's existence might well suffer from misconceptions con-
cerning, for example, the potential cost of the process to the complainant, the effect that any
complaint might have on pending legal matters for which the attorney had been retained, or
bias on the part of agency personnel. (They "are all in cahoots and they bury their own mis-
takes.") Steele & Nimmer, supra note 6, at 957, 962-63.
20. Attorneys in our survey who had experienced fee disputes over the previous five years
were asked to indicate the grounds on which the client had refused to pay, or had asked for a
reduction in, the fee. One possible ground suggested was that the client claimed that "the fee
charged was not in accordance with the fee agreement or with the understanding between the
client and your firm at the time your firm was retained." 31% of respondents answered that
clients disputing a fee "sometimes," "almost always," or "always" made such a claim. This
was by a considerable margin a higher rate than for any of the other possible grounds sug-
gested (for example, that the fee charged was not "reasonable" according to prevailing billing
standards in the community, or that the fee was excessive because of alleged deficiencies in the
quality of legal services rendered). Of course, this is self-reporting, that may lend itself to
possible tendentious characterizations by the attorneys involved. In addition, there were a
large number of miscellaneous responses that themselves suggested the presence of inadequate
communication - and perhaps inadequate self-awareness as well. For example:
"Client just didn't want to pay."
"Most of my complaints have been 'just too high' without any objective basis for the com-
plaint."
"People only remember what they want to remember and once they have no further need for
your service they come up with reasons why they should not pay an attorney .... They look
for someone to blame for their own stupidity, and the last one in line is the attorney."
"[O]ur only two real fee disputes were with individuals who were fairly irrational and unsta-
ble and I don't know they would have accepted an arbitrator's decision - they were angry at
the world and the legal system and took it out on us." Survey of the Texas Bar, supra note 7.
21. In the words of the Clark Committee [the Special Committee on Evaluation of Disci-
plinary Enforcement, whose report was formally adopted by the ABA in 1970]:
The profession's self-policing role has several purposes, including disciplining
the attorney guilty of misconduct, deterring future misconduct and protecting
the public by removing from the roll of attorneys those whose conduct has
2010 [Vol. 46
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deviance" on the part of the attorney rather than on the substandard prac-
tice of law. 22 Such an emphasis naturally tends to distort the process by
which the concerns of a client with respect to a fee are addressed. As with
most schemes of self-regulation, a substantial impetus for the traditional dis-
ciplinary model is the desire to forestall even more extensive regulation of
the profession by the state.23 The system accordingly does not even purport
to resolve particular private disputes, nor to provide redress for the client
(although it is increasingly common in some jurisdictions to see the imposi-
tion of lesser sanctions, or even a failure to prosecute, made conditional on
restitution by the attorney to the client of any excessive fee). 24 Assume, for
demonstrated that their continued practice may jeopardize the interests of cli-
ents or the public.
ABA REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
95 ANN. REP. ABA 783, 893-94 (1970) [hereinafter Clark Committee Report]; see also ABA
CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANC-
TIONS § 1.1 (1991).
22. See F. Raymond Marks & Darlene Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession:
Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 228.
23. See Clark Committee Report, supra note 21, at 805.
Unless the profession as a whole is itself prepared to initiate radical reforms
promptly, fundamental changes in the disciplinary structure, imposed by those
outside the profession, can be expected .... We will compound our own cure or
someone will mix up a dose which will curl our hair."
Id.
24. See, e.g., Toledo Bar Ass'n v. Lubitsky, 590 N.E.2d 746 (Ohio 1992) (fee claimed by
attorney "was clearly excessive based upon the limited nature of the task requested and the
minimal services performed"; attorney suspended from practice for six months "with reinstate-
ment contingent upon [his] return of $8,500 to [client]"); In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Guenther, 369 N.W.2d 700 (Wis. 1985) (fee agreement was on basis of 1% of sales
price of client's property but attorney nevertheless billed client at an hourly rate based on
inadequate time records; held, attorney suspended for one year and required to refund portion
of fees collected that exceeded the agreed percentage of sales price); Florida Bar v. Hollander,
594 So.2d 307 (Fla. 1992) (attorney agreed to a contingent one-third fee in collection case, but
later received $3,250 as a settlement of collection matter all of which he applied toward his fee;
held, attorney given a public reprimand and ordered to pay restitution of 2/3 of money re-
ceived on client's behalf); Florida Bar v. Della-Donna, 583 So.2d 307, 311 (Fla. 1989)
("Charging and collecting an excessive fee can cause harm just as converting a client's funds
can. Restitution of an excessive fee, therefore, can be ordered as a condition of readmission or
reinstatement..."). But see In re Brown, 511 N.E. 2d 1032 (Ind. 1987) (attorney charged
$5,678 for work in connection with an "extremely simple" estate valued at $2,618; held, attor-
ney publicly reprimanded but "a disciplinary proceeding cannot order [an attorney] to pay his
client a fixed amount"; the "finding that the charge was clearly excessive, hopefully, will moti-
vate [the attorney] to meet his obligations").
Even in jurisdictions where restitution may be made part of a disciplinary sanction, courts
will be reluctant to do so where the amount of the loss suffered by the client is not "ascertained
or ... readily ascertainable." See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harman, 403
N.W.2d 459 (Wis. 1987) (attorney filed suit against client to collect $9,000 but at trial court
found that under fee agreement he was only entitled to $2,850; in a later disciplinary proceed-
ing, the court refused to order attorney to reimburse client for legal fees incurred in defending
against attorney's action; an order for restitution "would convert the disciplinary proceeding
into a 'trial' on the issue of damages, something for which the disciplinary procedure is neither
designed nor fitting."). The client apparently has no right to intervene in any disciplinary
proceeding in order to seek restitution. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Guenther,
369 N.W.2d at 706-07 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
The Clark Committee Report recounts an incident in which the members of a state discipli-
nary agency concluded that an attorney who had charged $15,000 in a divorce case had ren-
dered services worth at most $3,000. The agency then offered the attorney to "take no action"
19931 2011
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example, that an attorney is hired on the basis of an hourly fee that is cus-
tomary and thus assumed to be "reasonable." The client, however, asserts
that the number of hours actually devoted to the project was surprising and
unnecessarily high. Does this commonplace scenario even pose an ethical
problem, or present a claim of a disciplinary violation? The author has
heard assertions by responsible bar officials that it does not.
Many client complaints filed with disciplinary agencies do not even lead to
formal proceedings; they are dismissed at an early stage and the underlying
contractual issues are never addressed. Only a very small number lead to the
actual imposition of sanctions. And in all probability, the rate of dismissal is
even greater in cases alleging excessive fees than in cases alleging other kinds
of misconduct. 25 As a practical matter, disciplinary action against an attor-
ney who has charged an "excessive fee" is imposed in only the most blatant
cases of abuse.26
if he was willing to reduce his fee to $3,000, warning that in the absence of such an agreement
it would file a complaint against him. See supra note 21, at 895-96; see also In re Kinghorn,
764 S.W.2d 939 (Mo. 1989) (staff counsel's offer to recommend disposition of a grievance by a
mere reprimand if attorney would refund fee to client "before sundown"). In a number of
jurisdictions claims of excessive fees may be the subject of informal mediation by the discipli-
nary agency at a preliminary screening stage, even though there appears to be no basis for a
finding of an ethical violation and the agency would therefore dismiss the complaint without
prosecution. In such cases agency personnel may "suggest that the attorney act to resolve the
grievance or... make a unilateral offer or action to produce such a resolution." See Steele &
Nimmer, supra note 6, at 983-90.
25. The 1989 survey of disciplinary systems conducted by the ABA's Center for Profes-
sional Responsibility indicated that on average, 58% of the complaints received by disciplinary
agencies survived an initial screening process and were "investigated." ABA SURVEY, supra
note 18, at 9. Public sanctions were ultimately imposed at an average rate of 2% of the total
complaints received, and private sanctions at an average rate of 2.5%. Id.; see also ABA
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 1, at 9 ("[i]n some jurisdictions up to
ninety percent of all complaints filed were summarily dismissed"). Such figures do not distin-
guish between complaints over excessive fees and other types of ethical violations. However, in
Steele and Nimmer's study of disciplinary sanctions in 17 jurisdictions, the authors did find
that a disproportionate number of the grievance cases that were not dismissed at an early
stage, but that proceeded to a formal hearing, resulted from inquiries initiated by the agency
itself, disproportionately few of the cases that survived early dismissal resulted from client
complaints. Steele & Nimmer, supra note 6, at 990-91.
During 1986, 11.9% of the complaints received by the Washington State disciplinary agency
involved an allegation of excessive fees. However, on only two occasions from 1984 through
1986 were sanctions imposed for violation of Rule 1.5(a) of the MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT. See supra note 8. This represented only 1.3% of the total number of
sanctions imposed during this period. Farrell, Discipline Statistics: Consistency and a Few Sur-
prises, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, June 1987, at 20, 21, 25. During 1992, 10.3% of disciplinary
complaints in Washington concerned fees, most of them alleging "excessive" fees; while the
state no longer categorizes sanctions according to the particular disciplinary rule involved,
state disciplinary counsel is aware of no case during the past five years in which sanctions were
imposed for "excessive" fees. WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Aug. 1993 at 35; Personal communication,
Leland G. Ripley, Chief of Disciplinary Counsel, Aug. 4, 1993. The pattern nationwide ap-
pears to be similar. According to the ABA, during 1990, violations with respect to fees consti-
tuted 5.2% of the offenses that were reported to the National Discipline Data Bank as giving
rise to the imposition of public disciplinary sanctions against attorneys. ABA, CENTER FOR
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, NATURE OF OFFENSES REPORTED TO NATIONAL DISCI-
PLINE DATA BANK IN 1990 (1991). And of these, almost all involved an offense categorized as
"failure to return fee"; the category of "overreaching, excessive fee" accounted for fewer than
1% of the sanctions. Id.
26. When discipline is imposed for an excessive fee, the penalty is rarely severe. The
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It is not hard to find explanations for the extraordinary infrequency of
disciplinary sanctions for excessive fees. We have already noted the extent
to which the bar's disciplinary process is typically an inquiry into attorney
"misconduct." And we have noted how difficult it is to be confident about
the proper valuation of legal services. In addition, it may well be true that
the organized bar may find it hard "in close cases to judge [a claimed fee] as
a disciplinary violation" since most lawyers would themselves "like to re-
ceive handsome fees," and may find the imposition of discipline for having
received too much as something like "a contradiction in terms." '27 In such
circumstances, a disciplinary body may understandably be reluctant to make
a finding of an ethical violation on the ground that an attorney's fee is "ex-
cessive" or "unreasonable." Such reluctance would be reinforced by an
awareness that any public and official finding of wrongdoing puts in jeopardy
a most valuable asset - the attorney's good reputation among colleagues
and potential users of legal services - and leaves the wrongdoer "stamped
with dishonor and disgrace."'28 In some jurisdictions, indeed, this common
reluctance to impose sanctions in fee cases may find support in the phrasing
of court rules that prohibit a finding of misconduct unless the amount of the
attorney's fee is actually "extortionate or fraudulent. '29
ABA's disciplinary standards call for suspension "when the lawyer did not mislead a client but
engages in a pattern of charging excessive or improper fees"; a single instance of charging an
excessive or improper fee typically leads to no more than a reprimand. See ABA, STANDARDS
FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, supra note 21, at 46; cf id. at 35 (lawyer who "intention-
ally overstated the number of hours he worked on a client's estate to make it appear that he
was entitled to $9,500" disbarred). See also In re Ferrucci, 580 N.Y.S.2d 806, 807-08 (N.Y.
App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 941 (1992) (lawyer's charging excessive fees was "not
simply an isolated incident of misconduct but more likely a pattern of behavior"; suspension
for six months ordered).
27. WOLFRAM, supra note 10, § 9.3 at 516.
28. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 147 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
29. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, Ch.1 app. 1-4, 1.4(a) (West 1984) (Rules Governing
Disciplinary Proceedings). We can never know whether such an apparently rigorous formula-
tion leads the Oklahoma courts and disciplinary authorities to shrink in practice from impos-
ing sanctions in fee cases to any greater degree than in other jurisdictions. It seems doubtful
that it does. See, e.g., State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Moss, 577 P.2d 1317, 1320 (Okla.
1978) (attorney charged 50% of the assets of an estate for services in connection with probate
of will and administration of estate; held, attorney suspended for 30 days; court relied on
dictionary that defined "extortionate" to mean "exorbitant" and that in turn defined "exorbi-
tant" to mean "excessive"!).
In addition, California's Rules of Professional Conduct are phrased so as to prohibit only
the charging of "an illegal or unconscionable fee" by the attorney. CALIFORNIA RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 4-200(a) (1992); Aronin v. State Bar, 801 P.2d 403 (Cal.
1991) ("A fee that 'seems high' or even one that is in fact high is not the same as an uncon-
scionable fee."); see also supra note 16. Play in the joints is reduced even further by the re-
quirement that an attorney found to have committed a "wilful violation" of this rule shall be
suspended from the practice of law for at least six months, "irrespective of mitigating circum-
stances." Wests Ann. Cal. 23, Pt. 2 (1973) (Transitional Rule of Procedure of the State Bar of
California Div. 5, Std. 2.7).
The verbal formulation for discipline used in states like Oklahoma and California appears to
be a remnant of the standard applied in many other jurisdictions in fee cases prior to the
adoption of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969. See ABA Comm. on Pro-
fessional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 27 (1930) (committee must decline to pass on any
question regarding proper fees "except in those flagrant cases where an attorney, under the
guise of charging a fee, has retained so much of the funds coming into his hands as . . .
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Of course, that the state disciplinary system is "avowedly coercive and
public-oriented, ' 30 and that the imposition of sanctions stigmatizes the at-
torney found guilty of misconduct, may have a double-edged effect on the
resolution of fee disputes. All this may make the actual imposition of public
sanctions unlikely. But at the same time no attorney threatened with a fee-
based complaint can completely ignore the existence of the bar's grievance
machinery or the possibility of formal hearings and an adverse finding: As
the ABA's Special Committee on the Resolution of Fee Disputes noted,
"Reputable attorneys have occasionally given in to preposterous demands by
clients simply to avoid involvement with the disciplinary machinery, while
less scrupulous lawyers soon learn that only fees so outrageous as to consti-
tute overreaching will be considered ... to warrant the institution of formal
disciplinary proceedings." 3 1
C. LITIGATION OVER FEES
Fee disputes may also become the subject of litigation. Unlike the griev-
ance mechanism for the discipline of attorneys, adjudication is overtly ori-
ented toward the resolution of private disputes. Lawyers sue clients to
recover fees, 32 and in adjudicating fee suits brought by lawyers, courts em-
amounts to misappropriation of funds"); see also In re Quinn, 135 A.2d 869, 872 (N.J. 1957)
(finding it "unthinkable to condemn a demand or charge as unethical merely because it ex-
ceeds another's judgment of what is fair. The touchstone is moral turpitude"); In re Greer,
380 P.2d 482, 487 (Wash. 1963) (where "ethical considerations take us from one end of the
spectrum marked 'reasonable' through categories designated successively as unreasonable, ex-
cessive, immoderate, inordinate, exorbitant, and unconscionable, we move in a direct line from
the civil arena into a disciplinary forum").
Texas has also recently adopted a restrictive and nonstandard formula for fee cases,
although one that is often derided as obscure and unworkable. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF.
CONDUCT Rule 1.04(a) (1989), Volume 3 of the Texas Government Code in title 2, subtitle G
app. (Vernon Supp. 1992). Because a standard of "reasonableness" is "too vague and uncer-
tain to be an appropriate standard in a disciplinary action," the rule prohibits only illegal or
"unconscionable" fees. Id. at cmt. I. The rule then goes on to define a fee as "unconsciona-
ble" if "a competent lawyer could not form a reasonable belief that the fee is reasonable." Id.
at 1.04(a).
30. WOLFRAM, supra note 10, § 3.5 at 138 n.77.
31. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES OF THE ABA SECTION OF
BAR ACTIVITIES, THE RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES: A REPORT AND MODEL BY LAWS 4
(1974).
32. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility suggested in EC 2-23 that
A lawyer should be zealous in his efforts to avoid controversies over fees with
clients and should attempt to resolve amicably any differences on the subject.
He should not sue a client for a fee unless necessary to prevent fraud or gross
imposition by the client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-23 (1980). Nothing similar even to
this hortatory "ethical consideration" can be found in either the 1983 Model Rules or the
Comments to those rules. See WOLFRAM, supra note 10, § 9.61 at 553 n.99; Theodore J.
Schneyer, The Model Rules and Problems of Code Interpretation and Enforcement, 1980 AM.
BAR FOUND. RES. J. 939, 944. As might be expected, it takes a fairly outrageous case before
discipline against a lawyer for instituting a collection lawsuit will even be contemplated. Such
a case is In re Wetzel, 574 P.2d 826 (Ariz. 1978), where an attorney filed "numerous lawsuits"
against clients to collect fees and "failed to exercise even minimal efforts to avoid these contro-
versies." Id. at 828. In many cases he sought punitive damages to bring his claim within the
jurisdiction of the superior court in order to force the client to "go in front of the jury" and
"teach him a lesson," even though he knew that punitive damages are not recoverable in con-
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ploy a curious and unpredictable hybrid of contract law and disciplinary
code-inspired equity. 33 Clients also sue lawyers, and whether the suit is de-
nominated as one for malpractice, fraud, or breach of contract, a substantial
number of such cases turn on claims by the client that the attorney's fee is
unwarranted.3 4
tract cases. Id. The attorney was indefinitely suspended from practice. Id. at 829. See also In
re Wetzel, 691 P.2d 1063, 1073 (Ariz. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1213 (1985) (attorney
disbarred).
33. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Scott, 777 P.2d 394 (Okla. 1989). In this case an attorney filed
suit to collect unpaid fees in excess of $140,000. The trial court reduced the fee to slightly over
$125,700, but the state supreme court found this still excessive: It reversed and remanded with
instructions to the trial court to reconsider and to apply the fee standards used in previous
cases where attorneys' fees were awarded under "prevailing party" statutes and under the
"equitable fund" doctrine. E.g., State v. City of Oklahoma City, 598 P.2d 659, 660-61 (Okla.
1979) (creation of a common fund through attorney effort; factors to be considered in award-
ing attorneys' fees are similar to guidelines of Code of Professional Responsibility). Wheeler,
777 P.2d at 396-97, 399. On remand, the trial court further reduced the fee to $75,500.
Wheeler v. Scott, 818 P.2d 475, 477 (Okla. 1991). A second appeal followed. The supreme
court held that while the number of hours on the case billed by a first-year associate was
unreasonable and should be reduced, the fee should have been calculated by using "the hourly
rate to which [the client] contractually agreed." Id. at 480. It accordingly fixed the fee at
$94,000. Id. at 482. In addition, the attorney received a statutory attorney's fee of approxi-
mately $14,000 as the prevailing party in an action to collect a debt - and a further attorney's
fee, to be determined upon a further remand, as the prevailing party on the appeal! Id. at 483;
cf McKenzie Constr., Inc. v. Maynard, 758 F.2d 97, 101 (3d Cir. 1985) (when asked to en-
force a fee contract in an adversary proceeding between attorney and former client, "the court
is not deciding whether a lawyer's conduct is unethical but whether.., it has resulted in such
an enrichment at the expense of the client that it offends a court's sense of fundamental fairness
and equity").
34. See, e.g., Coughlin v. SeRine, 507 N.E.2d 505 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). In an action by an
attorney to recover a fee, the client counterclaimed for "professional malpractice, breach of
fiduciary duty, accounting, breach of contract and fraud, in separate counts and all related to
the alleged charging by [the attorney] of excessive fees." Id. at 508. In the malpractice count,
the client alleged specifically that the attorney had "billed him for more hours than should
have been required to perform the work; and he was damaged by having paid more to [the
attorney] than should have been necessary." Id. The court held that it was error to dismiss
this count: "An attorney obviously owes his client a duty not to overcharge .... This alleged
breach, therefore, is cognizable as malpractice and actionable .... Id. at 509; see also Rodri-
guez v. Horton, 622 P.2d 261, 265 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (malpractice action; award of puni-
tive damages based in part on charging of excessive fees); cf Nolan v. Foreman, 665 F.2d 738,
743 (5th Cir. 1982) (action by client seeking return of excessive fee, and alleging that attorney
refused to return papers relating to criminal defense unless client agreed to release attorney
from malpractice liability; held, "allegations of violations of the State Bar rules, even if cast by
the plaintiff in terms of breach of contract, state a cause of action for legal malpractice in the
nature of a tort action").
One survey of attorneys suggested that 2.16% of legal malpractice claims concerned dis-
putes over fees. Werner Pfennigstorf, Types and Causes of Lawyers' Professional Liability
Claims: The Search for Facts, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 255, 272.
While this number seems small, it is identical to the percentage of malpractice claims involving
a breach of fiduciary duty, and higher than that involving trial malpractice (1.71%). Id. Al-
leged conflicts of interest accounted for 2.49% of the claims; the highest percentage involved
failure to meet procedural deadlines (11.23%). Id.
An additional cause of action of considerable power and increasing plausibility is the client's
suit under a state consumer protection or deceptive practices statute. Such statutes commonly
provide for recovery of treble damages and attorney's fees by the aggrieved "consumer." See,
e.g., Short v. Demopolis, 691 P.2d 163, 168, 170 (Wash. 1984) (client's counterclaim to attor-
ney's suit to recover fees; held, state Consumer Protection Act applies to "entrepreneurial"
aspects of legal practice including disputes over amount of fees, but not to claims of negli-
gence); Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 461 A.2d 938, 942 (Conn.
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The charge that litigation is in many cases unsuitable as a dispute resolu-
tion mechanism is well-rehearsed in the literature, which points to the cost,
delay, frustration and escalation of hostility that frequently attend the pro-
cess, to the limited range of remedies available to courts, the "binary"
(either/or) nature of court adjudication, and to its abstraction and isolation
from the interests and personal characteristics of individual disputants.35
Certainly the costs of litigation are likely to substantially deplete any recov-
ery for either the attorney or the client 36 (at least in the absence of a statute
that permits such costs to be shifted to the adversary), 37 and they may in-
deed equal or exceed the amount of the disputed fees.38 In addition, features
1983) (Unfair Trade Practices Act applies to practices such as deceptive advertising and mis-
representations as to fees by attorneys; investigative demand by Commissioner upheld). But cf
Ivey, Barnum & O'Mara v. Indian Harbor Properties, Inc., 461 A.2d 1369, 1370, 1373, 1375
(Conn. 1983) (client's counterclaim alleged that attorney was suing to collect fees which attor-
ney "knew was not due and owing"; held, statute did not apply since dispute was a "purely
private one" lacking the necessary "nexus with the public interest").
The proper amount of an attorney's fee may of course be determined by a court not only in a
suit between the attorney and an aggrieved client, but in some cases as part of the court's
responsibilities in adjudicating an underlying lawsuit. The most common examples are the
awards of attorneys' fees in probate cases, in class actions and other common fund cases, and
in cases arising under one of the many statutes specifically providing for the awards of fees to
prevailing parties. In some cases, a court may reduce an attorney's fee it considers excessive
even where the client himself has not challenged the fee. See, e.g., Snow v. Mikenas, 370
N.E.2d 1001, 1001 (Mass. 1977) (even though clients made no objection to fee, probate court
judge could inquire on his own motion into reasonableness of contingent fee arrangement and
could enjoin attorneys from receiving any fees or expenses out of distributed funds); Rosquist
v. Soo Line R.R., 692 F.2d 1107, 1111 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982) (personal injury suit brought by
father and minor children; held, the court's power to reduce attorney's fee on father's share of
judgment was "ancillary to the court's control over the children's share" and justified by the
court's inherent right to supervise members of its bar). But see United States v. Vague, 697
F.2d 805, 805, 808 (7th Cir. 1983) (criminal defense; court had no authority sua sponte to
adjourn the sentencing hearing after plea bargain and then order reduction in an "exorbitant"
fee).
35. See, e.g., JOHN S. MURRAY, ALAN S. RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN, PROCESSES OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 17-38, 49-52 (1989); THE BROOKINGS TASK
FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN
CIVIL LITIGATION 3 (1989); cf Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage
of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1808, 1820-31 (1986) (discussing the current "failure of adjudication" stemming from
the "quantitative inadequacy of adjudicative services," "procedural complexity," "substantive
uncertainty," and the "strategic infliction of waste" - but urging reform in the shape of a
"two-tier" trial system aimed at making adjudication more workable and available).
36. See Jeffrey M. Smith, The Pitfalls of Suing Clients for Fees, 69 A.B.A. J. 776, 777
(1983). Smith poses the case of a law firm's suit to recover a $15,000 fee from a client; he
posits that the fee is a reasonable one justifying a favorable judgment. Id. He then illustrates
how the net recovery is likely to be eroded by such factors as the cost of an independent
attorney to handle the suit (since "[a]ttorneys are well advised not to represent themselves in
suits against clients"), the time lost by lawyers in the firm who must work with that attorney
on the case, the additional costs of any expert witnesses, the impact of taxation on any recov-
ery, and the impact of a malpractice counterclaim on the firm's insurance deductible and on its
future insurance premiums. Id. at 777-80.
37. See Wheeler, 777 P.2d at 660-61.
38. A California statute makes fee arbitration "mandatory for an attorney if commenced
by a client," CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6200(c) (West Supp. 1991); see infra note 64. Of the
785 cases opened by the Los Angeles County arbitration program in 1990-91, the average
disputed fee (i.e., that portion of the fee claimed by the client to be excessive) was $23,938.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES, INC., FEE ARBITRATION COMMITTEE ANNUAL REPORT
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that are peculiar to fee litigation make such suits especially problematical.
The lawyer contemplating an action to recover an unpaid fee must realize
that such a suit virtually guarantees a counterclaim for malpractice - which
might take any form from the relatively commonplace allegation that the
underlying services were negligently performed, to more dramatic accusa-
tions of misbehavior. "Fee suits can be ugly affairs."'39 In addition, in many
jurisdictions an attorney who is found by the court to have committed a
serious ethical violation in the course of the representation may find that his
right to any fee whatever, whether "on the contract" or in quantum meruit,
has been forfeited. When the case is tried, then, the attorney often finds that
"the issue [is] no longer what is a fair and reasonable fee for services ren-
dered, but ... whether [the attorney] is barred from any recovery." 4° And
(1991). However, 57.3% of the cases involved disputed fees of $5,000 or less. Id. at tbl. B.
While some of these cases might have been brought in small claims court (13.9% involved
disputed fees of $1000 or less), most of them obviously represent disputes which could not
economically be litigated. Id.
The same pattern can be found in other arbitration programs. In the D.C. Bar's fee arbitra-
tion program during 1991-92, the average amount requested in client-initiated fee arbitrations
was $17,181; in attorney-initiated fee arbitrations, $4,387. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR AT-
TORNEY-CLIENT ARBITRATION BOARD 1991-92 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1992). Median
amounts requested, however, were considerably lower-2,500 in client-initiated cases and
$2,035 in attorney-initiated cases. Id. In the Tarrant County (Fort Worth) Bar Association
fee arbitration program, 115 arbitration awards were issued between 1986 and 1991; of these,
the average amount in dispute was $2,795 (personal communication, David Evans, Chairman
of Fee Arbitration Committee of the Tarrant County Bar Association). Similar conclusions
may be drawn from a nationwide survey of fee arbitration programs conducted in 1987 by
HALT (An Organization of Americans for Legal Reform). HALT, ARBITRATING LAWYER-
CLIENT FEE DISPUTES: A NATIONAL SURVEY 1 (1988) [hereinafter HALT SURVEY]. The
survey found that in more than half of the states offering statewide arbitration programs, the
average disputed fee in the arbitrations was below $2,500. Id. at 4.
39. WOLFRAM, supra note 10, § 9.61 at 554. See McDaniel v, Gile, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242,
244 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (attorney's suit to recover fee in divorce action; client's counterclaim
alleged sexual harassment and that attorney withheld legal services to gain sexual favors; held,
cause of action stated for malpractice and for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Bar-
bara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 433 (1983) (attorney's suit to recover fee in post-
divorce support case; client counterclaimed for damages sustained in pregnancy after inter-
course with attorney, who had misrepresented his infertility; held, cause of action stated for
deceit and for battery); see also 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MAL-
PRACTICE § 1.1 (3d ed. 1989):
Some insurers have recently reported that malpractice claims filed in response to
fee actions comprise approximately twenty percent of all claims against attor-
neys. Yet possibly as much as forty percent of all claims have some relationship
to how the lawyer handled the fee arrangement.
Unquestionably, a claim for legal malpractice is a deterrent to pursuing an
action for legal fees.
Id. at 6-7.
40. See Condren v. Grace, 783 F. Supp. 178, 185-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (attorney "failed to
satisfy his ethical obligations" by defending client in lawsuit while neglecting to advise him of a
potential conflict of interest due to a "festering monetary claim" arising out of their prior
business dealings; held, attorney "must forfeit his fee"). See also Financial Gen. Bankshares,
Inc. v. Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744 (D.D.C. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 768 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (attorney breached fiduciary duty to corporation by secretly supporting a group of
dissident shareholders and by secretly representing a group of Middle Eastern investors trying
to gain control of corporation; held, client corporation is relieved of duty to pay outstanding
attorney fees and entitled to refund of any fees paid, as well as punitive damages); Jackson v.
Griffith, 421 So. 2d 677, 677-78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (attorney sued client to recover fee;
trial court found that fee agreement had been induced by "coercion, duress and threats"; held,
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finally, even under the best of scenarios the public relations value of a suit by
an attorney against one of his clients is likely to be a very negative quantity.
For the client, the prospect of litigation over fees may be quite as unattrac-
tive as it is for the attorney. Even finding a local lawyer willing to handle a
suit, or to testify as an expert witness, against another attorney in a fee case
is likely to be difficult 41 - and, unless the expense can be shifted, is certain
to be costly. In addition, in any litigation between attorney and client the
client may find, to his dismay, that confidential information previously re-
vealed to the attorney has become part of the public record; under modern
codes of conduct, the attorney's ethical duty to "hold inviolate" these confi-
dences may take second place to his right to establish the amount of his
fee. 42
Given the drawbacks of these processes, it appears certain that both the
number of litigated cases appearing in the reports and the number of com-
plaints made to the bar's disciplinary agencies give a very inadequate picture
of the prevalence of fee disputes between attorney and client. When a differ-
no recovery on contract or in quantum meruit; "an attorney displaying conduct sufficient to
void an agreement in law should not be allowed to profit from his blatantly unprofessional
conduct in equity"); cf Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Gilmartin, 577 N.E.2d 350 (Ohio
1991). Gilmartin was a disciplinary proceeding rather than a private suit between an attorney
and client. The attorney, hired to assist the client in preparing a proof of loss for insurance
purposes, submitted a bill of $22,710. The court ordered a public reprimand for charging a
"clearly excessive fee" and ordered the attorney to make full restitution to the client of funds
held in a trust account, "without deduction for any attorney fees." Id. at 351. The case seems
unusual in suggesting that asking for too high a fee is itself an ethical violation that may be
sufficient to warrant the forfeiture of the attorney's entire claim to any fee, rather than of just
the "excessive" portion.
41. A formal ABA Ethics Opinion was actually required in 1935 to address the question
whether it is proper "for a lawyer to accept employment to collect a claim from, or to bring
suit against, another lawyer." The committee concluded that
[Ilt is not professionally improper for a lawyer to accept employment to compel
another lawyer to honor the just claim of a layman. On the contrary, it is highly
proper that he do so .... The honor of the profession, whose members proudly
style themselves officers of the court, must surely be sullied if its members bind
themselves by custom to refrain from enforcing just claims of laymen against
lawyers.
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 144 (1935).
See also Arthur W. Francis, Jr., How to Handle a Legal Malpractice Suit, L.A. LAW., June
1989, at 19, 20 ("[I]t should be kept in mind that the client is a person who is willing to sue a
prior attorney and would likely have no qualms about suing a second attorney."); Sterling
Hutcheson & C. M. Monroe, Actions Against Attorneys for Professional Negligence, in 14 AM.
JURY TRIALS 265, 273 (1968) ("Many mature lawyers refuse to appear, under any circum-
stances, as plaintiff's counsel in an action against another lawyer for damages for professional
negligence. They knew that such suits may disturb the amicable relations they enjoy with
other members of the bar and thus impede the disposition of other claims in which they are
involved.").
42. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1992). The text of Rule 1.6
provides that the lawyer may reveal confidential information "to the extent the lawyer reason-
ably believes necessary ... to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a contro-
versy between the lawyer and the client, . . . or to respond to allegations in any proceeding
concerning the lawyer's representation of the client." Id. The comment suggests that in doing
so, the attorney is nevertheless required to "make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary
disclosure of information relating to a representation, to limit disclosure to those having the
need to know it, and to obtain protective orders or make other arrangements minimizing the
risk of disclosure." Id. cmt. 18.
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ence of opinion arises concerning an attorney's fee, all the incentives are
either for a quick settlement or, at the end of the day, for one or the other of
the parties simply to "lump it."' 43 Our survey seems to confirm this impres-
sion. Of those firms that had experienced fee disputes over the previous five
years, 73.6 percent reported that in "all" or "most" cases they had
"reach[ed] a final agreement on the disputed fees after discussion and negoti-
ation with the client"; where a client refused to pay a fee, and negotiation
failed to resolve the dispute, 69.3 percent of respondents reported that in
"all" or "most" cases they "simply let the whole matter drop and fail[ed] to
take any further action to collect the fee." 44
43. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 124-25 (1974).
A dramatic picture of the winnowing out of private grievances before they reach the stage of
the filing of a lawsuit is provided by Miller & Sarat, supra note 13. The authors' survey of
randomly-selected households found that for every 1,000 "grievances" perceived by those
studied, "claims" were made against the adverse party in 718 cases, lawyers were consulted in
only 103, and lawsuits were filed in only 50. Id. at 544 (fig. IA). This attrition rate is likely to
be greater still in cases where "routinized, well-known, and widely available procedures" for
dealing with the particular problem do not exist, and where "popular expectations" and the
"principles governing redress" appear unsettled. Id. at 563. For example, where the grievance
involved personal injury, claims were asserted at a rate of 857 per 1000 grievances; while most
claims were routinely settled by insurance adjusters, lawyers were consulted in 116 cases and
lawsuits were filed in 38. Id. at 544 (fig. IB). By contrast, where the perceived grievance
involved discrimination, claims were asserted at a rate of only 294 per 1000 grievances, lawyers
were consulted in 29 cases, and lawsuits filed in only eight. Id.
The pattern of client claims against attorneys based on "excessive" fees is almost certainly
closer to the pattern found in discrimination cases than to that in personal injury cases; see also
Dan Coates & Steven Penrod, Social Psychology and the Emergence of Disputes, 15 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 655, 657, 659, 672 (1980-81) (identifying individual's comparison of self with
others ("relative deprivation") and sense of having control over outcome ("perceived control")
as elements influencing his decision to seek recompense for perceived injuries). In addition,
there are still other factors likely to dispose the client to "lump" any fee dispute. Even the
client who has not yet paid the demanded fee may be at a tactical disadvantage because of the
attorney's leverage in the form of the attorney's lien: The attorney may have a "retaining lien"
on the client's property (typically documents and files) that have come into the lawyer's pos-
session in the course of the representation, and may hold this property hostage until the
claimed fee is paid. See Tri-Ex Enter., Inc'. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 583 F. Supp. 1116
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying client right to copy documents but granting motion to compel pro-
duction by client's adversary in litigation; "the right to retain the papers is valuable to the
attorney in proportion as denial of access to them causes inconvenience to.the client"; "[w]here
the adversary has access to documents to which the client does not, the inconvenience to the
client is increased, thereby enhancing the value of the lien"); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 55 (retaining liens invalid) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1991). The
attorney may also have a "charging" or "judgment" lien that typically attaches to property
acquired in litigation, and that the attorney can enforce in an effort to recover his fees in
connection with the same litigation. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 10, at 558-62. Fi-
nally, consensual liens obtained by attorneys to secure payment of their fees are of course
extremely common. See Ellen J. Pollock, Divorce Lawyers Often Shortchange, Overcharge Wo-
men Clients, Study Finds, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1992, at B5; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 55 cmt. i ("Other security for attorney fees and disburse-
ments").
There is, however, no reason to believe that the pattern of fee claims brought by attorneys
against clients is dramatically different. We have already canvassed the costs, tangible and
intangible, and the risks and uncertainty, of litigation that are likely to work to discourage
claiming on the part of the attorney as well as of the client. See infra note 44 and accompany-
ing text.
44. Survey of the Texas Bar, supra note 7. 67.7% of all firms that had experienced fee
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D. TOWARDS THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE PROCESSES
The unsatisfactory nature of existing processes has led in recent years to a
number of reform proposals aimed at providing alternative forums to resolve
fee disputes. As early as 1928 the Los Angeles County Bar Association had
created a Committee on Arbitration to adjudicate fee disputes between attor-
neys and clients. The avowed "primary motive" for this and other early
reform efforts, however, was a desire to protect the bar's image - "the
avoidance of the public airing of fee disputes" that had "resulted in much
unfavorable publicity to the profession."145 Similar public relations concerns
have continued to play a part in many reform proposals coming from the
organized bar; the sense that disputes over fees are a major and continuing
source of unresolved attorney-client friction has led to calls for the creation
of private, preferably inconspicuous processes that would serve primarily to
"cool down" client discontent. In 1970, the report of the ABA's prestigious
Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement (the Clark
Committee) recommended that procedures be established for arbitrating fee
disputes; the report suggested in particular that this arbitration be conducted
"outside the organized bar" by such organizations as the American Arbitra-
tion Association. The major premise underlying this recommendation was
that, judging from local experience with fee arbitration, attorneys' fees were
"with rare exceptions" reasonable.46 It followed therefore, that arbitration
under the aegis of bar associations was "not likely to be an effective vehicle
for improving the relationship between the public and the bar"; in such cases
the client - the implication was that he would almost inevitably be unsuc-
cessful - would conclude that he had not been given a fair and open-
minded hearing, since "a group of attorneys [was] protecting one of its
disputes reported that they had "never" become involved in litigation at any stage with a client
concerning such a dispute.
While settlement remains the norm in all categories, the degree to which fee disputes are
finally resolved through negotiation still seems considerably higher in the case of larger firms
than where solo practitioners are concerned. Of firms with more than 10 attorneys, 94.4% of
those that had experienced fee disputes reported that in "all" or "most" cases they had reached
a final resolution with the client through discussion and negotiation; for solo practitioners,
however, the corresponding figure was only 70.4% (sig.=0.00). Id. This pattern might be
explained by the greater control and monitoring capabilities available to corporate clients, and
above all by the potential for continuing relationships, which may give corporate lawyers a
"powerful incentive to go the extra mile that is not present in many individual contexts."
David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 801, 826 n.109 (1992).
Some significant differences were also observed as a function of the type of practice in which
the firm was engaged. The extent to which any fee disputes were finally resolved "after discus-
sion and negotiation with the client" was significantly greater for firms that did a majority of
their work (accounting for half or more of their gross revenues) in either commercial law
(including corporate, banking, and tax) (80.7% in "all" or "most" cases), personal injury de-
fense work (80.9%), probate (84.8%), or real estate law (86.3%) than for firms doing most of
their work in other areas like criminal law (72.3%) or family law (67.6%) (in all cases sig.=
0.05 or better). Survey of the Texas Bar, supra note 7.
45. George E. Bodle, The Arbitration of Fee Disputes Between Attorneys and Clients, 38
L.A. B. BULL. 265, 265 (1963). The author was then Chairman of the County's Committee on
Arbitration.
46. Clark Committee Report, supra note 21, at 984-85.
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own." 47
Another ABA committee report, issued in 1974, was entirely devoted to
the resolution of fee disputes.48 This report also proposed that such disputes
be handled through binding arbitration, conducted by a "Committee on Res-
olution of Fee Disputes" that would be a committee of the local bar associa-
tion, but separate from the normal disciplinary mechanism. The 1974 report
addressed, as the Clark Committee had not, the critical issue of attorney
unwillingness to enter into fee arbitration initiated by the client. The report
noted that state and local bar associations that had been conducting arbitra-
tion were "experiencing more and more refusals by attorneys to submit to
arbitration of fee disputes."'49 In such circumstances, arbitration proceed-
ings could be "stopped in their tracks" simply by the attorney's refusal to
consent to arbitration, rendering the entire system "impotent." 50 And the
system would be thwarted in precisely those situations in which it was most
needed: Fee disputes are most likely to arise, the report suggested, where the
client is a one-shot player with no continuing need for legal services and
little familiarity with legal work, and where the attorney has little incentive
to "keep the client satisfied to preserve the basis for a future relationship."'5'
These were precisely the circumstances where an attorney - particularly
one "who look[s] upon the practice of law as merely a trade" 52 - would be
most likely to refuse to participate in arbitration. This shortcoming in the
system "does the profession immeasurable harm in its relationship with the
public." 53
Despite these problems arising from attorney unwillingness to consent to
fee arbitration, the 1974 committee report shrank from recommending that
attorneys actually be required to participate. The report expressed some un-
certainty as to "whether such a requirement could lawfully be imposed," '54
although there hardly seems to have been any elaborate investigation into
the legal position.55 More telling, perhaps, was the committee's conclusion
that "there was little likelihood" that mandatory arbitration could gain the
necessary support, and the suggestion that lawyers should not be "treated as
second-class citizens, barred from all recourse to the courts."'5 6 Instead, the
report proposed an ingenious if somewhat cumbersome compromise by
which the fee dispute committee could proceed ex parte in the event the
attorney refused to consent to binding arbitration.57 If after an ex parte
hearing the committee found in favor of the client, then one of the commit-
47. Id. at 985.
48. Special Committee on Resolution of Fee Disputes, The Resolution of Fee Disputes: A
Report and Model By-Laws, 1974 A.B.A. SEC. B. ACTIVITIES REP. [hereinafter Special Com-
mittee Report].
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id. at 3.
51. Id. at 1.
52. Id. at 1-2.
53. Special Committee Report, supra note 48, at 1-3.
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57, Id. at 4-6.
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tee members would bring suit against the attorney for the refund of any
excessive fees, or would defend the client against any suit brought by the
attorney, all at no charge to the client. The committee member would also
bring suit to vacate any lien asserted by the attorney on the basis of the
excessive fee. 58
In the years following these ABA reports, a large number of state and
local bar associations have set up arbitration programs to handle fee dis-
putes. 59 The rules of these programs typically provide that if both attorney
and client consent to arbitration, the decision of the arbitrators on the appro-
priate fee is final and binding, subject to challenge only on the same grounds
as other arbitration awards. 60 Almost all of the programs, however, are
voluntary. As a rule it is the client who makes the request for arbitration of
a fee dispute.61 Once he does so, a considerable amount of "jawboning"
undoubtedly takes place on the part of the bar aimed at persuading the attor-
ney to consent to the process rather than to "stop it in its tracks."' 62 But a
58. Id. The 1974 report contained a set of "model bylaws" for use by state and local bar
associations in setting up a Committee on the Resolution of Fee Disputes. See id. at 7-14. The
report does not indicate whether the committee envisaged that an ex parte arbitration award
could be used as evidence of a "reasonable" fee in the event of later litigation. The Model
Bylaws provide for the confidentiality of the arbitration records and proceedings-"[w]ith the
exception of the award itself' - but only in cases in which both client and attorney had
consented in advance to be bound by the result. Id. at 14; see also infra note 64 and accompa-
nying text (describing rules of Georgia program).
59. See, HALT SURVEY, supra note 38. The 1987 HALT survey found that the bars of 30
states offer fee arbitration statewide (as does the bar of the District of Columbia); in 14 addi-
tional states, fee arbitration is offered at the local level by at least some local bar associations.
According to HALT, fee arbitration was not offered at all in six states (Alabama, Arkansas,
Louisiana, Nebraska, South Dakota and West Virginia). Id. Since the date of the HALT
survey, the Louisiana State Bar has instituted a voluntary "Legal Fee Dispute Arbitration"
program; fee arbitration is now also conducted on a local level by some bar associations in
Alabama. See La. State Bar Ass'n, Guidelines for LSBA-Sponsored Legal Fee Dispute Arbi-
tration; Gail D. Cox, Arbitrating What Lawyers Bill: Clients Find They Sometimes Can Win
Cuts in This Increasingly Popular Forum, NAT. L.J., Apr. 8, 1991, at 1.
Earlier surveys of fee arbitration programs can be found in Paul G. George, Note, Arbitra-
tion of Attorney Fee Disputes: New Direction for Professional Responsibility, 5 UCLA-ALASKA
L. REV. 309, 315-21 (1976); James R. Devine, Mandatory Arbitration of Attorney-Client Fee
Disputes: A Concept Whose Time Has Come, 14 TOLEDO L. REV. 1205 (1983).
60. "The [petitioner] agrees to be legally bound by the Award of Arbitrators .... A court
of competent jurisdiction has the power to enter a Judgment on this award." Petition for
Arbitration of a Fee Dispute, Legal Fee Arbitration Board, Massachusetts Bar Assoc. See also
In re Pearson, 352 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Minn. 1984) (failure to abide by final and binding fee
arbitration award "constitutes professional misconduct warranting discipline").
61. For example, of the 239 cases filed in 1990 with the Oregon State Bar arbitration
program, 61% were initiated by clients and 39% by attorneys (private communication, Liz
Denecke, Administrator, Ore. State Bar Attorneys' Fee Arbitration Program). Of the 31 arbi-
tration programs surveyed in HALT's 1987 study, 29 responded that "most complaints" were
filed by the client; the other two responded that "most complaints" were filed by "both client
and lawyer" [sic]. HALT, SURVEY, supra note 38, at 4.
62. Under the Tarrant County (Fort Worth) Bar Association Fee Arbitration Rules, if an
attorney refuses to participate in arbitration, the committee chairman "shall notify the Presi-
dent of the [Bar] Association and promptly refer the matter to the Office of the General Coun-
sel of the State Bar of Texas for investigation as a potential grievance." TARRANT COUNTY
BAR ASSOCIATION FEE ARBITRATION RULES Rule 1.03. The present chairman of the com-
mittee refers to the Tarrant County scheme as "not mandatory but coercive." Of the 355
arbitration files opened in the past five years that the committee has analyzed, in only two did
the attorney both fail to settle the dispute and fail to participate in arbitration (private commu-
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continuing refusal by the attorney to participate in arbitration will in most
cases bring the arbitration process to an end.63
While there is considerable variation in the regulatory pattern, it appears
that only five states now require attorneys to submit fee disputes to binding
arbitration at the client's request.64 Nevertheless the climate has clearly
nication, David Evans, Chairman, Fee Arbitration Committee). See also Sheldon C. Toplitt,
Arbitration: Settling Fee Disputes Out of Court, DOCKET CALL, Spring 1983, at 14, 15 (Dela-
ware; where attorney fails to consent to arbitration, the chairman of the arbitration committee
"shall attempt to persuade the attorney to agree to submit in the best interests of the profes-
sion"); John Woytash, New Muscle for Fee Arbitration, BAR LEADER Mar. 1976, at 14, 16
(Orange County, California; "[i]n an effort to coax [attorney] cooperation, up to four follow-up
letters may be sent once a complaint is filed"); see also infra note 63 (rules of District of
Columbia program).
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct exhort the attorney to "conscientiously consider
submitting" to any arbitration or mediation procedure that the bar has established for the
resolution of fee disputes. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 cmt. (1992).
63. See, e.g., RULES OF THE LEGAL FEE ARBITRATION BOARD OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
BAR ASSOCIATION, Rule 9.1 ("If the Respondent fails to return the agreement [to arbitrate]
within a reasonable period of time, the petition will be dismissed.").
In the District of Columbia, the program rules provide that attorney-respondents shall be
routinely warned of the "consequences under these rules of failure to consent to arbitration."
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR, ATTORNEY-CLIENT ARBITRATION BOARD, RULES OF PROCE-
DURE FOR FEE ARBITRATION SERVICE Rule 7. These "consequences" are similar to those
proposed in the 1974 report of the ABA's Special Committee on Resolution of Fee Disputes: If
the Board determines after a preliminary investigation that the client's allegations concerning
the fee are not "frivolous," then the Board may help procure an attorney to represent the client
at no charge or a reduced charge, either to bring suit for a refund of any excessive fee paid by
the client or to defend any fee suit brought by the attorney. Id. Rules 7, 11, 13. It appears
that under these circumstances, about 65% of respondent-attorneys agree to proceed with
arbitration. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR, ATTORNEY-CLIENT ARBITRATION BOARD, AN-
NUAL REPORT, 1990-91, at 2; Fee, Malpractice Arbitrations Winning Greater Acceptance,
LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) No. 24, Jan. 2, 1991 at 431.
The HALT survey indicates that about one-third of the states with voluntary fee arbitration
programs follow a similar practice, in which the Bar will conduct an investigation and may
help the client in subsequent litigation in the event that the attorney refuses to participate.
HALT SURVEY, supra note 38, app. I.
64. Binding arbitration of fee disputes is mandatory for the attorney in Alaska, Maine,
New Jersey, South Carolina, and Wyoming. See ALASKA BAR RULES, Rule 34; MAINE BAR
RULES, Rule 9 (attorney who fails to reply to petition or to appear at hearing "shall be bound
by the findings and award of the [arbitration] panel in the same manner, and with the same
effect, as on a default judgment entered by the Superior Court"); N.J. GEN. APPLIC. RULES
Rule 1:20-4(i), 1:20A-3(a) (fee dispute arbitrated "upon a client's written request or upon
written consent to the attorney's request"; if attorney fails to comply with arbitrators' determi-
nation that he should refund fees paid by client, then attorney may be suspended from practice
of law until he does so); S.C. APP. CT. RULES, Rule 407; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.5 cmt. (1992) ("Upon application by a client ... an attorney shall submit to
the proceedings of the Resolution of Fee Disputes Board."); S.C. RESOLUTION OF FEE DIS-
PUTES BOARD Rule 9 (If client consents to be bound by results of arbitration proceedings, "the
attorney is also bound."); WYOMING RULES FOR RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES Rule 6(b) (if
client contests a charged fee within 90 days of receipt of a final billing by the attorney, "the
creditor-attorney shall participate in the proceedings and be subject to the final decision
made"). New York has recently imposed a requirement that fee disputes be resolved by arbi-
tration, "at the election of the client," in "domestic relations matters" only. See In re Amend-
ing the Disciplinary Rules of the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility (Committee
Approval of revisions to N.Y. COMp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.12(e)) (N.Y. App. Div.
1993); Jan Hoffman, New York's Chief Judge Imposes Strict Rules for Divorce Lawyers, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1993, at 1.
In addition, other states have instituted hybrid fee arbitration procedures that cannot easily
be characterized. In California, for example, a statute makes fee arbitration "mandatory for
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changed since the days when an ABA committee could conclude that "there
was little likelihood" that mandatory arbitration could generally be
adopted. 65 In 1991, the report of another ABA committee appointed to
study the lawyer disciplinary process strongly endorsed the concept of
mandatory fee arbitration, and this is certain to stimulate interest in the fu-
ture in mandatory schemes. 66
II. MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT
FEE DISPUTES
A. ARBITRATION AS A DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM
Arbitration has been used for centuries in England and in the United
States as a dispute resolution device. 67 The traditional foundation of the
process has been a voluntary agreement in which the parties undertake to
arbitrate a present dispute or to submit to arbitration a dispute that may
arise in the future.68 In the commercial sphere, arbitration has provided
an attorney if commenced by a client"; if the attorney refuses to participate, an award may be
rendered ex parte. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6200(c) (West 1991); CAL. FEE ARB. RULES
Rules 2.0, 3.0, 29.0. However, unless both parties have expressly agreed in writing that the
arbitration award is to be binding, then the award will not be binding; either party may reject it
and request a trial de novo within 30 days. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6204(a) (West 1991);
CAL. FEE ARB. RULES, Rule 6.1. The statute nevertheless creates a disincentive to a trial de
novo, by allowing the court to impose liability for the other side's attorneys' fees and costs on
the party who does not do better at trial than at arbitration. In addition, attorneys who failed
to appear at the arbitration hearing are in all cases barred from recovering any attorneys' fees
incurred at trial. CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE § 6204(d) (West 1991). Of the 692 fee arbitra-
tion cases opened by the Los Angeles County program in 1989-90, 16.3% were "mandatory
non-binding" cases, and 48.9% were closed "prior to determination of binding or non-binding
status"; the remainder were cases where both parties had agreed to be bound by the award.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES, INC., FEE ARBITRATION COMMITTEE ANNUAL REPORT I
(1990).
The Georgia program also skirts the edges of arbitration that is effectively "mandatory" on
the attorney. The rules for the program provide that attorneys who do not agree to be bound
by the arbitration award have no right to participate in the hearing; the arbitrators may never-
theless proceed ex parte, and if the client is successful, the State Bar is to provide the client
with a lawyer at no cost to represent him in subsequent litigation over the fee; see also supra
note 58. An additional "kicker" is that in such litigation, "the award rendered will be consid-
ered as prima facie evidence of the fairness of the award and the burden of proof shall shift to
the lawyer to prove otherwise." GEORGIA BAR RULES, Rule 6-502 (1990).
65. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
66. See DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 1, at 13 (Court should estab-
lish a "central intake office for the receipt of all complaints about lawyers" that would be
responsible for screening complaints and directing them to appropriate mechanism, including
mandatory arbitration of fee disputes and voluntary arbitration of lawyer malpractice claims
and other disputes); Recommendation 10 ("Procedures in lieu of discipline for minor miscon-
duct"; disciplinary counsel may reach agreement with attorney to submit matter to non-disci-
plinary proceedings, including fee arbitration).
67. See Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the Amer-
ican Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (1984); William C. Jones, Three Centuries of Commer-
cial Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193.
68. Arbitration has "flourished most in situations where parties to a contract have or
aspire to have a continuing future relationship in which they will regularly deal with each
other." In the administration of a collective bargaining agreement or in the relationship be-
tween a buyer and a seller of fabric in the textile industry,
[T]here is a history and a likelihood of continued mutual dependence by which
both parties may profit; there also exist non-legal sanctions allowing either party
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"merchants fora where mercantile disputes will be settled by merchants"; 69
in many trades or industries, it remains the predominant mechanism by
which disputes are processed. 70 In the last half century, fostered by national
labor legislation, arbitration has also become the principal method of resolv-
ing disputes between employers and unions that arise in the course of ad-
ministering collective bargaining agreements. 71  Both commercial and
collective bargaining agreements are frequently structured to allow the par-
ties to the contract to continue performance without interruption while any
dispute is being settled through arbitration.72 Particularly where the parties
are engaged in a long-term continuing relationship, arbitration has in fact
been viewed as a process enabling them to "continue and refine their bar-
gaining;"' 73 the decision by arbitrators chosen by the parties to the dispute
spells out the implications of their original bargain, gives "meaning and con-
tent" over time to their "system of self-government," '74 and helps them
achieve the resolution that they "would have achieved had they had the op-
portunity to negotiate with respect to the issues in dispute."
75
While the traditional attitude of judges towards arbitration was one of
considerable hostility, statutes enacted in most jurisdictions have completely
to withdraw from (or seek to adjust) the relationship, or at least to withhold
vital future cooperation. All this makes it easier to settle in advance on arbitra-
tion as a less disruptive method than litigation for resolving any future disputes.
MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 35, at 394.
69. Jones, supra note 67, at 219.
70. See Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 852 (1961)
(survey of prevalence of arbitration indicates that "in the case of [a trade] association reporting
that its members have an import relationship to foreign trade, deal in [fungible commodities],
and consist of merchants, the existence of arbitration machinery rises to approximately 100
percent"); Kerr, InternationalArbitration Y. Litigation, 1980 J. Bus. LAW 164, 165 (in interna-
tional commercial contracts, arbitration clauses "not only predominate but are nowadays al-
most universal" and are "virtually taken for granted"); Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co.,
Ltd., 815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1987) (widespread use of arbitration clauses in textile industry
should put contracting party "on notice that its agreement probably contains such a clause").
71. In 1981 the Department of Labor estimated that more than 96% of all collective
bargaining agreements, covering a total of almost 6.5 million workers, provided for the arbitra-
tion of employee grievances arising out of interpretation of the agreement. U.S. BUREAU
DEPT. OF LABOR, CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
112 (1981).
72. See, e.g., AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE
CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION, Doc. A201, arts. 4.34, 4.53 (1987) ("Pending final resolution
of a Claim including arbitration .... the Contractor shall proceed diligently with performance
of the Contract and the Owner shall continue to make payments in accordance with the Con-
tract Documents."); Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Major Container Co. and
the United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Cox, BOK, GORMAN & FINKIN, LABOR LAW, STAT.
SuPP. 110, 117 (11 th ed. 1991) ("In the event differences should arise between the Company
and the Union ... as to the meaning and application of this Agreement, . . . there shall be no
suspension of work by the employees on account of such differences."); cf Mann, supra note
67, at 471 n. 112 (17th century dispute between partners in shipping venture over missing bar-
rel of tar, settled by agreement to arbitrate dispute on return of vessel; "[a]greement on how
they would settle the dispute was enough to permit the voyage, which was far more important
than one barrel of tar, to continue").
73. Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 947
(1979).
74. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581
(1960).
75. Getman, supra note 73, at 929.
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reversed the common-law position on arbitration and have made executory
agreements to arbitrate enforceable. The original purpose of such statutes
was to place arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other con-
tracts."' 76 But in the past decade a series of court decisions - relying heav-
ily on the rhetoric of voluntary agreement, but undoubtedly inspired by an
interest in reducing heavy judicial case loads77 - has given such unwavering
support to the arbitration process as to virtually assure it a privileged posi-
tion in American law.78 Disputes involving statutory claims such as anti-
trust and securities fraud matters, long thought to be inappropriate for
arbitration because they implicate important "public" issues, must now be
arbitrated if the parties have so agreed. 79 At the same time, the strictly con-
tractual model of arbitration exemplified by the international commercial
76. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96,
68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 2 (1924)). The Federal Arbitration Act was enacted in 1925. 9 U.S.C.§ 1 (1988). Applying to maritime transactions and to transactions "involving commerce," the
Act makes agreements to arbitrate "enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." Id. § 2. When satisfied that the parties have agreed
to arbitrate, federal courts are instructed to order parties to arbitration and to stay any lawsuit
involving arbitrable issues. Id. §§ 3, 4. Arbitration awards are to be enforced by federal courts
and may be overturned only on very limited grounds. Id. § 10. See generally MURRAY, RAU
& SHERMAN, supra note 35, at 480-501. Statutes similar to the FAA are in force in most of the
states; a compilation appears in MARTIN DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION APP. I (rev.
ed. 1992).
77. See [then Chief Justice] Warren Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274(1982) ("neither the federal nor the state court systems are capable of handling all the burdens
placed upon them;" "arbitration should be an alternative that will complement the judicial
systems"); Wylie Indep. School Dist. v. TMC Found., Inc., 770 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1989, writ dism'd) (arbitration agreement not complying with state statute should nevertheless
be specifically enforced; the "increasing volume of litigation has forced the judicial system to
look for alternative means to dispose of mounting caseloads"). See also Harold H. Bruff, Pub-
lic Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality of Arbitration in Federal Programs, 67
TEX. L. REV. 441, 446-49 (1989).
78. The Supreme Court has held that within the ambit of the FAA, "a body of federal
substantive law of arbitrability" exists that overrides state law restricting arbitration. Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (arbitration clause in franchise agreement enforceable despite state
Franchise Investment Law requiring courts to hear claims); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483(1987) (arbitration agreement enforceable despite provision in state Labor Code preservingjudicial forum to recover unpaid wages); see also Securities Indus. Assoc. v. Connolly, 883
F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 956 (1990) (state regulations barring securities
firms from requiring customers to sign arbitration agreement as a condition to opening account
are "patently inhospitable" to arbitration and are thus invalid); Saturn Distribution Corp. v.
Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 726 (4th Cir. 1990) (state law prohibiting nonnegotiable arbitration
clauses in automobile franchise agreements is preempted by FAA; FAA "does not allow such
singular hostility to the formation of arbitration agreements").
79. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)
(arbitration of antitrust claims arising out of international commercial transaction; "[h]aving
made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it"); Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (Securities Exchange Act and RICO claims); Rodri-
guez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (Securities Act); see
also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1 I S.Ct. 1647 (1991) (claim under Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act); Hough v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 757
F. Supp. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (antitrust claim in domestic transaction). The strong federal
policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements also allows arbitration to trump
other important public interests, like "efficient dispute resolution." See, e.g., Dean Witter
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985) (compelling arbitration of pendant state-law
claims, despite the assumption that related federal law securities claims were inarbitrable and
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transaction or the collective bargaining agreement has been strained by a
growing tendency to import arbitration into contracts of adhesion; employ-
ment and franchise agreements, agreements between securities brokers and
their customers, and agreements between patients and doctors or hospitals
have also routinely come to include arbitration clauses, usually at the insis-
tence of the party in control of the printed form.80 In some cases, regulatory
legislation has actually imposed some form of "arbitration" as a mandatory
process to resolve private disputes that were not thought suitable for courts
or administrative agencies to handle.81
Compared to formal court adjudication, arbitration may often appear to
be "an inferior system of justice, structured without due process, rules of
evidence, accountability of judgment and rules of law."'82 That arbitration
thus affords a sort of "rough justice" may, however, be the trade-off for what
proponents of the process point to as arbitration's expeditious, "business-
like," expert settlement of disputes. The principal advantages claimed for
arbitration are largely advantages of efficiency. To begin with, it seems
likely that a dispute processed through arbitration will be disposed of more
quickly than if the parties had made their way through the court system to a
final judgment. 83 Arbitration tends to be a speedier process in part because
thus "the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in differ-
ent forums"). Id. at 217.
80. See MURRAY, RAU, SHERMAN, supra note 35, at 430-32, 437-447, 463-68, 517-26.
81. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(c)(l)(F)(ii) (Supp. 1992) (mandatory data-licensing
scheme by which pesticide manufacturer may utilize prior registrant's data to obtain federal
registration, but must compensate prior registrant therefor; if the two manufacturers cannot
agree on amount of compensation, either "may initiate binding arbitration proceedings,"
which are to be "final and conclusive"); see Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473
U.S. 568 (1985) (upholding arbitration scheme against constitutional challenge); PPG Indus.,
Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 637 F. Supp. 85 (D.D.C. 1986) ("Congress concluded that the EPA
lacked the requisite expertise in determining compensation."). See generally John Allison,
The Context, Properties, and Constitutionality of Nonconsensual Arbitration: A Study of Four
Systems, 1990 J. Disp. RESOL. 1. A "Model Employment Termination Act" was approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1991. MODEL EMPLOY-
MENT TERMINATION AcT, 7a U.L.A. 63 (Supp. 1992). Under this Act, an employee who has
worked for the same employer for one year or more may not be fired without "good cause";
claims for wrongful termination are to be heard by an arbitrator, who may order reinstatement
of the employee or may award up to three years' worth of severance pay. Id. § 5. See also
APPENDIX, COMMENT (the "preferred method" for enforcing statutory protection is through
the use of professional arbitrators who have the "skill, training and experience to understand
the special problems of the workplace"; placing enforcement in the hands of the civil courts
"would almost surely be the most complex, expensive, and time-consuming procedure"). Cf
Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 816 (1988) (Commodity Futures Trading Commission requires members of
commodity exchanges like the Chicago Board of Trade to submit disputes with members to
arbitration; held, arbitration requirement upheld; "by virtue of its continued membership in
the CBOT" plaintiff had "consented to arbitration"; that it "had no choice but to accept the
CBOT's rules" if it were to continue in business was irrelevant).
82. Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Industries, Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986).
83. In commercial arbitration cases administered by the American Arbitration Associa-
tion in 1992, an average of 211 days elapsed between the date a case was filed and the date of
the award. The median length of a case was only 138 days. American Arbitration Association
(private communication, Helmut Wolff, American Arbitration Association). In New Jersey's
fee arbitration program, 67% of the 1,756 fee cases disposed of in 1991 were concluded in
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it allows the parties simply to bypass any queue at the courthouse door and
to schedule hearings at their own convenience; in addition, the relative infor-
mality of arbitration means that pre-trial procedures, elaborate pleading,
motion practice, and discovery are substantially streamlined or in many
cases completely eliminated. 84 In commercial cases, arbitrators will usually
not devote time to writing reasoned opinions that explain and justify their
decisions; it is well understood that the lack of a reasoned opinion will help
to insulate an award from judicial scrutiny.8 5 And these decisions are likely
to be final: There is no process by which an aggrieved party can appeal an
award to another, higher arbitrator or panel of arbitrators; judicial review is
highly restricted and the possibility of a successful challenge extremely
slight.8 6 There is, in short, likely to be much less "lawyering" in arbitration
than in litigation. Savings in time and in pre- and post- "trial" work are
likely also to be reflected in lower expense, even allowing for the fact that the
costs of arbitration are borne by the parties themselves and (unlike litigation)
not even in part by the taxpayer.8 7
Efficiency considerations - what Marc Galanter has referred to as the
under 180 days (although 7% took longer than a year); the average age of all cases disposed of
that year was 172 days, while the median age was only 132 days. NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF
ATTORNEY ETHICS, STATE OF THE ATrORNEY DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM REPORT 115-16
(1991). In the District of Columbia the average processing time for all fee arbitration cases has
been 218 days; the median time has been 197 days. D.C. BAR, ATTORNEY-CLIENT ARBITRA-
TION BOARD, 1991-92 ANN. REP., 9; see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American
Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 460 (1988) (survey of practicing attorneys indicates that arbitra-
tion was overwhelmingly considered a speedier means of dispute resolution than either jury
trial or bench trial); see also id. at 473-77 (comparison with other studies).
84. See MURRAY, RAU, SHERMAN, supra note 35, at 555-65.
85. In fact the American Arbitration Association, which administers much commercial
arbitration in this country, actively discourages arbitrators from doing so; as the AAA's Man-
ual for Commercial Arbitrators explains, "[t]he arbitrator ... better fulfills his obligations to
the parties when his award leaves no room for attack." AAA Manual for Commercial Arbi-
trators (1985).
86. See MURRAY, RAU, SHERMAN, supra note 35, at 481-501. However, the finality of
arbitration awards may be undercut to some extent by the practice of commercial arbitrators
not to explain their decisions in written opinions. Since the actual basis of the award - a
determination of just what issues were actually resolved - may be unclear, the award's collat-
eral estoppel effect may be limited, permitting the later relitigation of issues that would proba-
bly have been barred by a judicial determination. See, e.g., Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon)
S.A.L., 637 F. Supp. 1333 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (customer initiated arbitration against broker seek-
ing to hold broker accountable for acts of its subsidiary, and arbitrators dismissed claim with-
out opinion; held, later action against the subsidiary itself was not precluded since "it is
impossible to tell" the basis for the arbitrators' award); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Arbitration
and Collateral Estoppel. Using Preclusion to Shape Procedural Choices, 63 TUL. L. REV. 29
(1988); G. Richard Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitra-
tion, 35 UCLA L. REV. 623 (1988).
87. The parties are responsible for the administrative fees of any institution (like the
AAA) that administers the arbitration, and in some cases may have to pay stenographic costs
and the costs of a hearing room. They must also pay the fees of the arbitrators themselves,
which in large and complex cases may be substantial. See Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 654 F.
Supp. 1487 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (three arbitrators were each paid $1500 per day of hearings plus
expenses, which included first-class air travel and "first-class" hotels; arbitration consumed 61
hearings over more than 4 years).
A survey of practicing attorneys found that 56.2% of respondents considered arbitration to
be more "economical" than a jury trial and 53.1% more "economical" than a bench trial; only
13.9% and 16.9%, respectively, thought it less "economical." However, attorney responses
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"cool theme" in the dispute resolution literature, emphasizing speedier and
less expensive decisionmaking88 - may predominate among the advantages
claimed for arbitration by its proponents. However, interest in arbitration
has also focused on other features of the process that, it is claimed, may
allow it to provide a higher quality of justice and superior outcomes. For
example, one important feature of most schemes of arbitration is that, unlike
litigation, the parties here are able to choose their own "judges": They are
free, therefore, to
avail themselves of decision-makers with expert knowledge of the sub-
ject matter in dispute. The arbitrator may have a similar background to
the parties, or be engaged in the same business; he is likely, then, to be
familiar with the presuppositions and understandings of the trade.
89
Use of knowledgeable arbitrators may allow the parties to avoid the
daunting task of having to educate a judge or a jury as to the content of
industry practice; it may also allow them to predict with greater confidence
the ultimate outcome of the arbitration. 90 As a general matter, the "evi-
dence from arbitration is that a single qualified lay judge is superior to six or
twelve randomly selected laymen--on reflection, a not implausible
suggestion." 91
In addition, arbitration usually takes place in private, and the result is not
a matter of public record unless it later becomes the subject of a court pro-
ceeding.92 Privacy in the process that prevents the revelation of sensitive or
indicated that arbitration was less likely to be perceived as cheaper if the case was a large one
involving more than $250,000. See Stipanowich, supra note 77, at 461-62.
88. Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases 69 JUDICA-
TURE 256 (1986); see also David Luban, The Quality of Justice, 66 DEN. U. L. REV. 381
(1989); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Inno-
vation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1991); cf Robert
Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition?: The Mediator's
Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253, 259-70 (1989) (distinguishing
different conceptions of the primary role of mediators, including "efficiency," "protection of
rights," "empowerment" and self-determination, and fostering mutual recognition and
understanding).
89. MURRAY, RAU, SHERMAN, supra note 35, at 391.
90. Arbitrators are not usually expected to "follow the law" or to treat prior arbitration
awards as having any precedential value. See id. at 401-03. In addition, the relative absence of
prehearing discovery in arbitration limits a disputant's ability to assess the quality of the oppo-
nent's case prior to the hearing. Nevertheless, lawyers experienced in arbitration tend to feel
that they are often able to predict the results of arbitration with some certainty, at least in part
because criteria of decision based on trade custom and past practice are likely to be available
and to be consistently applied. A survey of practicing attorneys found that 53% of the respon-
dents rated the predictability of arbitration as "good" or "excellent" in cases involving less
than $250,000, with only 15.5% considering it to be "poor" or "very poor"; for larger cases
involving more than $250,000, the ratings were 48.7% and 17.9% respectively. See Stipa-
nowich, supra note 83, at 457; cf Robert L. Bonn, The Predictability of Nonlegalistic Adjudica-
tion, 6 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 563, 571 (1972) (lawyers with extensive experience in commercial
arbitration replied "without hesitation that the decision of an arbitrator was by far the 'most
predictable,' that a judge's decision was 'predictable at some but not all times,' and a jury's
decision was 'virtually one of pure chance' "; however, this may be the result of a careful
prescreening of cases conducted by sellers before choosing to pursue arbitration).
91. William M. Landes & Richard H. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEG.
STUD. 235, 252 (1979).
92. The fee arbitration survey conducted by HALT in 1987 reported that the proceedings
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embarrassing material about the dispute may well be attractive to both par-
ties, minimizing unfavorable publicity for the attorney and the revelation of
confidential and privileged information of the client. 93 For all of these rea-
sons, then, attorneys have frequently found it desirable to insert pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in their agreements with clients, binding both attorney
and client to submit any later disputes over fees - and, sometimes over
malpractice claims to as well - arbitration.94
On the other hand, further claims for arbitration that advance a "warm"
theme - for example, claims that the privacy and "informality" of the pro-
cess may help to lessen the adversarial conflict and heightened antagonism
that frequently accompany litigation - seem considerably more speculative.
It is certainly plausible to suggest that the absence of the jury, of courtroom
ritual, and of the procedural jockeying that accompany pre-trial practice, all
can "make parties more comfortable and reduce enmity and disaffection
costs."'95 But in an extreme form, such claims can amount to little more
than wishful thinking - as in the frequent suggestion that the "non-adver-
sary atmosphere" of arbitration may permit the relationship between the
parties to continue after the dispute is settled. 96 One factoid that is troubling
and case documents were kept confidential in all of the states with statewide arbitration pro-
grams; the arbitration awards themselves were kept confidential in only about half of the pro-
grams. See HALT SURVEY, supra note 38. See, e.g., South Carolina Resolution of Fee
Disputes Board, Rule 19 ("all proceedings" confidential, except that the panel's decision "may
be summarized in a complaint" filed in order to enforce the award); CAL. FEE ARB. RULES
Rule 25.3 ("arbitration award is public; the arbitration case file ... remains confidential"); KY.
Sup. CT. RULES, Rule 3.810(8) ("With the exception of the award itself all records, docu-
ments, files, proceedings and hearings pertaining to arbitration of any fee dispute ... shall not
be open to the public."); see also Courier Journal & Louisville Times v. O'Bannon, 2 ADR
Rep. BNA 323 (Ky. App. 1988) (lawyer sought declaratory judgment that arbitration award
against him should not be made public; held, court had no authority to seal arbitration award).
The HALT data may now be somewhat outdated. Cf FLORIDA BAR RULES Rule 14-5.1
("All records, documents, files, proceedings and hearings ... shall be made available, upon
inquiry, to anyone."); WYOMING RULES FOR RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES Rule 18 (With
the exception of alleged ethical violations referred to a grievance committee, "no confidential-
ity exists in the resolution of fee disputes.").
93. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
95. Robert Baruch Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice:
Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 893, 1006 n.251. But see id. at
992-94 (arbitration may lessen the likelihood of hostility because there are fewer opportunities
for direct party confrontation; however, this reduces enmity only through the effect of party
"insulation" - i.e., limiting the number and intensity of party coritacts - rather than through
"interparty translation" - i.e., facilitating mutual recognition, understanding, and sympathy).
96. See George, supra note 59, at 319, 338. This student comment asserts in addition that
the often-noted tendency of arbitrators to "split the difference" between the claims of the dis-
putants is a sign of "flexibility" that allows "the parties to arbitration [to] approach their
attempts to persuade from a 'reasonable compromise of differences' approach rather than an
'all or nothing' (zero sum) approach." Id. at 338 n. 183. This, however, seems naive. For one
thing, if arbitrators do indeed tend to "split the baby" in their decisions, such a propensity is
hardly likely to dampen adversarial advocacy; on the contrary, it is likely to drive the parties
further apart, as each attempts to stake out an extreme position from which the arbitrators can
move to a compromise favorable to him. See MURRAY, RAU, SHERMAN, supra note 35, at
591-92 (describing the rationale for "final-offer arbitration"). This arbitral propensity is also
unlikely to contribute to the maintenance of future relations between the parties; on the con-
trary, in such areas as labor arbitration the tendency to give "a little bit to each side" may
instead be the effect of a stable collective bargaining system, in which parties of "rough equal-
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for such a thesis is that it appears parties rarely do continue to deal with
each other following an arbitration.97 Of course, such a failure to resume a
business relationship does not necessarily mean that arbitration is as "lethal
to continuing relations" as litigation,9" and one need not conclude from it
that the end of the relationship is attributable to the arbitration process.
That relations are rarely resumed after arbitration could instead be the result
of a process of advance screening: It would be natural to prefer the less
disruptive processes of negotiation and settlement for more valued partners,
and to neglect those processes when disputes arise with marginal firms or
those who were not in any event serious future business prospects.99
Of course, attributes of arbitration that in the abstract appear to make it a
superior dispute resolution mechanism may in fact turn out to be either a
blessing or a curse, depending upon the tactical position of the party con-
cerned. Rapid resolution of a dispute may well benefit everyone. Neverthe-
less, the party against whom a claim is being asserted will probably find that
there are offsetting advantages in delaying the ultimate reckoning. In addi-
tion, the larger of the disputants may well prefer to exploit the fact that its
smaller opponent does not have the financial resources for an extended
struggle. A party for whom the stakes and risk of loss are high may for that
reason become less interested in "informality," and more reluctant to chance
a decision without having taken every possible advantage of the full pano-
poly of legal procedures available to him - including the ability, with an
appeal, to play out his hand to the bitter end. °0 Similarly, a party who is
aware that his case is a weak one may not always find a knowledgeable arbi-
ter to be desirable; he may prefer instead to take his chances with a decision
maker who is somewhat less expert and considerably more malleable. 01
ity," locked in to a long-term relationship, resort to arbitration to help them "achieve the
results of successful negotiation." See Getman, supra note 73, at 928-33; PHILIP SPERBER,
ATTORNEY'S PRACTICE GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS 349 (1985); Lester Brickman, Attorney-
Client Fee Arbitration: A Dissenting View, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 277, 278.
97. In a survey of textile disputes arbitrated through the AAA, one author found that of
78 cases, "business relations were resumed" following the arbitration in only 14. Robert L.
Bonn, Arbitration: An Alternative System for Handling Contract Related Disputes, 17 ADMIN.
Sci. Q. 254, 262 (1972).
98. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 4, 25 n.117 (1983).
99. See Bonn, supra note 90, at 574 (sellers in textile disputes carefully screen or preselect
cases they take to arbitration, pursuing arbitration primarily against "buyers who are marginal
firms or who have weak or specious claims," and settling disputes with buyers who had a
strong case or who were good future business prospects).
Similar patterns may be found in fee disputes between attorneys and clients. See infra note
228 and accompanying text.
100. It is revealing in this respect that a recent survey of practice in patent disputes sug-
gests that corporations "overwhelmingly favor arbitration for disputes involving smaller
stakes," but that "only a very small percentage prefer arbitration where the risks exceed six
figures." Wesley & Peterson, Patent Arbitration, 4 ADR Rep. (BNA) no. 2 at 30 (1990).
101. This has in fact been suggested by the General Counsel of Refac Technology Develop-
ment Corporation, who has written this about his company's patent litigation strategy:
[I]f patent validity or infringement is questionable, why take a chance with an
arbitration expert who will know exactly how weak the patent is and how dubi-
ous infringement is? It makes sense to take one's chance with a judge inexperi-
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Parties who are not themselves established members of a trade may be reluc-
tant to confide the dispute to a process relying on decisionmakers who are
"insiders," and who are therefore likely to share the preconceptions and val-
ues of their adversary.
B. MAKING THE CASE FOR MANDATORY ARBITRATION
As we have seen, the prevalence and intractability of fee disputes between
attorneys and clients have led many jurisdictions to create arbitration mech-
anisms to hear such disputes, and led some jurisdictions to impose upon
attorneys an obligation to participate in the process. We are often reminded,
however, that historically the primary success of arbitration has come in
resolving disputes that arise in the course of ongoing contractual relation-
ships, between parties of roughly equal bargaining power; we are told that it
would therefore be a facile error to assume that these successes can be repli-
cated merely by importing wholesale into other contexts the surface features
that appear to distinguish an "arbitration" mechanism. 10 2 In particular,
when arbitration is imposed by law on parties in discrete transactions, it may
be thought to be somehow at odds with "the concept of voluntary arbitra-
tion" for which "valid contract formation" is required.103
All this may be true but seems curiously beside the point. Mandatory
arbitration may indeed not benefit from the dynamic of self-government that
often makes labor and commercial arbitration an extension of the parties'
own negotiations. It may indeed lack the legitimacy of processes founded on
consent, in which an arbitrator chosen and paid by the parties is charged
with interpreting substantive standards laid down by them in their agree-
ment, in accordance with procedures to which they have also consented.
enced in the technical and legal aspects involved. If the infringer is much bigger
than the patentee or an entire industry has copied the patent, a jury trial would
be much more beneficial than arbitration because of the sympathy and deep-
pocket doctrine that can be played to the hilt.
Philip Sperber, Overlooked Negotiating Tools, 20 LEs NOUVELLES 81 (June 1985).
Similar tactical considerations might counsel that a party challenging an excessive legal fee
would, all else being equal, prefer to rely on a jury's "gut reaction" that the fee is probably
"too high" instead of a determination by experts aware of the many considerations that enter
into fixing attorneys' fees. See George, supra note 59, at 319.
102. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text; see also Getman, supra note 73.
Getman suggests that the widespread success of labor arbitration is largely attributable to the
existence of collective bargaining between management and unions that have a "significant,
almost equivalent, voice in establishing the ground rules of industrial life." Getman, supra
note 73, at 946. He argues that this collective bargaining process tends to ensure the selection
of arbitrators whose awards will carefully respect the parties' own priorities in order to main-
tain the arbitrators' future acceptability; it also tends to ensure that awards are unchallenged
and obeyed due to "the feeling that awards are likely to be equalized over the long run and that
erroneous awards can be dealt with through negotiation." Id. at 922-23. The much-criticized
practice in labor arbitration of compromise awards may actually be a reflection of the fact that
labor awards are shaped so as to accomplish these goals of responsiveness and finality. It
follows, then, according to Getman, that the labor analogy may be inapposite when brought in
to urge the use of arbitration in such different contexts as prison disputes or disputes between
attorneys and clients. Id. at 938-46. See also Mann, supra note 67, at 444 n.4 ("To impose an
arbitration process without reference to an existing community ignores the relationship be-
tween arbitration and community and dooms the experiment to failure.").
103. George, Note, supra note 59, at 350.
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Mandatory arbitration is, instead, simply a form of economic or professional
regulation.
One sees this point clearly if one considers the many state statutes requir-
ing arbitration of "interest" disputes in public employment. 10 4 Public em-
ployees are for obvious reasons usually forbidden to engage in strikes; the
tests of economic strength used in the private sector to determine contract
terms after a bargaining impasse are therefore limited in the public interest.
When a police union and a municipality cannot agree on the terms of a new
collective bargaining agreement, statutes may instead give either party the
right to submit "any and all unresolved issues" to "arbitration." 10 5 The
award, usually subject to limited judicial review, determines what the future
terms and conditions of employment shall be. The decisionmakers are not
formally state employees, but are private individuals chosen by the parties
themselves; some statutes specifically envisage that if the parties themselves
cannot agree, private organizations like the American Arbitration Associa-
tion will select the arbitrators. 0 6 When the inevitable constitutional objec-
tions to such schemes are raised, for example on grounds of improper
delegation of legislative or political power, they are often bypassed by the
simple device of characterizing the arbitrators as "public officers" rather
than as mere "private persons": The arbitration panel must be considered
an "administrative or governmental agency" after all, since it had been
granted "a portion of the sovereign and legislative power of the govern-
ment." 10 7 Of course, such a transparent semantic ploy hardly deals with the
critical problem-that private decisionmakers, insulated from the political
process, are being charged with determining sensitive issues implicating the
level of public services or the use of public money.' 08 But in any event it is
clear enough that these arbitrators are in fact exercising governmental func-
tions in the regulation of public employment; one may be hard put to distin-
guish such an "arbitration" panel from a specialized tribunal or "public"
agency created to administer a public regulatory scheme and funded out of
104. See MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 35, at 403-09, 587-90.
105. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.2-1 (Supp. 1992) (Policemen's Arbitration Act); see
also id. § 28-9.1-1 (firefighters); id. § 28-9.3-1 (public school teachers); id. § 28-9.4-1 (other
municipal employees); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-16 (West 1988) (police and fire depart-
ments); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-473c (1991) (municipal employees); Cf TEX. REV. CiV.
STAT. ANN. art. 5154c-1 § 10(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (Fire and Police Employee Relations
Act; although "the policy of this Act favors and encourages the parties to elect voluntary
arbitration, nothing contained herein shall be deemed a requirement for compulsory
arbitration").
106. E.g., WASH REV. CODE § 41.56.450 (1991) (uniformed personnel); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 28-9.3-10 (1991) (public school teachers); cf id. § 28-9.2-8 (policemen; where parties cannot
agree, arbitrator selected by chief justice of state supreme court).
107. City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 256 A 2d 206, 219 (R.I. 1969);
see also WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.452 (1991) (interest arbitration panel "exercises a state
function and is, for the purposes of this chapter, a state agency").
108. See Clyde W. Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Deci-
sionmaking, 44 U. CINN. L. REV. 669 (1975); see also HARRY H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K.
WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 23 (1971); Joseph R. Grodin, Political Aspects of




By the same token it might be thought desirable to entrust the regulation
of certain private disputes to decisionmakers called "arbitrators" rather than
to small claims courts, administrative agencies, or other specialized tribu-
nals. " 0 Whether fee disputes between attorney and client should be diverted
to arbitration requires an exercise of judgment with respect to familiar con-
cerns, usually thought appropriate in discriminating among different forums
- concerns with respect to expense, expeditiousness and other, intangible
costs of disputing; the neutrality and competence of the decisionmakers; and
the creation of "both internal incentives and outside supervision [to] con-
form ... decisions to the public interest."'I Such considerations may jus-
tify a form of "arbitration" even though the process may not benefit from
the legitimacy of time-honored models.
The variety of local experiments across the country with fee arbitration
has naturally led to different patterns of dispute resolution and to different
rates of success. In some cases the local bar may be small and relatively
collegial, and a local fee arbitration program may benefit from an energetic
committee chairman who is not reluctant to pursue recalcitrant attorneys:
In such circumstances one would not be surprised to find that lawyers rarely
decline to participate in arbitration, and anecdotal evidence suggests in fact
that this tends to be true. A high rate of attorney participation may be rein-
forced both with sticks (such as a threat to refer cases of non-participation to
bar counsel "for investigation as a potential grievance, ' 12 or a threat to
provide another lawyer to represent the client at no charge in subsequent
109. See Getman, supra note 73, at 933, 938, 946 n.119; Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric.
Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 600-01 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (Although dispute over
compensation for use of pesticide data "ultimately involves a determination of the duty owed
one private party by another, at its heart the dispute involves the exercise of authority by a
Federal Government arbitrator in the course of administration of [the statute's] comprehensive
regulatory scheme. As such it partakes of the characteristics of a standard agency adjudica-
tion.").
One might well ask in what significant way "interest" arbitration of public-sector employ-
ment disputes differs from a scheme such as Nebraska's in which responsibility for such dis-
putes is allocated to a state Commission of Industrial Relations, consisting of five "judges"
named for six-year terms by the Governor with the advice and consent of the legislature. The
statute stipulates that such "judges" are to be appointed "because of their experience and
knowledge in legal, financial, labor and industrial matters," see id. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-
801, 803-806, (1988), and that they are to be paid $180 for each day spent in performing their
duties, plus travelling expenses. Commission orders are binding and of the same force and
effect as orders issued by state courts. Id. at § 48-819.
110. See, e.g., MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 81, at spp. Cmt. (ar-
bitration is the "preferred method" for resolving wrongful discharge cases). But some of the
same functions performed by arbitrators could conceivably be entrusted to specialized courts;
courts might, for example, be created to handle business litigation, taking such matters as
shareholder lawsuits, takeovers and trade secret cases out of the general civil courts. See
Christi Harlan, Massachusetts Bill Seeks Courts for Business, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1988, at B6.
The chairman of the corporate law committee of the Boston Bar Association claimed that a
proposal for such specialized courts "would help speed action on the business cases and place
them in the hands of judges who have expertise in business law." Id.
111. Harold H. Bruff, Public Programs, Private Deciders. The Constitutionality of Arbitra-
tion in Federal Programs, 67 TEX. L. REv. 441, 463 (1989).
112. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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litigation),1 3 or with carrots. The chairman of at least one local arbitration
committee regularly represents to attorneys that if they agree to participate,
any potential claim for malpractice would necessarily be waived by the client
- although of course the written submission to arbitrate does not so
provide. 114
In other situations, however, the rate of attrition from complaint to hear-
ing may be substantial. One can only speculate as to the many possible ex-
planations for such attrition. Undoubtedly, the attorney and client
themselves will frequently arrive at a negotiated settlement of the fee dis-
pute, and this may occur after as well as before a demand for arbitration is
filed with a bar arbitration program." 15 We know, however, that in many
cases the term "settlement" can only be a euphemism, used to flatter out-
comes that hardly partake of the usual justifications for private ordering: It
is likely, for example, that much attrition can be accounted for by clients
who, having filed an initial complaint with a bar arbitration program, ulti-
mately become discouraged and abandon the process as futile when they find
out more about it. They may assume, perhaps, that a panel dominated by
attorneys will not be completely evenhanded. Or they may assume, on the
other hand, that an attorney who has charged an "excessive" fee will never
agree to participate in arbitration anyway if the program is a voluntary one
and he is not required to do so."l 6 And indeed perhaps the most common
cause of attrition is that either attorney or client simply refuses to participate
in arbitration when the other party has requested it.' 17 Cases where attor-
neys reject the notion of arbitration may not, perhaps, coincide perfectly
with the universe of cases in which attorneys are most conscious of having
charged a fee that would be perceived as clearly excessive. However, it
would not seem wildly speculative to suggest that there is considerable over-
113. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
114. Such a representation is not necessarily disingenuous: To be fair, it may be a some-
what awkward - and highly inaccurate - attempt to invoke the potential collateral estoppel
effects of an arbitration award favorable to the attorney. See infra note 159 and accompanying
text.
115. Cf supra note 44 and accompanying text.
116. In the Illinois arbitration program, "more than half the clients who complain about
their bills give up after reading materials [the] bar provides." Cox, supra note 59, at 30. Cli-
ents "look at the brochure and say, 'No attorney would agree to this.' " Id.
117. From 1986 through 1990, 3,714 petitions for arbitration were requested from the Ore-
gon State Bar's fee arbitration program. Petitions were actually filed with the program in
1,158 cases (that is, in only 31 percent of the cases did a request for a petition lead to the
formal initiation of proceedings). And in only 400 cases did the process continue to a hearing
and the rendering of an award (that is, in only 35 percent of the cases in which the arbitration
mechanism had been set in motion did an arbitration actually take place). Figures are not
available to explain precisely why the process aborted in all these cases. Statistics do indicate,
however, that of all the cases in which arbitration was formally initiated under the Oregon
program during 1991, 25 percent were aborted because the attorney-respondent either failed to
respond or expressly declined to participate; 27 percent were aborted because the client either
failed to respond or declined to participate. (private communication, Liz Denecke, Adminis-
trator, Ore. State Bar Attorneys' Fee Arbitration Program); see also DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BAR, ATrORNEY-CLIENT ARBITRATION BOARD ANN. REP., 1990-91 at 4 n.55 ("Clients are
significantly more likely to consent to arbitrate lawyer-initiated fee disputes than lawyers are
likely to consent to client-initiated fee disputes.") In the District of Columbia program, about
65% of attorney-respondents agree to proceed with arbitration. Id. at 2.
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lap between the two categories.1 18
Proposals for the mandatory arbitration of fee disputes are frequently met
with objections grounded in provisions of the federal or state constitutions.
Of course, no state arbitration program purports to bind a client unwilling to
engage in the process, and in the absence of an arbitration provision in the
original attorney-client agreement, there would appear to be no way to do
so." 19 It is sometimes asserted, however, that obligating an attorney to par-
ticipate in arbitration would implicate in some way the attorney's rights to
due process, to equal protection, to a trial by jury, or to access to the judicial
system. Constitutional challenges to mandatory arbitration programs may
not be actually disingenuous. It is not too much to suggest, however, that
these arguments tend to function largely as makeweights, disguising or ratio-
nalizing a simple reluctance to submit to the process. And it is not surpris-
ing that when pressed, such challenges have universally been rebuffed.
The overarching element in any constitutional analysis must be the tradi-
tional supervision of the legal profession by the state judiciary. The author-
ity of a state's supreme court over "admission to the bar and the conduct of
its members" may be written into the state constitution; 120 even in the ab-
sence of such an explicit provision, however, it is routinely asserted as part of
the "inherent powers" of the judiciary, "necessary and incidental to the
court for its own protection, to secure the proper administration of justice, to
maintain the prestige of the profession for integrity, to conserve the public
good and to protect clients from malpractice attended with fraud and cor-
ruption."' 2' This judicial authority has been the basis for a pervasive regula-
tion of the profession, even in contexts outside the conduct of litigation - as
a practical matter, of course, largely "self-regulation" through extensive del-
118. See supra notes 48-53 (discussing the ABA's Special Committee on Resolution of Fee
Disputes, 1974); see also Cox, supra note 59, at 31 (recounting experience of coordinator of
Wisconsin's fee dispute committee; "[o]ne case now pending involves an attorney who won a
$23,000 settlement and then charged his client $20,000 . . . and there is no chance he will
participate").
119. The Wyoming Rules for Resolution of Fee Disputes do require - in a rather high-
handed manner - that where an attorney files a petition seeking arbitration to collect an
unpaid fee, the client must move to dismiss the petition within 15 days; the client's failure to
do so "shall constitute an irrevocable election by the client to be subject to the jurisdiction of
the Committee [on Resolution of Fee Disputes] and any proceeding [thereunder]." WYOMING
RULES FOR RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES Rule 6(e). The authority for such a rule has
apparently never been tested.
120. MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2(3); see also N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, 3 (jurisdiction of
supreme court "over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons
admitted").
121. State ex rel. McCormick v. Winton, 5 P. 337, 339 (Or. 1884); see also Board of Over-
seers of the Bar v. Lee, 422 A.2d 998 (Me. 1980) (the "power to define and regulate the prac-
tice of law naturally and logically belongs to the judicial department"; the "inherent power"
of the supreme court to regulate the conduct of attorneys thus derives from the "concept of
separation of powers"); Anderson v. Elliott, 555 A.2d 1042 (Me. 1989) (upholding mandatory
arbitration program, which "comes within the court's constitutional authority to regulate the
attorney-client relationship"); see generally Joseph D. Robertson & John W. Buehler, The Sep-
aration of Powers and the Regulation of the Practice of Law in Oregon, 13 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 273 (1977); WOLFRAM, supra note 10, at § 2.2 ("Inherent Powers of Courts to Regulate
Lawyers").
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egation to the organized bar. 122 It is taken for granted not only with respect
to such matters as admission to the profession and discipline for misconduct,
but equally in contexts for which there exist close common-law analogues,
such as the policing of the terms of client contracts. When a court asserts
the authority (sometimes on its own initiative) to reduce the fees charged by
an attorney in a case before it, it does so not only in its role as an adjudicator
of litigated disputes, but in exercise of its "inherent powers" to supervise the
profession.' 23 Mandating an alternative forum in which disputes over fees
can be heard and resolved is little more than a variant on that exercise of
authority. 124
Against that backdrop, the constitutional concerns occasionally expressed
with respect to mandatory arbitration of fee disputes hardly appear to be
substantial. It certainly should not be difficult to design a fee arbitration
program in such a way as to satisfy minimal requirements of due process, 125
and challenges by attorneys on due process grounds are likely therefore to
border on the frivolous. 126 Challenges based on other constitutional provi-
122. Wolfram writes that the supervision by courts of the organized bar is most often exer-
cised "in a passive and reactive capacity," in which courts "serve as the largely passive sound-
ing boards and official approvers or disapprovers of initiatives that are taken by lawyers
operating through bar associations." WOLFRAM, supra note 10, at 37, 33-34. One can of
course find movement in a number of jurisdictions toward more direct judicial supervision, in
the form of a court-appointed bureaucracy, see DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra
note 1 at 19-20; "ABA Adopts Lawyer Discipline Model But Resists Call for Greater Open-
ness," 60 U.S.L.W. 2490, 2491 (Feb. 11, 1992).
123. See supra note 34; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Brower, 368 N.E.2d 1240 (1977) (court-
promulgated directive that on the entry of default judgment, attorneys' fees are to be awarded
on quantum meruit basis rather than on the basis of any formula in agreement between credi-
tor and debtor; directive upheld given the "traditional authority of the courts to supervise the
charging of fees for legal services under the courts' inherent and statutory power to regulate
the practice of law"); Gair v. Peck, 160 N.E.2d 43 (N.Y. 1959) (court has power to adopt a
rule setting forth a "schedule of reasonable fees" and method of computation of contingent
fees in personal injury and wrongful death cases; the "idea is frivolous that disciplinary power
over attorneys is unrelated to the exaction of excessive fees"); American Trial Lawyers Ass'n
v. N.J. Supreme Court, 316 A.2d 19 (N.J. 1974) ("[T]he power so vested in the Supreme Court
to regulate the practice of the law includes the power to adopt a reasonable rule establishing
the outer limits of permissible contingent fees in tort litigation.").
124. See In re Livolsi, 428 A.2d 1268 (N.J. 1981) (upholding state mandatory fee arbitra-
tion program; if the supreme court "has the authority to control the substance of the fee rela-
tionship, then a power of a lesser magnitude determining the procedure for resolving fee
disputes must also be within our province"); Anderson v. Elliott, 555 A. 2d, at 1050 (The
"overriding responsibility and authority of the Supreme Judicial Court to superintend that
professional relationship [between attorney and client] is a complete answer to the constitu-
tional challenge to Maine's client-initiated fee arbitration."); see also W. Perry Brandt et al.,
Special Project, Recent Developments in Attorneys'Fees, 29 VAND. L. REV. 685, 710-18 (1976)
(maximum contingent fees by court rule).
125. E.g., ALASKA BAR RULES Rule 40(f) (at hearing, both parties have right to be repre-
sented by counsel; to present, examine, and cross-examine witnesses; to present documentary
evidence and to have subpoenas issued; to challenge arbitrators for cause and to make one
peremptory challenge; and to have hearing recorded). "[A]ny relevant evidence will be admit-
ted if it is the sort of evidence on which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the
conduct of serious affairs." Id. Rule 40(n). Arbitrators are to make written findings "on all
issues and questions submitted which are necessary to resolve the dispute." Id. Rule 40(q).
Awards may be vacated on the grounds set out in the Uniform Arbitration Act. Id. Rule
40(u).
126. Existing mandatory arbitration programs have regularly been held to provide attor-
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sions are likely to appear more trivial still. It seems difficult to argue, for
example, that mandatory arbitration denies attorneys the "equal protection"
of the laws: Attorneys, at least outside the realm of popular humor, hardly
appear to be a "suspect class" as the term is used to draw attention to race-
and gender-based classifications; a rational basis for close regulation of attor-
neys' contracts can readily be found once one acknowledges the court's per-
vasive interest in the attorney-client relationship and the absence of
alternative remedies readily available to the client.127 And the claim that
neys with the "some form of hearing" required by due process jurisprudence. Guralnick v.
Supreme Court of New Jersey, 747 F. Supp. 1109 (D.N.J. 1990), aftd, 961 F.2d 209 (3d Cir.
1992). See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). It could not seriously be argued
that an attorney's due process rights incorporate the motion practice, discovery, rules of evi-
dence and written reasoned opinions that distinguish litigation from the informality that is the
hallmark of arbitration procedure. See generally Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glid-
den, 284 U.S. 151 (1931) (mandatory arbitration of amount of loss in fire insurance cases; held
prospect of "speedy determination" and resort to "expert knowledge" support state's choice to
require "a more summary method of determining the amount of the loss than that afforded by
traditional forms"; 14th Amendment is satisfied "if the substitute remedy is substantial and
efficient"); Country-Wide Ins. Co. v. Harnett, 426 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (mandatory
arbitration under state "no fault" insurance law; "arbitration is a reasonable alternative to a
judicial determination of insurance claims"; the "process afforded plaintiff clearly passes con-
stitutional muster"). See generally Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution
Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues, 68 ORE. L. REV. 487, 534-40 (1989).
127. See Guralnick, 747 F. Supp. at 1114-16. Does mandatory arbitration somehow "im-
pair the obligation of contracts"? The Guralnick court noted that fee arbitration at the client's
request does not change the "terms of the contract" but merely "dictates the forum in which
disputes regarding the attorney's fee may be adjudicated"-This rhetorical move that has been
so often repeated as to become almost unimpeachable doctrine. Id. at 1115. See Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229-30 (1987) (arbitration agreement
between broker and customer does not amount to impermissible waiver of substantive provi-
sions of Exchange Act; by agreeing to arbitrate the client did "not forego the substantive rights
afforded by the statute ... [but merely submitted] to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than
a judicial, forum"); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
481-83 (1989). An increasing judicial tendency to presume arbitral competence even as to
statutory or "public policy" matters has increasingly undercut the force of earlier cautionary
notes to the effect that "the choice of forums inevitably affects the scope of the substantive
right to be vindicated." U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 359-60 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
A common provision in state constitutions guarantees the "right of access" to courts. See,
e.g., TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13 ("All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done
him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.").
Such provisions are apparently derived from Magna Charta. But however ancient and estima-
ble the sentiment, they can hardly be read to require the freezing of all common-law actions in
their traditional form; "reasonable substitutes" may be crafted for any common-law claim, and
remedies reshaped or restricted accordingly. See Davidson v. Rogers, 574 P.2d 624 (Or. 1978)
(statute prohibited recovery of general damages for defamation unless defamation was inten-
tional or defendant refused to publish retraction when requested to do so; held, statute is valid
because, "while restricting the remedy.... it does not wholly deny the injured party a remedy
for the wrong suffered"); Donald B. Brenner, Note, The Right of Access to Civil Courts Under
State Constitutional Law: An Impediment to Modern Reforms as a Receptacle of Important
Substantive and Procedural Rights?, 13 RUTGERS L. J. 399, 413 (1982); David Richards &
Chris Riley, Developing a Coherent Due-Course-of-Law Doctrine, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1649, 1652-
53 (1990). In fact, in many jurisdictions, the "access to court" guarantee has simply been
"balanced away" where a plausible "legitimate, countervailing public interest or policy" can be
found justifying the modification or even the elimination of common-law forms of liability. See
David Schuman, Oregon's Remedy Guarantee.- Article I, Section 10 of the Oregon Constitution,
65 OR. L. REV. 35, 49 (1986); Johnson v. Star Mach. Co., 530 P. 2d 53 (Or. 1974); cf Sax v.
Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983) (a two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations
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mandatory fee arbitration somehow reduces the attorney to a state of "invol-
untary servitude" in violation of the 13th Amendment 128 seems little more
than an open invitation to the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.
Perhaps the most serious attention has focused on provisions of state con-
stitutions that guarantee a right of trial by jury. 129 When asserted in this
context to challenge a mandatory arbitration program, however, a general
right to trial by jury may well be trumped by the judiciary's interest in regu-
lation of the legal profession.130 The interests that underlie the courts' su-
pervisory authority over the legal profession are perceived to be strong ones;
in exercising such authority, courts claim to be concerned with nothing less
than the proper functioning of the judicial system. Judicial supervision of
client contracts is in the first place intended to insure the actual integrity of
the attorney-client relationship, to which citizens are compelled to resort for
access to "the law." And in addition - a consideration of at least equal
held unconstitutional as applied to minors because the restriction was "unreasonable or arbi-
trary when balanced against the purpose and basis of the statute," which "effectively abolishes
a minor's right to bring a well-established common law cause of action without providing a
reasonable alternative"). See generally Patrick E. Sullivan, Note, Medical Malpractice Statute
of Repose: An Unconstitutional Denial of Access to the Courts, 63 NEB. L. REV. 150, 170-78(characterizing different interpretations given to "access to courts" guarantee in different juris-
dictions); Golann, supra note 126, at 529-31 (separation of powers), 546-49 (access to courts).
128. See Guralnick, 747 F. Supp. at 1116.
129. Guarantees in state constitutions of the right to trial by jury are quite common. See,
e.g., N.J. CONsT. art. 1, 9 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."); OR. CONST.
art. I § 17 ("In all civil cases the right of Trial by Jury shall remain inviolate."), art. VII § 3("In actions at law, where the value in controversy shall exceed $200, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved."); TEX. CONST. art. V, § 10 ("In the trial of all causes in the District
Courts, the plaintiff or defendant shall, upon application made in open court, have the right of
trial by jury.").
In addition, if the parties are in federal court, the 7th Amendment to the federal constitution
may guarantee a jury trial "in suits at common law" even if a jury trial would be unavailable
under state law. See 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2303(the "language of the Rules of Decision Act cannot prevail over the clear command of the
Seventh Amendment"). However, the Supreme Court has held that the 7th Amendment guar-
antee "applies only to proceedings in courts of the United States and does not in any manner
whatever govern or regulate trials by jury in state courts." Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v.
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916). It is widely assumed that this holding is still "good law."
See Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. 284 U.S. at 158 (14th Amendment "neither implies
that all trials must be" by jury, nor guarantees any particular form or method of state proce-
dure"); Boyd v. Bulala, 672 F. Supp. 915, 921 (D.C. Va. 1987); Rozbicki v. Huybrechts, 576
A.2d 178 (Conn. 1990). 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 256 n.12 (1986).
130. Cf Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S.Ct. 2720 (1991). In Gentile Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the Court, concluded that a lawyer representing a party in
a pending proceeding could be disciplined for public statements about the case "upon a lesser
showing" than the "clear and present danger" standard generally applied under the First
Amendment. Id. at 2743. In the course of his opinion Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to
earlier attorney solicitation cases in which the Court had "engaged in a balancing process,
weighing the State's interest in the regulation of a specialized profession against a lawyer's
First Amendment interest in the kind of speech that was at issue." Id. at 2744; see also In re
Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31 (Or. 1990) (censuring supreme court justice for violating provision of
Code of Judicial Conduct that prohibited personal solicitation of campaign contributions; held,
the code prohibition was justified by "offsetting societal interest" of eliminating "the appear-
ance (at least) of impropriety . . . and preserv[ing] the judiciary's reputation for integrity";
"[tihe means chosen to carry out the state's purpose are the least intrusive possible if there is to
be any chance to achieve the desired aim").
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importance - it is designed to maintain a critical public confidence in the
court system as a whole; widespread public dissatisfaction with attorney con-
duct over fees might indeed become, as one court has asserted, "the principal
source of public dissatisfaction with the judicial system" itself.' 3 '
The assertion of judicial authority over attorney-client contracts is but-
tressed by the fact that in many jurisdictions the attorney's supposed right to
a jury trial of a fee dispute may in any event be rather tenuous. An attor-
ney's suit to recover a fee need not be equated with a common garden-vari-
ety claim of "contract" or "debt." The relationship of trust and confidence
between attorney and client, and the latter's "presumed vulnerability,"'' 3 2
will frequently induce a court to characterize the relation as a "fiduciary"
one, thereby allowing it to treat an action involving fees as one within the
historical jurisdiction of "courts of equity."' 133 In such a case, of course,
there would simply be no common-law jury right to preserve.' 34
131. Anderson v. Elliott, 555 A.2d 1042, 1049 (Me. 1989); see also In re Livolsi, 428 A.2d
at 1272, 1281 ("[Plublic confidence in the judicial system is as important as the excellence of
the system itself."); McGill v. City of Ottawa, 773 F. Supp. 1473, 1474 (D. Kan. 1991)
("courts have a stake in fee contracts because the fairness of the terms reflects directly on the
court and its bar"; the court "reformed" fee contract between client and attorney in the exer-
cise of its "equitable jurisdiction").
132. WOLFRAM, supra note 10, at 497.
133. When an attorney brings suit to recover a fee, he would in most cases be required to
proceed "at law." See Gray v. Joseph J. Brunetti Construc. Co., 266 F.2d 809, 818 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959); Elting v. Frieman, 215 A.2d 367, 368-69 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1965) (Equitable jurisdiction "is assumed to protect the client from oppression by
his attorney .... Those reasons give no support to the proposition that the attorney should
have an equal right to seek the aid of equity.") But cf Rosenman & Colin v. Richard, 850
F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1988) (client has no right to jury trial when attorney seeks to enforce a
charging lien on proceeds of judgment). On the other hand, the jurisdiction of courts of equity
to intervene at the client's request, by enjoining a legal action and determining the fee, is well
established. See, e.g., Lewis v. Morgan, 28 A.2d 215 (N.J. Ch. 1942) (client successfully
sought to enjoin prosecution of attorney's suit to recover fee; "the existence of a confidential
relationship between an attorney and client has been recognized from the earliest times ....
The bill is manifestly fashioned to invoke this constituent of equitable jurisdiction"); Kelley v.
Schwinghammer, 79 A. 260 (N.J. Ch. 1911) (enjoining attorney's suit to recover on a note
executed by client).
It seems accurate to conclude, then, that "equity courts have always had broad powers to
adjudicate attorney-client fee disputes on behalf of the client," In re Livolsi, 428 A.2d at 1274
- and thus that clients have been able to deny attorneys any right to a jury trial of a fee claim
by invoking equitable jurisdiction. Such equitable intervention is not limited to those cases
where the attorney-client relationship was already in existence at the time the fee agreement
was made, but it is of course considerably more likely and particularly intense in such situa-
tions. See Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35, 37-39 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (suit by attorney to recover
on promissory notes given by client long after the attorney-client relationship had commenced;
held, the attorney's success in a suit on an earlier note did not estop the client from raising
defenses; clients "are wards of the court in regard to their relationship with their attorneys,"
and the client could therefore "make any legal or equitable defense to the remaining notes
which appeals to the conscience of the court"). On this point, see generally Lester Brickman,
Attorney-Client Fee Arbitration: A Dissenting View, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 277, 282-87 (fiduciary
duties of attorneys). Cf Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963) (per curiam). Simler was a
declaratory judgment suit brought by a client to determine the amount of an attorney's fee.
The Court held that under the 7th Amendment, the "questions involved are traditional com-
mon-law issues which can be and should have been submitted to a jury." Id. at 223. The
result of such a holding, however, was merely that the client was entitled to the jury trial
which he had been demanding. Id.
134. See supra note 129. In most jurisdictions the test of the applicability of such constitu-
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C. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARBITRATION PROCESS
The nature of arbitration admits considerable flexibility and variation in
design, allowing the process to be adapted both to local conditions and to the
contours of the individual dispute. Nevertheless, in designing an arbitration
program to resolve fee disputes between attorneys and clients, there are cer-
tain critical concerns that must be addressed and resolved at the outset.
Some of these will be examined briefly below.
1. Dealing with Attorney Misconduct
This is perhaps the thorniest problem likely to arise in connection with fee
arbitration programs. The danger has often been pointed out: When per-
ceived inadequacies in the official, formal system of adjudication lead to in-
creased diversion to "private" processes, then important "public" concerns
may be ignored or disserved. The relief obtained by an individual claimant
tional guarantees is an historical one, focusing on whether "the claim would have received a
jury trial... at the time the Constitution was ratified." Golann, supra note 126, at 502-03; cf
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 1257-58, 1267-71 (1985) (Seventh
Amendment test); Molodyh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 744 P.2d 992, 996 (Or. 1987) (statute pro-
vided mandatory appraisal procedure to determine amount of loss in fire insurance policies;
since "plaintiff had a well-established right to have a jury determine the amount of damages in
an action on an insurance policy when our constitution was adopted," such arbitration would
be unconstitutional if appraisal was binding; "[to] save the statute,"court construed provision
as "non-binding in respect to the non-demanding party").
The strategic device of re-characterizing a suit over legal fees as one in "equity" may not
succeed in the few jurisdictions where the constitution grants an absolute right to a jury trial in
all civil actions. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 10; State v. Credit Bureau of Laredo, Inc., 530
S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex. 1975) (constitution extends right to jury trial to "any legal process
which a party institutes to obtain his demand or by which he seeks his right"). Even in those
states, however, it is conceded that in "special circumstances" there may be "some special
reason" that a jury is "unsuitable." Id. at 293; see Adams v. Texas State Bd. of Chiropractic
Examiners, 744 S.W.2d 648, 654 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ) (no right to jury trial in a
suit to review an order of an administrative agency where "expert knowledge or experience to
properly evaluate the evidence" may be required, and jury trial might therefore interfere sub-
stantially with the agency's role in statutory scheme of regulation).
To argue that a suit over an attorney's fee is not the sort of case with which the guarantee of
trial by jury was historically concerned is at least to approach the doctrinal question on its own
terms and to play the game with a straight face. By contrast, other arguments that purport to
avoid the claimed right to jury trial are little more than hollow makeweights. For example, the
suggestion that by engaging in his profession an attorney has somehow "waived" his right to ajury trial is an unconvincing fiction, especially implausible when a mandatory arbitration
scheme is made applicable to attorneys already in practice. See Kelley Drye & Warren v.
Murray Indust., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 522 (D.N.J. 1985), in which a federal district court in a
diversity case directed a law firm to proceed with arbitration despite the "direct collision" of
New Jersey's mandatory fee arbitration program with the 7th Amendment. Id. at 528. The
court held that the firm had "voluntarily given up its right to a trial of any kind," presumably
by having chosen to "exercise [the] privilege" of practicing law. Id. at 527. It also suggested
that the state's mandatory arbitration rules "might well constitute a written agreement for
arbitration" under the Federal Arbitration Act, the firm's "having become a party to the
agreement by taking advantage of the opportunity to practice law in New Jersey." Id. at 526.
See also Adams, 744 S.W.2d at 654 (revocation of chiropractor's license; held, chiropractor
"waived" constitutional claim to a jury trial by "avail[ing] himself" of the right to practice and
"enjoying the benefits" of the statutory scheme); Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310, 319 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 816 (1988) (plaintiff
"consented" to arbitration mandated by CFTC "by virtue of its continued membership in the
[Chicago Board of Trade]").
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in an alternative private process may be quite satisfactory to him - may,
indeed, even approximate what he might have obtained in litigation, and at a
lesser cost. Dispute processing through private mechanisms, however, may
neglect those functions that can only be performed through the authoritative
pronouncements of public institutions like courts - functions such as the
general deterrence of wrongdoing, the channelling or shaping of private con-
duct, or structural change. 135
135. One of the leading commentaries that sounds this cautionary note about ADR is
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073, 1085-89 (1984) (The function of adju-
dication, using public resources and employing public officials, "is not to maximize the ends of
private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values
embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values
and to bring reality into accord with them;" "[c]ivil litigation is an institutional arrangement
for using state power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals."); see also
Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV.
668, 676, 679 (1986). (Private disputes may "implicate important public values," and resolu-
tion in ADR processes "may treat as irrelevant the choices made by our lawmakers and may,
as a result, ignore public values reflected in rules of law."); see also Alschuler, supra note 35, at
1816-17 (public adjudication "can discourage wrongful primary conduct ... and it can dis-
courage violent self-help"; adjudication "is a cornerstone of commerce, an essential social ser-
vice, and a hallmark of civilization." Id. at 1817); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard & Paul D.
Scott, The Public Nature of Private Adjudication, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 42, 57 (1988)
(noting that determinations by a private tribunal lack "governmental imprimatur," "the
message that society is unified against the condemned behavior," and therefore lack "the corre-
sponding social import").
The point that a private process, responsive only to the disputants themselves, may fail to
weigh the effects of its decisions on the interests of society at large can be illustrated by the
large number of labor arbitration cases in which "industrial due process" and the maintenance
of good relations between employer and union have seemed to justify the reinstatement of
employees discharged for endangering public safety. See, e.g., Stead Motors v. Automotive
Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 946 (1990)
(upholding reinstatement of automobile mechanic who was fired for recklessness in failing to
tighten lug bolts on front wheels); cf Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 801 F.
Supp. 1379, 1390 (D.N.J. 1992) (breathalyzer test of seaman on oil tanker showed elevated
blood alcohol level; held, the "public policy underlying efforts to keep intoxicated persons
from operating commercial vessels is severely undermined by the arbitration award [ordering
reinstatement of employee]"). Or the many product liability cases that are settled with gener-
ous compensation to the plaintiff, but with the understanding that the settlement itself and
other information about the product's dangers are to remain unavailable to the public. See
Bob Gibbins, Stealth Litigation: Protective Orders'Social Costs, N.J. L.J., Dec. 9, 1991, at 16.
At the same time, of course, an important theme in much of the literature is that, given
disparities between the disputants in terms of needs, resources, and access to information, the
results reached in private processes are not in any event likely to be as fair or satisfactory to the
disadvantaged party as results in public institutions like the courts. The most common sugges-
tion is that such disparities are particularly likely to distort the process of bargaining and
settlement. "[T]he distribution of financial resources, or the ability of one party to pass along
its costs, will invariably infect the bargaining process, and the settlement will be at odds with a
conception of justice that seeks to make the wealth of the parties irrelevant." Fiss, supra note
129, at 1076; see also Edwards, supra note 129, at 679 (Because of inequality in power and
resources, alternative mechanisms may produce "inexpensive and ill-informed decisions [that]
merely legitimate decisions made by the existing power structure within society.") Sometimes,
however, the critique seems to sweep more broadly. See Edward Brunet, Questioning the
Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 31-47 (1987) ("comparing the
qualitative efficiency of ADR processes with more traditional litigation procedures"); Richard
Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359. ("ADR should be reserved for cases in which parties of
comparable power and status confront each other."). Id. at 1359. See generally infra note 160
and accompanying text.
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It is possible then that public interests implicated by many attorney-client
disputes may be bypassed or undermined by strictly private processes. For
example, many disputes between attorneys and clients nominally arise be-
cause a client is demanding the return of a fee paid. On this basis a griev-
ance committee saddled with an excessive caseload may be eager to shunt
the dispute to the bar's fee arbitration committee as a fee dispute - even
though it may also appear that the representation of the client had been less
than devoted because of a conflict of interest, that the attorney is refusing to
account for trust funds that he is holding on the client's behalf, that the
attorney had promised services that he did not in fact perform, or that his
past conduct reveals many similar instances of client overreaching or billing
abuse. 136 In a significant category of cases, then, a contractual dispute over
the fee may be only the tip of the iceberg, with other issues of vital public
concern lurking just beneath the surface. 137 There are a number of related
points here: The resolution of "fee disputes" by arbitration may fail to ad-
dress the public interest in law enforcement, by failing even to address re-
lated issues of professional misconduct. When individual disputes are
resolved at different times by different panels of arbitrators, recurrent pat-
terns of abuse may not be detected or sanctioned. And if the diversion of fee
disputes to alternative processes allows attorneys to avoid costs (such as ad-
verse publicity and the stigma of disciplinary proceedings) 138 that they
136. See, e.g., ABA, DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 1, at 31; JETHRO
K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR: LAWYERS UNETHICAL ETHICS AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 200-01 (1978).
137. A good illustration is In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978). In this case the attor-
ney defended a client in a civil suit; during the same period, he undertook to represent the
plaintiff in the suit in a criminal matter. When the client heard about this she contacted the
state bar and "expressed concern over the conflict of interest and asked about obtaining the
return of the fee she had paid." Id. at 415. Disciplinary proceedings were brought based on
this conflict of interest and also based on allegations that the fee was excessive. The court
noted that "when there has been a deviation from proper professional standards there should
be some appropriate penalty, not only for the effect upon the attorney, but as a salutary mea-
sure for the benefit of the Bar and the public." Id. at 417. The proper disposition in this case
was "to call attention to such impropriety ... and to require [the attorney] to recognize that he
breached his contract." Id. In addition, because his conduct fell short of what was required,
the attorney "should not be entitled to the fee paid him"; if he failed to refund it within 30
days, he was to be suspended until he did so. Id.
The intertwining of fee disputes and disciplinary matters may also be exemplified by a case
like Grossman v. State Bar, 664 P.2d 542 (Cal. 1983). Here the attorney initially agreed to
handle a personal injury suit for a one-third contingent fee. Despite that agreement, he later
unilaterally withdrew 40% of the settlement funds from the client's trust account as his fee,
and when the client complained, responded that "we feel entirely justified in taking the normal
fee." Id. at 544. The court imposed a one-year suspension from practice, stayed for a proba-
tionary period. Id. at 546.
138. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. For this reason the court's decision in
a case like In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413, is likely to be considerably more powerful - both in
terms of general deterrence and in terms of the respondent's future behavior - than the result
of a fee arbitration proceeding in which an arbitration panel resolved the dispute by merely
ordering a refund of the fee paid by the client.
On the use of disciplinary sanctions as a means of giving "warning to other lawyers," see
WOLFRAM, supra note 10, at 124-25. See also id. at 107-08 (trend in many -jurisdictions to-
wards lessening the secrecy of the disciplinary process and "opening" it up to the public);




would otherwise incur in an official forum, the resulting level of deterrence
of misconduct may well be inadequate.13 9
Any scheme for the mandatory arbitration of fee disputes should then at
the very least be part of an overall system - a system in which the resolu-
tion of a particular attorney-client dispute is connected with the disciplinary
process through which professional conduct is scrutinized for ethical viola-
tions. "Loops'140 between the two can be designed to ensure that the law
enforcement functions served by attorney discipline are not swept under the
rug in the drive toward private settlement.
For example, a state may have set up a "central intake office for the re-
ceipt of all complaints about lawyers;" 14 1 such an office could initially screen
complaints to determine, either from the face of the complaint or after a
summary investigation, whether any dispute exists between attorney and cli-
ent that appears to involve a colorable claim with respect to the attorney's
fee. If it does, the dispute would in the first instance be referred directly to
an arbitration panel - without the further burden of determining whether
the dispute was "primarily," "substantially," "predominantly," "really" (or
some other unadministrable formulation) about fees. 142 At the same time,
139. On this point, though, one suspects that there may be countervailing considerations.
Where more accessible means of redress are provided to clients, there is likely to be an increase
in the number of claims asserted against attorneys which may more than offset any decrease in
deterrence attributable to the ability of attorneys to avoid the costs incurred in official forums.
This at least seems intuitively plausible, although one cannot of course be certain which effect
would predominate.
140. See WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS
TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT (1988). The authors coined this term in connection with
their suggestion that formal "loop-back" procedures be built into the design of any dispute
resolution system. Such procedures, they note, can increase the chances of a satisfactory set-
tlement by encouraging disputants to move (or "loop") back from "rights" disputes (e.g., liti-
gation) or "power" disputes (e.g., strikes) into negotiation. Id. at 52. For example, provision
for a mini-trial or non-binding arbitration could supply parties in litigation with information
about the likely court outcome and thus help them in a negotiated settlement; a required
"cooling off" period could provide a window for negotiations prior to a strike. See id. at 53-55.
The term is used here of course in a different sense. The point is simply to underscore the need
for some functional connections between the various subsystems that carry out the goals of any
overall system of attorney regulation (the goal of a satisfactory resolution of "private" client
grievances as well as the societal interest in sanctioning attorney misconduct).
141. As recommended by the ABA REPORT, see supra note 1, at 13. See also 60 U.S.L.W.
2490, 2491 (Feb. 11, 1992).
142. A possible exception to such a policy of automatic referral to arbitration is suggested
by the Wyoming Rules, which exclude from arbitration "fees for claimed legal services which
constitute a violation of the rules of professional conduct." WYOMING RULES FOR RESOLU-
TION OF FEE DISPUTES Rule 2(b)(ii). As interpreted, this seems to envisage only a narrow
exception: Arbitration is excluded only in rare cases where the face of the complaint reveals a
clear and "truly outrageous" professional violation, such as a claimed contingency fee in a
divorce action in violation of MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(d); in
such cases the dispute is referred directly to a grievance committee. (Personal communication,
Cary Album, Chairman of Committee on Resolution of Fee Disputes). To the same effect are
the New Jersey Rules, providing that where "a grievance involves aspects of both a fee dispute
and a charge of unethical conduct," the case is sent first to fee arbitration; if, however, "it
clearly appears ... that there is presented an ethical question of a serious or emergent nature,"
the fee dispute is to be held "in abeyance" and the file is transmitted to the appropriate ethics
committee. N.J.R. GEN. APPLIC. Rule 1:20A-4. This exception is intended as an "escape
hatch" from an otherwise rigid policy of primary referral to fee arbitration, and is meant to be
triggered primarily by those unusual cases that would justify an immediate suspension from
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however, the initial screening would provide enough information to indicate
whether the complaint should be forwarded to disciplinary counsel, who
could retain it "in the system" for evaluation as a grievance after the arbitra-
tion is completed. Any such inquiry into professional misconduct at a later
time could of course consider any number of alleged ethical violations, in-
cluding the question whether the attorney has engaged in the sort of aggra-
vated billing abuse-"overreaching," recurrent or "unconscionable"
overcharging-for which disciplinary sanctions have traditionally been re-
served. 143 In addition, where evidence of this or any other violation of the
lawyer codes surfaces in the course of the arbitration process, it should - at
least in theory - trigger an obligation on the part of lawyer-arbitrators to
report such wrongdoing to disciplinary authorities. l4 While too great a reli-
ance on reporting by attorneys of their peers' misconduct would undoubt-
edly be misplaced, 145 a state that chose in the first instance to divert all fee
complaints to arbitration might also formalize the duty to report related mis-
conduct, by embedding it in some institutional routine.146
practice under state rules. Cf N.J.R. GEN. APPLIC. Rule 1:19A-7, Rule 1:20-5 (in "an emer-
gent situation the Supreme Court . . . may order a temporary suspension" from practice);
Personal communication, David Johnson, Director, N.J. Office of Attorney Ethics, Jan. 4,
1993. Further exceptions might be envisaged-where, for example, it appears that there are
other disciplinary complaints currently pending against the same attorney. In other cases,
however, holding any disciplinary action in abeyance for the short period it should take to
complete the arbitration proceeding seems unlikely to have serious ill effects. Cf Ronald D.
Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's Unethical Violation in the Wake of
Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 977, 992-95.
143. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. A good candidate for such two-tier
processing is Attorney Grievance Comm. v. Kerpelman, 438 A.2d 501 (Md. 1981). In this
case, the attorney originally agreed to represent the client in a contested divorce and custody
dispute for a fee of $70 per hour, although the client was under the impression that the retainer
of $2000 he had paid "would probably just about cover the total costs." In the midst of the
trial, the attorney obtained the client's signature on another fee agreement, stressing that "re-
sults will be important" and that the time spent "may be only a minor factor." After a three-
day trial, the client was not required to pay any alimony and was awarded custody of his
children. The attorney, having spent no more than 39 hours on the case, demanded a fee of
$25,000 that the client refused to pay. A lawsuit followed in which the lawyer claimed his fee
and the client counterclaimed, alleging fraud. In a later disciplinary proceeding, the court
referred to the attorney's behavior as "gouging of the lowest and most under-handed order,"
id. at 510, and imposed a suspension from practice of one year. Id.
144. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1992) (duty to report a
violation "that raises a substantial question as to [another] lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects"). The earlier Model Code swept more broadly to require
that attorneys report "knowledge of a violation of a [Disciplinary Rule]," see MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A) (1983), but such an absolute requirement
"proved to be unenforceable." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 83.3, cmt.
(1991). See Wolfram, supra note 10, at 683-86.
Under the rules of the New Jersey program, where a case is sent to fee arbitration even
though a charge has been made of unethical conduct, the arbitrators are instructed that "after
hearing and determination of the fee" they are to "refer any matter that [they conclude] may
involve unethical conduct (including overreaching) to the appropriate district ethics commit-
tee." N.J.R. GEN. APPLIC. Rule 1:20A-4. Such referral after arbitration takes place an esti-
mated ten to fifteen times per year. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
145. See Wolfram, supra note 10, at 683. ("Probably no other professional requirement is
as widely ignored by lawyers subject to it" as the duty to report.); Wilkins, supra note 44, at
822-23.
146. At least in cases where the complaint appears on its face to allege a disciplinary viola-
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This sequencing of processes - the dovetailing of fee arbitration for the
resolution of attorney-client disputes with the bar's disciplinary mechanism
- reserves a vital function for arbitration. In many cases, when allegations
of attorney misconduct (perhaps inserted for rhetorical effect, or for leverage
in the grievance process) are peeled away, all that will remain is a colorable
claim that in light of the quality of the services rendered, the fee charged was
an excessive one. In such a case, an adjustment of the fee ordered by the
arbitrators is likely to defuse the client's sense of grievance and to appropri-
ately resolve the dispute with some finality. Where more serious misconduct
is present, the matter should not end there. But the more closely intertwined
the questions whether the attorney has committed an ethical violation and
whether his claimed fee is in fact justified, the more likely it is that an initial
arbitration proceeding will generate useful information for the disciplinary
process. The arbitration proceeding itself would lead to an award as to fees
that between attorney and client would be binding and enforceable, finally
determining their contractual rights subject to whatever limited degree of
judicial review is thought necessary. 147 In any later inquiry, the issue of
attorney misconduct would for purposes of disciplinary sanctions be ad-
dressed de novo. The hearing panel, however, would presumably benefit
from an expert "first look" at the problem in the form of the arbitrators'
conclusions and findings with respect to such matters as the factual back-
ground of the dispute, the understanding of the parties, and local billing
practices. We are already quite familiar in other contexts with the notion
that courts may engage in an extensive re-examination of arbitral decisions
- recognizing that arbitration between parties to a contract may have third-
party effects of general public importance - while at the same time taking
tion, the arbitration panel might be charged by disciplinary counsel or by a central screening
office to include along with its award a recommendation as to whether the complaint should
ultimately be prosecuted as a grievance, as well as a summary of any evidence justifying prose-
cution. Cf ALASKA STATE BAR RULES Rule 40(q)( 4) (Decision of arbitrators in fee dispute
"will include ... a specific finding as to whether the matter should be referred to Bar Counsel
for appropriate disciplinary proceedings."). Id. There is naturally some risk that this use of
arbitration as a "first look" at ethical violations might lead to the arbitration process itself
becoming further "legalized," adversarial and protracted, and to increased difficulty in
recruiting volunteer arbitrators; it is difficult to say, however, whether these effects would be
seen in a sufficiently large number of cases to have a substantial impact.
It should be clear that however desirable it might otherwise be to maintain the privacy and
confidentiality of the arbitration process, confidentiality would have to yield to this duty of the
lawyer-arbitrator to report misconduct. See NANCY ROGERS & RICHARD SALEM, A STU-
DENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE LAW 100-03 ("Limits on Confidentiality: Duties to
Disclose"); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 154.073(d) (Vernon Supp. 1993) ("confidential-
ity of communications in dispute resolution procedures [made subject to] other legal require-
ments for disclosure"); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-7(4)(a) (1992) (exception to
confidentiality in "ADR procedure" where ADR provider is subject to the child abuse report-
ing requirements of state law); cf ABA COMMITTEE AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
INFORMAL ETHICS 1393 (1977) (declining to resolve apparent conflict between duty to report
and provision for confidentiality in by-laws of voluntary bar arbitration program); WOLFRAM,
supra note 10, at 685 (While the attorney-client privilege must be respected despite the duty to
report misconduct, "reporting the violations of nonfirm lawyers that are observed other than
when representing a client will rarely involve client information and thus will rarely be ex-
cepted from the reporting requirement.").
147. See infra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
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advantage of arbitral expertise and the exercise of arbitral judgment. 4
Once we recognize that it is desirable to create some mechanism for the
efficient handling of client complaints concerning fees that does not depend
upon the law-enforcement model of the disciplinary system, the existence of
separate, sequenced processes for the resolution of fee disputes and of formal
grievances seems inevitable. 149 However, where a client is not only challeng-
ing an attorney's fee but also contemplating a suit in which he would seek
affirmative recovery on the basis of the attorney's malpractice, much is to be
said for the resolution of all such claims in a single proceeding. On occasion,
a malpractice claim may in fact turn on nothing more than alleged abuses in
billing;' 50 in all cases the question of the quality of an attorney's perform-
ance is inevitably just the other side of the same coin from the question of
the appropriate fee to which the attorney is entitled.' 5 ' A defense to a
148. A collective bargaining agreement between a union and an employer typically extends
protection against the discharge of employees without "just cause." It also provides that chal-
lenges to the propriety of any discharge are to be finally resolved by arbitrators, who are likely
to make use of their knowledge of the "practices, understandings and accommodations of
unions and management over the years," Roger I. Abrams, The Nature of the Arbitral Process:
Substantive Decision-Making in Labor Arbitration, 14 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 551, 572 (1981).
However, where a union has unsuccessfully asserted a grievance on behalf of a particular em-
ployee, the adverse arbitral award will not bar the employee from claiming in later litigation
that his discharge was in violation of federal civil rights legislation. See, e.g., McDonald v.
City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (deprivation of civil rights under color of law in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)
(racial discrimination, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). The principal remaining
rationale for this result, given an increasing tendency to presume arbitral competence even as
to statutory matters, appears to be the possible disparity of interests between union and em-
ployee that may cause the union to "present the employee's grievance less vigorously, or to
make different strategic choices, than would the employee." Cf. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1656-57, n.5 (1991) (distinguishing McDonald and Alexander).
The arbitration award may nevertheless be introduced into evidence in the later litigation and,
"especially ... where the issue is solely one of fact," and depending on such factors as "the
degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum" and "the special competence of particular
arbitrators," the court may accord the award "great weight." McDonald, 966 U.S. at 292
n.13. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60 n.21; Becton v. Detroit Terminal of Consolidated Freight-
ways, 687 F.2d 140 (6th Cir. 1982) (" 'just cause' or similar contract questions are an integral
part of many discrimination claims" and "both involve the same operative facts"; while a court
in a later judicial proceeding is not "conclusively bound" by an arbitral award even as to the
"just cause" issue, it may treat the arbitration decision as "persuasive evidence"). See also
Sheets v. Sheets, 22 A.D.2d 176 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (child custody and visitation; after
arbitration, the court "would examine into the matter, de novo, and in doing so could utilize
the proof adduced before the arbitration tribunal, could call for new proof, or could employ a
combination of both"); Faherty v. Faherty, 477 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1984) (child support; "courts
should conduct a de novo review unless it is clear on the face of the award that the award could
not adversely affect the substantial best interests of the child"). Id. at 1263.
Still another analogy might be to the "screening panels" that are imposed by many jurisdic-
tions as a preliminary step in any medical malpractice litigation. Physicians commonly serve
on, and sometimes dominate, these panels; while the panel decisions are not binding, they are
in many states admissible into evidence in a later trial of the malpractice claim. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(H) (West 1992) (report of the "expert opinion" of the panel is "ad-
missible," but is not "conclusive"). A recent comprehensive guide is Jean A. Macchiaroli,
Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Proposed Model Legislation to Cure Judicial Ills, 58
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 181 (1990).
149. See supra notes 14-31 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
151. See Mallen & Smith, supra note 39, § 11.24 ("Legal Malpractice as a Defense to Coin-
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claimed fee in which the client asserts that legal services were substandard-
that the attorney lacked adequate skills and knowledge, or exercised inade-
quate care and diligence-can easily become an independent action or coun-
terclaim in malpractice, one based on precisely the same allegations.
Attorneys therefore often express the concern that arbitration of fee disputes
might subject them to the possibility of the "inefficient maintenance of sepa-
rate proceedings in different forums"; 152 the same client problem might then
give rise to duplicate procedures and potentially inconsistent results. 53
The rules of some fee arbitration programs attempt to address such con-
cerns by providing that at least where the client has already filed suit against
the attorney seeking damages for malpractice, the arbitrators are to have no
jurisdiction.1 5 4 Such provisions would not, obviously, bar the client from
pensation"); Cherney v. Moody, 413 So.2d 866 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (client's counter-
claim against attorney "sounding in malpractice" was barred as an independent cause of action
by statute of limitations, but could still be maintained "in recoupment"); Riley v. Montgom-
ery, 463 N.E.2d 1246 (1984); see also CAL. FEE ARB. RULES Rule 36.6, (governing fee arbitra-
tion proceedings and providing that the arbitration panel "may receive evidence relating to
claims of malpractice and professional misconduct, but only to the extent that those claims
bear upon the fees to which the attorney is entitled").
The point of course is that in most cases, an attorney's negligence will naturally "reduce the
value of the services, and consequently the amount of compensation to be awarded." Mallen &
Smith, supra note 39, at 699. A separate, but related, point is that where an attorney is found
to have committed a serious violation of the rules of professional conduct, a court may apply a
rule of "forfeiture," denying him the recovery of any fees whatever and not taking account of
the actual value of any services rendered. See infra note 40 and accompanying text; see also
Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244,
1493-96 (1981) (denial of compensation "is a penalty against the attorney that goes beyond any
actual harm the client suffered").
152. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217-18 (1985) (Even though "arbi-
trable" claims and claims assumed to be "nonarbitrable" arose out of the same facts and were
indeed "inextricably intertwined," separate proceedings and "piecemeal litigation" were neces-
sary given the mandate of the Federal Arbitration Act that voluntary arbitration agreements
be "rigorously enforced."). Id. at 218.
153. This appears to be one of the major objections by attorneys to mandatory fee arbitra-
tion programs. See infra note 254 and accompanying text.
154. See CAL. FEE ARB. RULES Rules 8.2 ("client's right to request or maintain arbitra-
tion is waived if ... the client commences an action or files any pleading ... seeking affirmative
relief against the attorney for damages or otherwise based upon alleged malpractice or profes-
sional misconduct"); ALASKA STATE BAR RULES Rule 39(d)(2). The "or maintain" language
obviously requires that the arbitration be terminated on the attorney's motion if a malpractice
action is brought at any time during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings. In other
places, the same state rules seem to sweep more broadly and to suggest that this limit on the
arbitrator's jurisdiction extends even beyond those cases where the client has actually filed a
lawsuit. See CAL. FEE ARB. RULES Rules 5.2 (disputes are not subject to arbitration "where
the client seeks affirmative relief against the attorney for damages or otherwise based upon
alleged malpractice or professional misconduct"); ALASKA STATE BAR RULES Rules 34(c)(2);
see also GA. BAR RULES Rule 6-202 (fee arbitration committee may decline or terminate juris-
diction if the client, "in addition to disputing the fee, claims any other form of relief against the
lawyer arising out of the same set of circumstances, including any claim of malpractice or
professional misconduct"). In the unlikely event that this difference in language was intended
to have substantive significance, it would merely suggest the advisability of caution on the part
of clients in phrasing requests for arbitration, taking care when doing so not to invoke other
potential claims.
It goes without saying that where fee arbitration is mandatory for the attorney, any separate
lawsuit brought by the attorney to collect his fee will be stayed at the client's request pending
arbitration. Eg., Wyo. RULES FOR RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES Rules 6(c); CAL. FEE
ARB. RULES Rules 9.0; ALASKA STATE BAR RULES Rules 39(b). Any lawsuit brought by the
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asserting a malpractice claim after the arbitration is concluded. 55 At the
same time, it would clearly be unrealistic to treat a client's decision to seek
fee relief in arbitration as somehow amounting to a "waiver" or "abandon-
ment" of the right to bring a malpractice action' 56 - and abusive to subject
even an informed client, acting in full understanding of the consequences, to
an irrevocable choice between the advantages of fee arbitration and the abil-
ity to press a malpractice claim. Unless the scope of any arbitration is
broadened with the consent of both client and attorney to embrace claims of
malpractice as well as claims relating strictly to a fee,' 57 relief from duplica-
tive proceedings is likely to be found only in the limited application of doc-
trines like collateral estoppel. A prior lawsuit over an attorney's fee would
indeed be likely to act as a bar to a later malpractice action;5 8 however,
client in which the client seeks a judicial resolution of the fee dispute will have to be stayed as
well, see, e.g., ME. BAR RULES Rule 9(e)(5)(D), or it will be treated as an election by the client
not to seek arbitration. See, e.g., CAL. FEE ARB. RULES Rules 8.2; ALASKA STATE BAR
RULES Rules 39(d)(2).
155. Only where the statute of limitations for malpractice actions is unusually short would
there be any substantial likelihood that a malpractice claim, brought by a client after the termi-
nation of arbitration proceedings, would be time-barred. See Mallen & Smith, supra note 39,
at §§ 18.2-18.8 (malpractice statutes of limitations commonly range from one year to six years,
although even longer periods might be available if the cause of action can be characterized as
one for fraud or for breach of a written contract).
156. Even though attorney-respondents might like to believe that it would be so treated,
and even though such wishful thinking is occasionally encouraged. See supra note 114 and
accompanying text.
157. In 1989, the Attorney-Client Arbitration Board of the District of Columbia Bar ex-
tended its jurisdiction beyond the voluntary arbitration of fee disputes to include voluntary
arbitration of legal malpractice claims. Attorneys have consented to arbitration in "approxi-
mately one-third" of the malpractice cases filed with the program; during 1991-92, five mal-
practice cases went to hearing and award, and - perhaps as a result of a process of self-
selection - all of the awards were in favor of the attorney. D.C. Bar, Attorney-Client Arbi-
tration Board, 1991-92 Annual Report, pp. 4, 7. Cf I MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 39, at
208 (in the absence of a pre-dispute clause in the attorney-client contract, widespread use of
ADR to handle malpractice claims by former clients is uncertain since the "relationship be-
tween the attorney and former client is likely to be strained and cooperation, at least in the
initial states of the dispute, is unlikely").
158. This result may be rationalized in terms of the malpractice claim having been a com-
pulsory counterclaim in the earlier action. See Law Offices of Jerris Leonard, P.C. v. Mideast
Systems, Ltd., 111 F.R.D. 359, 361 (D.D.C. 1986) (the "party raising the malpractice claim is
in effect asserting a defense of failure to perform to the lawyer's claim for breach of contract");
see also CLS Assoc., Ltd. v. A.B., 762 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ). Or it
may be justified on the ground that the issue of the quality of the attorney's services had
necessarily been litigated and decided in the earlier fee suit. See Chisholm-Ryder Co. v. Som-
mer & Sommer, 434 N.Y.S.2d 70, 73 (1980) (prior action "necessarily determined" that com-
pensation was due to attorney; client "could have raised" the issue of malpractice as a defense
and it "was required to do so or be precluded on it"); cf Van Dyke v. Boswell, O'Toole, Davis
& Pickering, 697 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. 1985) (trial court had granted separate trials for attorney's
fee suit and for malpractice counterclaim; jury verdict in favor of attorney in former suit could
therefore not preclude later malpractice action). See also Felger v. Nichols, 370 A.2d 141 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (attorney's motion for summary judgment in malpractice action granted).
The court in Felger noted that in a suit for attorney's fees, "the court must consider, among
other things, the skill requisite properly to conduct the case;" therefore, "assuming that both
actions involve the same legal service, the matter of the adequacy of the client's legal represen-
tation would be raised in both, either directly or by way of defense, and would be litigated and
determined in both." Id. at 143. The client in that case, however, had actually testified in the
earlier fee suit that the attorney had given him "bad advice" and had failed to "faithfully and
fully discharge the business entrusted to him." Id. at 144; compare Rowland v. Harrison, 577
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application of doctrines like res judicata and collateral estoppel to prior arbi-
tration awards is considerably more problematical.15 9
2. Monitoring the Process
As we have seen, the concern is sometimes expressed that where there is
an increased diversion to arbitration of what appear to be "fee disputes,"
important interests underlying the formal disciplinary system may come to
be neglected. Connections thus need to be established between this system of
private dispute resolution and the "public" system of law enforcement. 60
At the same time, it is possible for the process or the results of fee arbitration
itself to be directly called into question: Are the awards of private arbitra-
tors likely to protect, in an adequate fashion, the interests of clients against
the charging of excessive fees? Are private arbitrators likely to be as zealous
as the courts in using fee disputes as a vehicle to police the conduct of attor-
neys guilty of professional misconduct? 1 6 1
The expression of such concerns usually begins with the familiar observa-
tion that arbitration is not supposed to be a "law-" or "rule-applying" pro-
cess; when one adds the equally familiar point that courts do not generally
scrutinize arbitration awards for compliance with "the law," it is clear that
close congruence between awards of arbitrators in fee cases and results that
would be reached by courts on similar facts can hardly be taken for
granted.'62 It would be a mistake, however, to leap uncritically from such
A.2d 51, 55 (Md. Ct. App. 1990) (veterinary malpractice; since the question of negligence
"was not litigated and determined" in earlier debt action brought by doctor, later malpractice
action was not barred).
159. In the absence of an express grant of jurisdiction by the parties, the arbitrators would
have had no authority to grant any relief to the client on a malpractice claim. Cf Shell, supra
note 86, at 643. And it may not in any event be clear from the award just what issues the
arbitrators had actually addressed or decided. See generally supra note 86. While arbitrators
who award the entire amount of a claimed fee have presumably rejected any arguments the
client may have made based on the attorney's alleged substandard performance, a reduction or
denial of a fee could be motivated or justified in any number of different ways. In addition, the
abbreviated and informal nature of arbitration proceedings, and the lack of evidentiary safe-
guards and discovery available in judicial proceedings, might also suggest a lessened collateral
estoppel effect. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 84 cmt. c (where arbi-
tration procedure is "very informal," findings should not have preclusive effect in "another
action where the issue would otherwise be subjected to much more intensive consideration");
Shell, supra note 86 at 653-54, 659-60 (arbitration, "with its compromise awards, loose eviden-
tiary practices, and secret decisionmaking, places less of a priority than litigation on discover-
ing and reporting historical fact"). And such concerns might be heightened where - in
contrast to the labor and commercial arbitration models - arbitration does not take the form
of a consensual process under a contractual agreement but rather appears as economic regula-
tion, made mandatory on one party and designed to be particularly accessible to the other
without the need for professional assistance in development of the case.
Even where a fee arbitration is not to have collateral estoppel effect, however, the award and
any findings the arbitrators may have made could still be admissible and useful in a later
proceeding. See note 53; HALT, Fee Arbitration: Model Rules and Commentary (1989), Rule
13(b) (award "may be considered by, but is not binding on, the decision-maker in other legal
proceedings between the parties").
160. See supra notes 135-59.
161. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
162. Indeed, the frequently "alegal" character of arbitration is often put forward as one of
the potential advantages of the process relative to litigation, as it may permit greater "effi-
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truisms to the assumption that arbitration awards can be expected to diverge
substantially from results in litigated cases in such a way as to jeopardize
important client interests. It would be a mistake, for example, to assert -
particularly in the absence of any functional analysis whatever - that arbi-
trators in fee disputes are "likely" (or at any rate "not unlikely") to resolve
disputes over fees in a way that would lead to a "forfeiture of a client's fidu-
ciary and ethical protections" against attorney misconduct.163 And in any
event, as we have seen, the alternatives of litigation and disciplinary proce-
dures, while theoretically available to clients, may not in fact adequately
ciency" in terms of time and cost and greater "flexibility" in fashioning results to the equity of
the case. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text; see also MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN,
supra note 35, at 390-91, 401-03, 480-98.
163. See Brickman, supra note 133, at 298 ("likely"), 299 ("not unlikely"), 301 ("poten-
tially may"); cf id. at 297 ("accentuate the likelihood").
Some sort of functional analysis to test, or at least to justify, such an assertion seems espe-
cially called for in light of an inflexible jurisprudence insisting on the institutional competence
of private arbitrators to handle disputes that turn on violations of regulatory statutes. See
supra note 79 and accompanying text. No evidence seems to exist that suggests any dramatic
difference in the patterns of decisions of courts and arbitrators with respect to such disputes.
The General Accounting Office recently conducted a study of the use of arbitration in disputes
between individual investors and securities brokers; it found itself unable to compare the re-
sults of arbitration with the results of litigation because of a lack of cases and the inherent
differences between the two processes. The few cases that could be identified in five federal
district courts "were usually settled out of court or dismissed." G.A.O., Securities Arbitra-
tion: How Investors Fare 26, 48 (1992). Nevertheless, what data there was revealed no great
disparities. Cf id. at 35-39, 45 (in cases brought by investors, investors won in 59% of cases in
industry-sponsored arbitration forums and in 60% of AAA cases; investors receiving an award
got 61% of their claims in industry forums and 57% in AAA cases; punitive damages were
rarely awarded) with id. at 49 (decision favored investor in only 9 of 23 court cases, although
in 6 cases investors received 100% of compensatory damages claimed; no punitive damages
awarded).
The proposition that arbitration of attorney-client disputes is likely to entail a loss of protec-
tion to clients seems even more paradoxical in light of the fact that as a practical matter, it is
self-regulation by the organized bar that has traditionally given content to most ethical restric-
tions on attorney conduct. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 10, at 33-38, 82-85. It may be
true that in the fee arbitration programs set up under the auspices of state and local bar as-
sociations, arbitrators (unlike members of a grievance committee?) are "not generally regarded
as having code enforcement obligations or powers." Brickman, supra note 133, at 281. But to
attach great importance to that fact is to claim substantive significance for what may merely be
a matter of form. Arbitration may indeed be problematical when used in certain types of
adhesion contracts to shield non-compliance with rules of public law or to insulate from judi-
cial scrutiny one-sided contractual arrangements imposed by a party wiih superior bargaining
power. See, e.g., Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981) (arbitration clause in
standard musician's contract is "unconscionable and unenforceable" because it "designates an
arbitrator who, by reason of its status and identity, is presumptively biased"); Brickman, supra
note 133, at 296-97 (although "pay or play" clause in standard musician's contract may be
unenforceable penalty, there "is no reported arbitration decision [sic] in which 'pay or play'
clauses in employment contracts have been voided as contrary to contract law"); cf. Heinrich
Kronstein, Arbitration is Power, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 661, 662 (1963) (development of arbitra-
tion organized and administered by private groups may lead to "the removal of duly consti-
tuted legislative and judicial control over large areas of conduct"). But this seems a
particularly inapt analogy to use in criticism of mandatory fee arbitration programs in which
arbitration is not in fact required of clients, not part of an adhesion contract, but instead
mandated for attorneys as one further aspect of the pervasive regulation of the profession by
courts and the organized bar. See also DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 1,




address the client interest in compensation; 64 in such circumstances, using
"the likely judicial outcome"165 as a baseline from which to judge arbitration
is to structure an entire argument around what is in most cases a hypotheti-
cal construct. (The worst kind of Comparative Law, as Jerome Cohen has
said, is that which favorably contrasts "our" theory with "their" practice.)
One might well suggest, then, that holding out the possibility of some sort of
settlement and some sort of redress through arbitration would serve at least
as a valuable addition to a client's arsenal of remedies.
In addition, it would be a mistake to assume that arbitration in fee cases
must take on all the familiar characteristics of traditional commercial arbi-
tration. The process can be structured in such a way as to increase the likeli-
hood that it will be sensitive both to the client's interests and to questions of
professional misconduct. To ensure the acceptability and fairness of awards
in fee cases, however, a number of issues need to be addressed.
a. The Arbitrators
In all existing fee arbitration programs, attorneys are the principal deci-
sionmakers. Where a panel of three arbitrators is used rather than a single
arbitrator (typically this will occur in cases where larger sums are in dis-
pute), it is common for laymen to sit on the panel along with attorneys.1 66
However, in such cases it is almost always provided that non-attorneys are
to make up only a minority of the panel. 167
164. See supra notes 14-44 and accompanying text.
165. Brickman, supra note 133, at 298.
166. The HALT survey indicated that of 31 states (including the District of Columbia)
with statewide fee arbitration programs, 19 used lay arbitrators; a later National Law Journal
survey lists 21 states that used lay arbitrators. See generally HALT SURVEY, supra note 38;
Cox, supra note 59. Even these figures seem to understate the current trend towards use of
non-attorneys on arbitration panels: For example, while the HALT survey indicates that Mas-
sachusetts does not use lay arbitrators, the Massachusetts rules currently provide for non-
attorneys on arbitration panels, see RULES OF THE LEGAL FEE ARBITRATION BOARD OF THE
MASS. BAR Assoc., Rule V(A)(3) (1991); while the National Law Journal survey indicates
that Oregon does not use lay arbitrators, the Oregon rules now also provide for non-attorney
arbitrators. See RULES OF THE OREGON STATE BAR ON ARBITRATION OF FEE DISPUTES,
Rule 2.0(1992).
In smaller cases where single arbitrators are used, it is almost always the case that an attor-
ney will serve as the single arbitrator. See, e.g., State Bar of Calif., RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR
THE HEARING OF FEE ARBITRATIONS, Rule 21.1 (single attorney arbitrator for disputes in-
volving less than $7500). Even this, however, is by no means a universal rule. See State Bar of
Montana, RULES ON VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION OF FEE DISPUTES, Rule 5.4 (single arbitra-
tor may be either a layperson or a lawyer). The threshold at which a case will be heard by a
panel of three arbitrators varies considerably, but is usually well under five figures. Extremes
are exemplified by Louisiana (one arbitrator in attorney-client disputes under $10,000, La.
State Bar Assoc. Lawyer Dispute Resolution Program, Rule 15) and Wyoming (one arbitrator
if amount in dispute is $1000 or less, WY. RULES FOR RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES Rule
4(d)(i)); more common is Alaska's $2000. ALASKA STATE BAR RULES Rule 37(c); cf N.J.R.
GEN. APPLIC. RULE 1:20A-3(b)(1) (hearing may be held before single arbitrator where the
"amount of the total fee charged is less than $3000" (emphasis added)).
167. E.g., State Bar of Calif., RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE HEARING OF FEE ARBI-
TRATIONS, Rule 21.1 (three arbitrators for dispute involving $7500 or more, "one of whom
shall be a public (non-lawyer) member").
There are occasional exceptions. In some local programs a larger panel of seven arbitrators
may be named with the understanding that not all panel members will be able to attend the
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It is almost obligatory in any discussion of arbitration to call attention to
what Judge Posner has called the necessary "tradeoff between impartiality
and expertise" on the part of the arbitrators themselves. 16 8 If one of the
principal attractions of the process lies in the advantages of knowledgeable
and expert decisionmakers,169 it is obvious that attorney-arbitrators are par-
ticularly likely to be familiar with the demands of legal practice and with the
applicable norms imposed by both contract law and professional discipli-
nary rules. This is especially true where an effort is made to use attorney-
arbitrators who are experienced in the area of practice giving rise to the
dispute. The presence of such arbitrators may obviate the need to resort to
"expert witnesses" hired to educate judges or juries about such matters.
There is, however, a familiar corollary: The more experienced the arbitra-
tor, the more familiar he is with the subject matter of the dispute, the more
likely it is that he will be an "insider" sharing with one of the disputants the
predispositions and preconceptions of the trade that often accompany tech-
nical expertise. Particularly where arbitration operates as a form of profes-
sional or economic regulation, this may become a serious concern. The
presence of at least one non-attorney arbitrator in a fee dispute may be seen
as an attempt to address this problem of neutrality; similar considerations
are often thought to require the use of non-professionals on arbitration
panels dealing with doctor-patient disputes over alleged malpractice,' 70 or
with securities disputes between brokers and investors.
17
'
hearing, and that only a quorum of three is necessary; it may turn out that a majority of those
actually present will be non-attorneys. See also supra note 166 (State Bar of Montana, single
arbitrator may be either a layperson or a lawyer).
168. Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1983).
169. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
170. Some states have imposed preliminary hurdles on malpractice litigation by requiring
that claims be submitted to a sort of non-binding arbitration, in the form of what are called
"screening" or "medical review" panels. See Macchiaroli, supra note 148, at 186. Arbitration
clauses are also sometimes found in "voluntary" agreements drafted by hospitals or doctors,
and entered into with patients before any services are rendered and of course before any dis-
pute has arisen; these clauses contemplate a true arbitration leading to a binding award. In the
case of both processes it is not uncommon for legislation to mandate the composition of the
arbitration panel, including the presence on the panel of attorneys or members of the "general
public." See generally MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 35, at 429-32, 465-66;
Macchiaroli, supra note 148 at 188-90.
171. Binding arbitration, conducted under the auspices of one of the securities exchanges,
is regularly provided for in the contracts that brokers require of investors as a condition to
opening an account. See G.A.O., Securities Arbitration: How Investors Fare, supra note 163,
at 28-30 (All large firms and most smaller firms required arbitration clauses for individual
investors opening margin and options accounts, although only a minority of firms required
arbitration clauses for cash accounts; most of the firms that required arbitration clauses "never
or almost never waived or negotiated the clauses.").
Where arbitration is required of the client at the instigation of the broker - and in the
context of an adhesion contract in which the genuineness of consent is doubtful - a different
balance may be called for with respect to the use of non-professional arbitrators, if the process
is at all to maintain its legitimacy. The arbitration rules of the various exchanges, developed
with the approval of the SEC, in fact require that a majority of every arbitration panel be
"public arbitrators," not "from the securities industry"; in recent years the definition of "pub-
lic" arbitrators has been clarified and tightened to exclude not only those associated with bro-
kers and dealers, but also attorneys or accountants who have devoted 20% of their work to
securities industry clients, and individuals who are retired from or who had spent "a substan-
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However, the primary impetus for the use of lay arbitrators in fee cases
may come simply from seeing the presence of non-attorneys as part of an
exercise in public relations.1 7 2 It may be difficult in any event to win public
acceptability and legitimacy for a process dominated by the professional col-
leagues of the attorney whose fees are being called into question; 73 the use
of "public" arbitrators may be intended to give the process an aura of impar-
tiality that may encourage client usage. There appears in fact to be no evi-
dence at all suggesting any different pattern in the decisions of non-attorney
and attorney arbitrators. Anecdotal reports from the personnel of arbitra-
tion programs are usually to the effect that no such differences exist, and
even discounting for the source, this should hardly be surprising. In most
programs at the present time, non-attorney arbitrators are likely to be on the
panel simply because their names have been informally suggested by bar
committee members from among their friends in the community. Lay mem-
bers, in short, are likely to be just the sort of people who "network" with
attorneys and deal with them professionally and socially. 174 On the other
hand, while the attitude and motivation of attorneys who serve on the bar's
regulatory committees are likely to be quite complex, one can assume that at
least in larger communities a certain antipathy on the part of the establish-
ment bar to apparent "corner-cutters" or marginal practitioners will fre-
quently play no small role in their decisions. 175
tial part of [their] business career" in the securities industry. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EX-
CHANGE, ARBITRATION RULES, Rule 607(a) (panel of three arbitrators where amount in
controversy exceeds $10,000); see also id. Rule 601(0 (disputes involving smaller amounts shall
be heard by a "single public arbitrator knowledgeable in the securities industry selected by the
Director of Arbitration"). See generally G.A.O., supra note 163, at 55-57. The HALT Model
Rules for attorney-client fee arbitration also find the need for an apparently "impartial and
hospitable forum" to weigh more heavily than the value of expertise, and consequently require
the pool of arbitrators to contain a majority of non-lawyers. HALT, supra note 159, Rule
22(b).
172. There is of course a parallel here to the increasing use of non-lawyers on hearing
panels in disciplinary cases. See ABA, STANDARDS .FOR LAW DISCIPLINARY AND DISABIL-
ITY PROCEEDINGS § 3.4 (1979) ("Participation by nonlawyers increases the credibility of the
discipline and disability process in the eyes of the public."); A.B.A. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCE-
MENT REPORT, supra note 1, at 45-46 ("The presence of nonlawyers serves to assure the
public that the disciplinary process is not a 'whitewash.' ").
173. See Martha Brannigan, Critics Argue that Legal-Fee Arbitrators Tend to Side With
Their Fellow Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1990 at BI ("The major complaint we hear from
consumers is about the makeup of arbitration panels," says the chairman of a Los Angeles
legal-reform group.). -
174. The HALT survey indicated that virtually all programs that use lay-arbitrators recruit
them on the basis of "lawyer recommendation" or "bar recommendation." HALT SURVEY,
supra note 38. Imputations of "cronyism" might easily be dampened if "lay" mediators were
selected in other ways-for example, by resort to AAA panels, consumer groups, or the roster
of volunteer mediators at local dispute resolution centers.
175. That in practice disciplinary sanctions often seem to be reserved for the less prestigi-
ous segments of the bar, particularly solo practitioners and others not in corporate practice,
has often been noted. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1991); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, STAN.
L. REV. 589, 641 n.168 (1985) (survey of disbarments, suspensions, and public censures in
three major jurisdictions in 1982 indicated that none of the attorneys sanctioned came from a
firm of more than seven attorneys). It is true that this pattern of sanctions seems overdeter-
mined, and one need hardly rely solely on the class bias of the elite bar as an explanation. One
can also point to the fact that corporate clients have no great incentive to resort to the discipli-
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Existing arbitration programs are generally sponsored and administered
by state or local bar associations. In some cases, they are run by fee arbitra-
tion committees appointed directly by the supreme court of the state as part
of a mandatory arbitration program. 176 In any event, the suggestion of the
Clark Committee that fee arbitration programs be entrusted to organizations
like the American Arbitration Association which have "no connection with
the organized bar" - in order to avoid giving clients the impression that "a
group of attorneys is protecting one of its own"'177 - has been uniformly
ignored. There is perhaps another analogy here with securities arbitrations
involving brokers and investors; regulators have also regularly urged that
clients of securities brokers be permitted to choose the AAA in preference to
industry-sponsored forums like the stock exchanges. 178 There is, however,
undoubtedly greater reason to insist that alternative forums be available in
such circumstances, where arbitration is made mandatory for the client at
the firm's instigation as part of a contract of adhesion.
179
nary system, there being alternative strategies at their disposal for controlling their attorneys.
See Wilkins, supra note 44, at 828-29 and n. 116.
176. See, e.g., N.J. R. GEN. APPLIC. Rule 1:20A-1; OFF. ATT'Y ETHICS SUP. C. OF N.J.,
REP., supra note 83, at 110-12.
177. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 95 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 985 (1970).
178. The SEC has urged the securities industry to allow investors to choose between indus-
try-sponsored arbitration forums and independent forums like the AAA in order to "enhance
investor confidence in the fairness of securities dispute resolution proceedings." See G.A.O.,
supra note 163, at 15-16, 31-33. In response, five of the larger firms set up an experimental
"pilot project" in 1991 under which they would agree to AAA arbitration on a "case by case"
basis even though their standard pre-dispute arbitration clauses did not provide for AAA arbi-
tration. Some of the firms agreed to use the AAA only under certain conditions, among them
that the arbitrators used would be selected from the pool of arbitrators at industry forums. See
generally MORRIS ET AL., SECURITIES ARBITRATION AT SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZA-
TIONS: NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE AND NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEAL-
ERS ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURES, Exh. 1, 2 (PLI 1992).
Attempts by states to impose such a requirement on brokerage firms have been less success-
ful. See Securities Ind. Ass'n v. Lewis, 751 F. Supp. 205, 206 (S.D.Fla. 1990) (Florida statute
requiring brokers to allow customers the option of arbitration before the AAA "or other in-
dependent nonindustry arbitration forum" invalid under Federal Arbitration Act); cf. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Georgiadis, 903 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1990) (closing the
"Amex window" for AAA arbitration); Perry E. Wallace, Securities Arbitration After McMa-
hon, Rodriguez, and the New Rules: Can Investors'Rights Really Be Protected?, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 1199, 1235-39 (1990).
179. See supra note 171. An additional consideration is that arbitrators in securities cases
are compensated for their service. In industry forums, arbitrators receive an "honorarium" of
$150 for a single "session" (defined as 4 hours of hearings or less); at the AAA, arbitrators
traditionally are not compensated for the first day of hearings, but receive substantial per diem
fees thereafter. See G.A.O., supra note 163, at 57; see also id. at 46 ("Over 60 percent of the
cases at [industry forums] and AAA took two or fewer sessions."). There may thus be some
cause for concern that arbitrators who expect to decide a large number of securities cases may,
in disputes between customers and repeat players like brokers, see their decision patterns af-
fected by the desire to obtain future assignments. See id. at 63-64 (at Chicago Board Options
Exchange, one arbitrator "decided 47 percent of the cases.., reviewed," and he decided 71%
of these in favor of the broker-dealer). The AAA is not likely to use the same arbitrators as
often as do industry forums. Id.; see also David E. Robbins, Securities Arbitration from the
Arbitrators'Perspective, 23 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 171, 175 (1990) ("One too often
sees the same faces week after week at certain arbitration forums. With all due respect, arbi-
tration should not be a supplement to social security ... [W]hen they sit on cases day after
day, arbitrators build up an immunity to outrageous conduct.").
In contrast to securities cases, however, fee arbitrations between lawyers and clients will
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Whether the public relations benefits from AAA administration of fee ar-
bitration would be substantial is certainly open to question - under any
auspices a majority of the arbitrators would, after all, presumably continue
to be attorneys. It is questionable also whether any such putative benefits
would be worth the candle, even where contracting with an established
outside organization like the AAA would turn out to be less costly than
direct administration. Where arbitration is made independent of the organ-
ized bar, the links between various elements of the regulatory system - be-
tween fee dispute processing and the disciplinary process - would
presumably become attenuated. 180 In any event a study of arbitration of
securities disputes has found that results for investors do not in fact vary
appreciably between AAA arbitrations and arbitrations conducted in indus-
try forums. 18 1
There might perhaps be greater prospects for manipulating client percep-
tions of the fairness of the arbitration process by expanding client participa-
tion in the selection of the arbitrators themselves. One would not be
surprised, after all, to find that procedures that involve the parties more di-
rectly in the choice of arbitrators are more likely to "enhance disputants'
perceptions of impartiality and, in turn, their procedural justice judg-
ments."' 8 2 In some arbitration programs the parties are apparently given no
role at all in the choice of their arbitrators. 8 3 However, their sense of par-
ticipation in the process could be fostered by any number of alternatives,
from the fairly simple (allowing each party a limited number of peremptory
challenges) 184 to the somewhat more complex (permitting each party to
generally be done by attorney-arbitrators on a pro bono basis as part of their service to the bar.
See, e.g., OFF. ATT'y ETHICS SUP. C. N.J., Information About the Supreme Court of New
Jersey's Attorney Fee Arbitration System (1991) ("All fee committee members are directly ap-
pointed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey and serve without compensation."); KY. R. Sup.
CT. Rule 3.810(5)(C) ("Members of the Panel shall not be paid or compensated for their serv-
ices."); LA. ST. BAR ASS'N, LAWYER DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM Rule 48 ("In lawyer-
client disputes, arbitrators shall serve pro bono.").
180. See supra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
181. G.A.O., supra note 163, at 38-39 (after controlling for all other factors, analysis
showed no differences caused by the particular forum [i.e., industry forum or AAA] with
respect to whether investors received an award or what proportion of their claim was
awarded).
182. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUS-
TICE 126 (1988).
183. See, e.g., WY. RULES FOR RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES, Rule 4(d) ("When a fee
resolution petition is filed, the Chairman shall designate members for a hearing panel for that
dispute with selection considerations to include geographical factors"); D.C. Bar, Attorney-
Client Arbitration Board, Rules of Procedure for Fee Arbitration Service, R. 14, 15 ("hearing
panels to consist of members 'randomly selected' from the roster of arbitrators").
184. E.g., RULES OF THE OREGON STATE BAR ON ARBITRATION OF FEE DISPUTES, Rule
5.2 ("each party may challenge without cause and thereby disqualify ... not more than two
members of the panel"); cf STATE BAR OF MONTANA, RULES ON VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION
OF FEE DISPUTES, Rule 5.1, 5.3 (each prospective arbitrator is assigned a number; the dispu-
tants each eliminate one lawyer and one layman from the list, with the final panel consisting of
those having the lowest assigned numbers); GA. R. BAR Rule 6-303 (petitioner strikes one
name from list of potential attorney-arbitrators and one name from list of potential lay arbitra-
tors; respondent is then given the remaining names and also strikes one name from each list;
the remaining names constitute the panel).
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strike arbitrators from a list submitted to them, and then asking them to
rank all the remaining acceptable names in order of preference).' 85
b. The Arbitration Proceeding: Awards and Review
There seems to be little of any value that can be learned about the fee
arbitration process by looking at the actual results of arbitrations in existing
programs: Many bar programs, indeed, choose not to disseminate or even to
compile information concerning the frequency or the extent of client victo-
ries in arbitration. 8 6 The available figures hardly demonstrate the existence
of any systematic bias in favor of either clients or attorneys. 8 7 One quite
common criticism of arbitration focuses, not on the risks of favoritism to-
wards one party or the other, but on the supposed tendency of arbitrators to
185. This is of course the usual method of arbitrator selection used in AAA arbitrations;
the arbitrators that are ultimately selected are those with the most favorable overall ranking.
See MURRAY, ET AL., supra note 35, at 542; see also LA. STATE BAR ASS'N, LAWYER Dis-
PUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM, Rule 12; HALT, supra note 159, Rule 22(c) (same, but each
party "may not cross off more than one half of the arbitrators listed").
It goes without saying that the sort of party participation in the choice of arbitrators that is
exemplified by these rules requires that adequate background information be supplied to the
parties to enable them to exercise a meaningful choice. It might then be required that the
names of the prospective arbitrators given the parties be accompanied by a "short biography"
of each. HALT, supra note 159, Rule 22(b); see also MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note
35, at 542; Morris, supra note 178, Exh. 15, 16 (sample of arbitrator profile provided to parties
in securities arbitrations).
The time-honored system of selection in "tripartite" arbitration - in which each disputant
names one arbitrator, with the third, "neutral" arbitrator being named by the two party-ap-
pointed arbitrators - of course gives the disputants the maximum control over the choice of
the decisionmaker. This method may, however, prove to be too cumbersome and confusing for
the average client in small-stakes fee disputes.
186. See Cox, supra note 59 (some bar officials decided "it would be safer not to keep
score"; the Washington State Bar deliberately does not keep such data since keeping track of
who prevailed in arbitration might have a "chilling effect" on use of the program).
187. See, e.g., DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR, ATTORNEY-CLIENT ARBITRATION BOARD,
1991-92 ANN. REP. at 7 (Of 30 fee dispute hearings held during the year, 14 resulted in awards
"in favor" of the client and 16 resulted in awards "in favor" of the attorney.); L.A. COUNTY
BAR ASs'N, DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES, INC., ARBITRATION COMMITTEE ANN. REP.
(1990-91) (of 312 cases heard during the year, 69% resulted in awards ordering that the fee be
reduced or refunded); OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS, SUP. CT. OF N.J., REPORT, STATE OF
THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM 132-34 (1990) (of 911 cases resolved through arbitra-
tion during 1990, fees were "upheld in full without any reduction" in 39.8% of the cases; in the
remaining 60.2% of the cases the legal fees billed were reduced, by a total of 25.1% of the
dollar amounts in dispute). In the Oregon State Bar arbitration program, 77 fee disputes went
to a hearing in 1990; the client prevailed completely in 20% of these cases and the attorney's
fee was reduced in another 27% of the cases (personal communication, Liz Denecke, Adminis-
trator, State Bar of Oregon Fee Arbitration Program). Only 17 fee disputes were arbitrated
between 1989 and 1991 under the Montana State Bar program; the client apparently prevailed
completely in three of these cases and the attorney's fee was reduced in another 6. Letter from
Geraldine Little, Executive Assistant, State Bar of Montana (Oct. 9, 1992) (on file with au-
thor). In California, while local bar associations handle most fee arbitrations under their own
rules, the State Bar has a statewide arbitration program that operates in the absence of a local
program. Of the 139 cases closed by the State Bar between January 1 and August 31, 1992, the
client was awarded a refund in 19% of the cases; in 60% the attorney was awarded a fee either
in full or in a reduced amount-in this category the fees claimed by attorneys were reduced by
a total of about 23%-and in 20% of the cases "no money was awarded to either party."
Letter from Linda L. Harrington, Director, Mandatory Fee Arbitration (Sept. 15, 1992) (on
file with author).
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engage in compromise-"splitting the baby" rather than straining for a prin-
cipled decision "on the merits."' 88 However, the results from existing pro-
grams are necessarily inconclusive on this point: It would, for example, be a
meaningless exercise to look at the amounts or the percentages by which
nominally disputed fees are reduced in arbitration; officials of bar arbitration
programs often note that clients will for tactical purposes typically place the
attorney's entire fee in "controversy," even though some of the fee was
clearly earned and only a portion could plausibly be claimed to be "exces-
sive."' 189 It can at least be pointed out that the functional elements usually
thought to create incentives for compromise awards in labor and commercial
arbitration-primarily the arbitrators' desire for repeat business, and the
consequent desire to promote their acceptability-are likely to be absent in
bar-sponsored fee arbitrations.190
If arbitration is to become at all a meaningful alternative for clients who
are in the midst of fee disputes with attorneys, the process must be made
accessible and comprehensible to them. Some resources must presumably be
devoted to structuring the process with this most important goal in mind.
For example, clients who will be without their own attorney at the hearing
may need to be given adequate information in advance to enable them to
invoke the process and to use it effectively. It might be useful, to begin with,
if attorneys were required to give clients notice of the existence of the fee
arbitration mechanism and to tell them how to go about initiating a proceed-
ing.19' Unrepresented clients may also need to be given some sense of what
188. See generally MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 35, at 427-29.
In securities arbitrations investors who received an award in industry-sponsored forums got
an average of 61% of the amount they were claiming; in AAA arbitrations they received an
average of 57%. However, in industry-sponsored forums successful investors were awarded
the total amount they were claiming, or more, 30% of the time. G.A.O., supra note 163, at 35-
39.
189. Such an impressionistic judgment is not entirely without empirical support. It is sug-
gestive that in 1991-92 the average amount requested in client-initiated arbitrations under the
D.C. Bar's program was $17,181, while the average amount awarded was only $2,240; in attor-
ney-initiated cases, by contrast, there was little difference between the average demand and the
average award ($4,387 as opposed to $4,063). However, only 5 attorney-initiated arbitrations
were heard during the year (the attorney prevailed in three). DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR,
supra note 187, at 7-8.
190. See MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 35, at 427-29; Shell, supra note 86, at 634
(arbitrators "often have an incentive to make disputants equally happy or unhappy because
they are paid by the parties rather than by the state"; "arbitrators who want to encourage
repeat business will seek a reputation for moderation rather than extremism in their decision-
making."). Cf id. at 634 n.51 (warning that the "empirical work on arbitrator decision
processes to date has been limited to data derived from labor arbitrators"). See also supra note
102; cf supra note 179.
191. Cf TEX. Gov. CODE ANN. § 81.079(b) (West 1993). This recent statute requires
attorneys to give notice to clients of "the existence of a grievance process," either by (1) mak-
ing available brochures prepared by the state bar, (2) displaying a sign in the attorney's office,
or through information contained (3) in the client contract or (4) in the attorney's bill.
Of course, information conveyed at the beginning of the relationship, as envisaged by the
first three alternatives, might be inadequate where the client has not yet focused his attention
on the problem and the dispute has not yet crystallized. A better psychological moment for
requiring information about arbitration might be shortly after the attorney is "notified by the
client of a fee dispute." See HALT, supra note 159, Rule I l(a). This alternative does, how-
ever, put the onus on the client to take the initiative of challenging a fee before being given any
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the process will be like and what they should expect to happen; written
materials or program staff may be called on to provide information with
respect to such matters as how to prepare and to put on a case, what docu-
ments the arbitrators are likely to want to see and how to obtain them, 192
and how to go about challenging an unfavorable award. 193 And at the hear-
ing itself some considerable care may have to be expended to insure that the
client's story is adequately told and that the facts are adequately devel-
oped. 194 Ensuring that the arbitration process becomes more user-friendly
information about the availability of arbitration, and it also obviously creates some definitional
complexity. See HALT, supra note 159, Rule 1 l(b) (defining "notified... of a fee dispute" to
mean a communication "that indicates the client disagrees with or is dissatisfied with" the fee).
Some of the states with mandatory programs require an attorney to give notice to the client
of the right to arbitration before the attorney may file suit to collect a fee. This then permits
the client to move to stay the collection suit in favor of arbitration. See, e.g., N.J. R. GEN.
APPLIC. RULE 1:20A-6; ALASKA STATE BAR RULES RULE 39(a). Obviously this type of
notice cannot deal with the converse situation where it is the client rather than the attorney
who is the claimant.
192. See, e.g., FLA. BAR, CONSUMER GUIDE TO THE LEGAL FEE ARBITRATION PRO-
GRAM (1991) ("What Information Should I Furnish to the Circuit Arbitration Committee?");
MASS. BAR ASS'N, A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL FEE ARBITRATION BOARD.
The rules of many state programs explicitly grant arbitrators the power to subpoena evi-
dence or the appearance of witnesses at the request of either party. See, e.g., ALASKA STATE
BAR RULES Rule 37(i)(3); N.J. R. GEN. APPLIC. Rule :20A-3(b)(2); STATE BAR OF CALIF.,
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE HEARING OF FEE ARBITRATIONS, Rule 28.0. In other cases
the arbitrators may have such powers under the general arbitration statute in the jurisdiction.
See, e.g., MAINE BAR RULES Rule 9(g)(3). The need to exercise the subpoena power on behalf
of the client, helping him to obtain necessary evidence in the attorney's possession, is some-
what mitigated where the burden of proof on the issue of the reasonableness of the disputed fee
is placed on the attorney rather than on the client. See, e.g., N.J. R. GEN. APPLIC. Rule
1:20A-3(b)(l) ("burden of proof shall be on the attorney to prove the reasonableness of the fee
in accordance with [the Rules of Professional Conduct] by a preponderance of the evidence").
193. See Marino v. Tagaris, 480 N.E.2d 286 (Mass. 1985). Arbitrators here had decided a
fee dispute in favor of the attorney. The award was confirmed on the attorney's motion but the
court reversed, even though the statutory period for moving to vacate an unfavorable arbitra-
tion had expired. Id. at 286. The client claimed that she had not realized she had the right to
move to vacate the award, and "she did not challenge the award only because she was unaware
that it was possible to do so." Id. at 290. The court noted that neither the rules of the arbitra-
tion program nor the "guide" sent to clients by the bar association "explicitly refers" to the
client's right to move to vacate awards, and it found as a result that the client had not been
"sufficiently apprise[d]" of her right to challenge the award. Id. The informational deficien-
cies noted by the court seem to have been remedied since Marino was decided. See MASS. BAR
ASS'N, A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL FEE ARBITRATION BOARD (n.d.) ("What if I disagree with
the arbitrator's decision?"; brochure stresses time limits and grounds for overturning awards,
and the need "in most cases" to retain an attorney before filing a formal motion to vacate).
To the same effect as Marino, see Pickens v. Weaver, 219 Cal. Rptr. 91, 94 (Cal. App. 1985)
(both the form sent the client by the local bar association and the arbitration award "failed to
provide any guidance necessary to a lay person concerning the proper court for filing a peti-
tion" for review of the award or the time limitations within which to do so).
194. In refusing to confirm the arbitration award, the court in Marino also found that the
client, a housewife who had led "a relatively sheltered life," may never have been given an
adequate explanation of "what she [could] expect to confront at the hearing." Marino, 480
N.E.2d at 287. The court particularly emphasized that in conversations with the program staff
prior to the hearing, "it was stressed to her that she did not need an attorney to represent her,
since the hearing was 'informal.' " Id. at 290. As a result, the court suggested (although
without so holding) that her understanding of arbitration might even have been so faulty as to
prevent a "meeting of the minds" necessary for a valid arbitration agreement. Id.
Nowhere, however, did the court explain whether or why it had in fact been necessary for
the client to hire an attorney for the arbitration, even if the amount in dispute had been large
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in ways like these is likely to make some call upon the resources of program
administrators, although other alternatives might be canvassed. 195 If no ef-
fort at all is made in this direction, however, the vaunted "informality" of
the arbitration process might become nothing more than a snare for clients
who are unfamiliar even with "the factors relevant in mounting a successful
challenge to the claimed fee,"' 196 but who are faced nevertheless with deci-
sion-makers inclined to decide cases in accordance with "official" legal
principles. 197
Legitimacy of the fee arbitration process might also be enhanced where
arbitrators are expected to give some explanation of their awards in written
opinions. One major goal here is to justify the result to the parties, assuring
them that the arbitrator has given some thought to the decision, that he has
heard and considered their various contentions, and that the result is an
arguable one supported by reason or policy or experience rather than a mat-
ter of mere fiat. Requiring a written opinion might also tend to ensure that
possible issues of professional misconduct or ethical violations have been ad-
dressed for purposes of later disciplinary action. 19 8 All this would of course
mean going well beyond the one-sentence dispositions that are typical in
commercial arbitration' 99 and that indeed seem to be mandated by the rules
of some fee arbitration programs. 20 0 The writing of fully-reasoned opinions
might well be too much to expect from the volunteer arbitrators who will
staff most arbitration programs, 20' but at least some indication in summary
enough to justify the expense of doing so-or why the advice of the program staff to represent
herself had in fact been misleading. The primary defect in the award rather appears to lie
elsewhere, in the failure of the proceeding to permit a fair presentation of the client's case.
Apparently the client, relying on representations that the proceeding would be "informal,"
came to the hearing and spoke for two minutes. The attorney then himself made a "lengthy
presentation," but the client was not permitted by the arbitrators to respond because they were
"running behind schedule." Id. at 288; cf MASS. BAR ASS'N, A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL FEE
ARBITRATION BOARD (n.d.) ("You will have a chance to respond to statements made by the
other person, and you will also have an opportunity at the end of the hearing to summarize
your position.").
195. See D.C. BAR, ATTORNEY-CLIENT ARBITRATION BOARD, RULES OF PROCEDURE
FOR FEE ARBITRATION SERVICE, Rule 42 (suggesting that in order to assist clients in present-
ing claims in arbitration, the Board might obtain "the services either of members of the Bar or
of law students who are working under the supervision of a faculty member as part of a regular
law school program").
196. Marino, 480 N.E.2d at 289-90.
197. Richard Lempert has referred to adjudication that is conducted in an informal style,
but where "the decision is almost always fully determined by legal criteria," as an example of
"hidden legalism."). Richard Lempert, The Dynamics of Informal Procedure: The Case of a
Public Housing Eviction Board, 23 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 347, 390-92 (1989).
198. See supra note 145.
199. See MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 35, at 401, 495-97.
200. See, e.g., WY. STATE BAR, RULES FOR RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES, Rule 12(b)
("The award shall state only the amount of the award, if any, and the terms of payment if
applicable."); D.C. BAR, ATTORNEY-CLIENT ARBITRATION BOARD, RULES OF PROCEDURE
FOR FEE ARBITRATION SERVICE, Rule 37 ("No opinion shall be issued with the award."); cf
MAINE BAR RULES Rules 9(h)(2) (award "need not be in any particular form, but shall con-
tain, as a minimum, a statement of the amount or nature of the award, if any, and the terms of
payment, if applicable").
201. The SEC has recently decided not to require that awards in securities arbitrations
include written opinions, on the ground that such a requirement could "slow down the arbitra-
2060 [Vol. 46
DISPUTES OVER ATTORNEYS' FEES
fashion of the principal considerations that motivated the award might be a
reasonable substitute. 20 2
Where arbitrators write opinions to explain and justify their decisions, ju-
dicial scrutiny of an award is made that much easier; 20 3 court challenges by
dissatisfied parties now supplied with grounds for vacating an award become
that much more likely. Indeed, one rationale for a requirement of a rea-
soned opinion in arbitration seems precisely to be that it will make possible a
broader scope of judicial review of the award. 2 °4
It is, however, by no means clear that fee arbitration awards should be
subject to any more extensive form of judicial review than are other types of
awards. It has been suggested that closer scrutiny of fee arbitration awards
might be justified by a court's "inherent power to regulate the practices of
members of the bar," and that such review is an exercise of the court's role
in maintaining public confidence in the conduct of attorneys and the fairness
of the judicial system.20 5 It is also sometimes suggested that a more elabo-
rate review of awards is required in cases where arbitration has been made
mandatory, and that where arbitration is imposed on the parties the judicial
deference usually accorded awards in consensual arbitration may be totally
tion process and discourage many persons from participating as arbitrators." David A. Lip-
ton, Generating Precedent in Securities Industry Arbitration, 19 SEC. REG. L.J. 26, 42 n.51
(1991); cf Brickman, supra note 133, at 293, 307 (Arbitrators in fee disputes should be re-
quired to "demonstrate" that they have applied "relevant ethical and fiduciary doctrines" by
setting out in their decisions "the specific applications of fiduciary law and ethical rules that
were made in the matter before them.").
202. See, e.g., N.J. R. GEN. APPLic. Rule 1:20A-3(b)(4) (award "shall have annexed a brief
statement of reasons therefor"); STATE BAR OF CALIF., RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE
HEARING OF FEE ARBITRATIONS, Rule 36.2 ("arbitrators are encouraged, where appropriate,
to file findings of fact with their awards"); ALASKA STATE BAR RULES Rule 40(q) (award
"will include" findings "on all issues and questions submitted which are necessary to resolve
the dispute" and "a specific finding as to whether the matter should be referred to Bar Counsel
for appropriate disciplinary proceedings").
The Massachusetts arbitration rules require the award to state "the factors which may have
influenced the panel's decision." MASS. BAR ASS'N, RULES OF THE LEGAL FEE ARBITRA-
TION BOARD, Rule VI(D)(2). This requirement has been institutionalized through a form
arbitration award, the reverse side of which recites that "[t]he Arbitrator(s) considered each of
the following eleven factors"; there follows a list that essentially reproduces the laundry list of
Rule 1.5(a) of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. See supra note 8. The form
then asks the arbitrator to indicate whether each item on the list has been a "principal factor"
in the decision, an "other significant factor," or "not applicable to this case." MASS. BAR
ASS'N, RULES OF THE LEGAL FEE ARBITRATION BOARD, Rule VI(D)(2). The result is a
stylized memorandum of such a high level of generality and abstraction from the facts of the
particular dispute that the parties are hardly likely to obtain any great insight from it into the
arbitrator's decision-making process.
203. One California judge has advised commercial arbitrators that in the event "they feel
compelled by some uncontrollable urge, literary fluency, good conscience, or mere garrulous-
ness to express themselves about a case they have tried, the opinion should be a separate docu-
ment and not part of the award itself." Herbert L. Sherman, Analysis of Pennsylvania
Arbitration Act of 1980, 43 U. PrrT. L. REV. 363, 397 (1982) (quoting Loew, Inc. v. Krug, No.
609, 196 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles City, Santa Monica, Dept. A., December 2, 1953)).
204. See, e.g., Brickman, supra note 163, at 293 ("Lacking articulation of the arbitrator's
rationale, it is impossible to determine whether the arbitrator applied the wrong law. ...
Therefore, to ensure that arbitrators apply fiduciary and ethical rules, arbitrators.., should be
required to reveal the rationale for their awards.").
205. Marino v. Tagaris, 480 N.E.2d 286, 289 (Mass. 1989). See generally supra notes 121-
25 and accompanying text.
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out of place. 20 6 But of course, the same supervisory power over the bar that
supports the imposition of mandatory arbitration in the first place207 could
also support extensive limitations on the right of attorneys to challenge
awards resulting from the process imposed on them. Some mandatory arbi-
tration programs in fact do as a practical matter cut off all review of the
award. 208
While eliminating any judicial review at all may be somewhat extreme,
any review process must have as its primary focus an attempt to ensure that
the client's consent was meaningful and that the proceeding itself was not
tainted by misconduct or partiality on the part of the decision-maker.20 9 Be-
yond that, there appear to be no reasons to assume a priori that arbitrators
would not be competent or inclined to apply any relevant legal rules,
whether of contract law or of professional regulation, to the resolution of a
fee dispute.210 Extending judicial scrutiny to include a "substantive review"
with respect to whether these legal standards were "properly applied" 21'
206. See Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Mercer County Improvement
Auth., 386 A.2d 1290, 1294 (N.J. 1978) (compulsory arbitration for public sector labor dis-
putes; judicial review "should extend to consideration of whether the award is supported by
substantial credible evidence present in the record," the test "normally applied to the review of
administrative agency decisions and . . . particularly appropriate here"); Mount St. Mary's
Hosp. v. Catherwood, 260 N.E.2d 508, 576 (N.Y. 1970) (compulsory "interest" arbitration
between unions and private nonprofit hospitals; process "is a substitute for a determination of
the dispute by an administrative or regulatory agency," and "its objective may not be accom-
plished under lower constitutional standards" than would be required of such an agency);
MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, supra note 81, § 8, cmt. (arbitration award may
be vacated if arbitrator committed "prejudicial error of law"; this ground of review was added
because under the statute, arbitration "has been imposed upon, not agreed to by, the parties"
and because individual statutory rights are in issue).
However, a rule of stricter review where the process is mandatory is by no means universal.
See Allison, supra note 81, at 70-72; see also CONN. GEN. STATS. § 7-473c(c)(3) (mandatory
"interest" arbitration for municipal employees; award made final and binding except for
grounds on which any award could be overturned under state's general arbitration law). But
cf Carofano v. City of Bridgeport, 495 A.2d 1011, 1018 (Conn. 1985) (scope of review under
this statute is not "so essentially different in practical application from that available for re-
viewing determinations of administrative agencies that any constitutional deficiency is
perceptible.").
207. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
208. Under the New Jersey program, no appeal of an arbitration award can be taken to a
court; either party may appeal to the state's Disciplinary Review Board, but the grounds for
such appeal are essentially limited to failure by the arbitrators "substantially to comply" with
the procedural requirements of the program or "actual fraud" on the part of any member of
the panel. N.J. R. GEN. APPLIC. Rule 1:20A-3(c); Office of Attorney Ethics of the Sup. Ct. of
N.J., Report, supra note 83, at 111-12; In re Livolsi, 428 A.2d 1268, 1282 (N.J. 1981) ("appeals
of this kind to the DRB will ordinarily not require clients to find a new lawyer or incur any of
the other expenses which would have to be incurred in court").
209. These are of course the traditional, and highly restrictive, grounds for challenging
awards found in most modern arbitration statutes. See, e.g. FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, 19
U.S.C. §§ 1, 10 (1988).
210. See supra notes 163-65, 175 and accompanying text. It must be acknowledged how-
ever that unlike most other sorts of "ethical" restrictions on the practice of law, the prohibition
of "excessive" fees is particularly likely to expose the latent tension between the norms of
professional regulation and the "ethic of free enterprise" to which most attorneys subscribe,
see WOLFRAM, supra note 10, at 516 ("Lawyers will always be inadequate enforcers of fee
limitations because their economic hearts aren't in it."); cf supra notes 25-29 and accompany-
ing text.
211. Brickman, supra note 133, at 306-07.
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would be certain to undermine the finality of arbitration and, by promising
further proceedings, would lead to substantially increased cost and delay. 212
Even if it were somehow possible to limit review of awards to appeals
brought by dissatisfied clients rather than by attorneys, 2 13 the likely result of
an extended review on the merits would be a radical transformation and
formalization of the arbitration process itself. Such a trade-off seems to be of
extremely doubtful utility to the client. Even in the usual case where judicial
review will be possible only on the narrow "procedural" grounds provided
for in general arbitration statutes,214 considerable forbearance will have to be
exercised by courts in order to ensure that their role in reviewing awards
does not come to affect the efficiencies of the arbitration process.
c. Mediation Prior to Arbitration
While the rules of some state arbitration programs contemplate that the
arbitrators "shall attempt to facilitate the amicable resolution of the dis-
pute, ' 2 15 in practice mediation between attorney and client has not played a
212. The HALT Model Rules provide that awards may be overturned only on grounds of
fraud by one of the parties, partiality or misconduct on the part of the arbitrator, procedural
irregularity, or newly discovered evidence; "[m]isinterpretations or misapplications of substan-
tive law shall not be grounds" for overturning an award. HALT, Fee Arbitration: Model
Rules & Commentary, supra note 158, Rule 37. Comments to the rules caution that "[u]nless
arbitration provides a final decision for both parties, it simply adds an unnecessary layer of
time and expense to the proceedings." See also In re Livolsi, 428 A.2d at 1281-82 (upholding
mandatory fee arbitration program including the absence of any appeal from an award; "[tihe
least we owe to the public is a swift, fair and inexpensive method of resolving fee disputes";
finality of awards "protects clients who can ill afford the time and expense" of defending an
award on appeal).
213. Cf Brickman, supra note 133, at 306 (construing In re Livolsi, 428 A.2d 1268 (N.J.
1931), as limited to cases where the petition for review was brought by the attorney rather than
by the client).
214. See supra note 209. This is accomplished in most fee arbitration programs by incorpo-
rating into the rules of the program the standards of the state's general arbitration statute. See,
e.g., ME. BAR RULES Rule 9(i) (mandatory program; award "may be enforced in accordance
with the Uniform Arbitration Act"); ALASKA STATE BAR RULES Rule 40(t) (mandatory pro-
gram); GA. BAR RULES Rule 6-417 (voluntary program).
See also James P. Hargarten & Susan A. Ardisson, Fine Tuning California's Mandatory
Attorney Fee Arbitration Statute, 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 411, 431-32 (1982) (limited grounds for
review, but the necessity for client to defend attorney's action to vacate award can result in
considerable expense and delay for him).
215. ATTORNEY-CLIENT ARBITRATION BOARD OF THE D.C. BAR, RULES OF PROCE-
DURE FOR FEE ARBITRATION SERVICE, Rules 9, 10, 11. The D.C. Rules only contemplate
such attempts at "informal settlement" in cases where either the client or the attorney has not
actually consented to the arbitration process itself. But see FLA. BAR RULES OF PROCEDURE
FOR ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS II.G. ("The chairperson may appoint a member of the [cir-
cuit arbitration] committee to assist the parties in seeking settlement."); S.C. Bar, Resolution
of Fee Disputes Board, Rule 4 ("It shall be the duty of the Board to encourage the amicable
resolution of fee disputes falling within its jurisdiction."), Rule 12 (Member of panel assigned
to investigate complaint "shall encourage resolution of the complaint by compromise if he
finds that compromise is consistent with these rules."); cf ME. BAR RULES Rule 9(e)(2) ("Af-
ter the petition [for arbitration] is filed ... it shall be expeditiously reviewed by Bar Counsel,
who may endeavor to resolve the dispute informally, and for such purposes may communicate
directly with the petitioner and the attorney against whom the claim is being made."). Travis
County (Texas) has a formal two-stage procedure under which, "[i]f either party requests me-
diation ... mediation services will be offered to the disputants"; [i]f mediation is not requested,
or if mediation does not result in an agreement, the disputants will be requested to appear for
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major part in existing procedures for resolution of fee disputes. One may
naturally expect, before the arbitration proceeding is formally put in motion,
that a number of informal contacts, in the form of correspondence or phone
conversations, will take place between either or both of the disputants and
personnel of the program. These may usefully serve to clarify the nature of
the dispute and to determine that the dispute is indeed one over which the
arbitrators have jurisdiction; before and even during the hearing itself, it
may be common to urge accommodation on the part of the attorney. 21 6
However, the utility of institutionalizing mediation as a preliminary stage for
fee disputes, promoting or relying on the process before an arbitration award
is rendered, may seriously be questioned.
At whatever stage of the dispute the parties find themselves, one might
sensibly have a preference for consensual rather than imposed or adjudicated
solutions to resolve it. This preference is a major theme that is sounded in a
particularly rich literature on the subject. 21 7 Mediated settlements, it is
claimed, have at least the potential to lead to outcomes that are "superior"
to those resulting from adjudication-"superior" in that they are more likely
to take into account the particular circumstances and needs of the parties, to
be responsive to the parties' particular values and concerns, and to go be-
yond traditional adjudicative outcomes by displaying greater flexibility and
creativity in the solutions reached and the remedies provided. 2 18 As a result,
arbitration." TRAVIS COUNTY BAR Ass'N, FEE DISPUTE RESOLUTION BY-LAWS, § 1.01.
The rules of the Hawaii program are similar, see HAWAII STATE BAR ASS'N, ATTORNEY-
CLIENT RELATIONS COMM., RULES FOR THE MEDIATION/ARBITRATION OF FEE DISPUTES,
Rule 4.9 (committee member assigned to the case is to contact both client and attorney to
"determine whether the parties desire mediation or arbitration").
In other states, by contrast, it is specifically provided that the "arbitrators will not engage in
efforts to settle the controversy." E.g., LA. GUIDELINES FOR LSBA-SPONSORED LEGAL FEE
DISPUTE ARBITRATION 11.
216. See Cox, supra note 59 (arbitrator with D.C. program comments that "[t]ypically ....
[t]he attorney skids in at the last minute, and the arbitrator then takes the attorney aside and
cajoles him about working something out. Which leaves the client outside of the process,
seething").
217. See, e.g., Baruch Bush, supra note 88, at 267-70 ("Mediation places the substantive
outcome of the dispute within the control and determination of the parties themselves ...
[and] not only allows the parties to set their own standards for an acceptable solution, it also
requires them to search for solutions that are within their own capacity to effectuate."); HOW-
ARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 219 (1982) ("Joint gains could be
realized if only the contending parties were willing to yield up enough sovereignty to allow a
mediator to help them devise creative alternatives and to help them analyze their joint prob-
lem."); Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 429-31 (1986); JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR,
MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION
10 (1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure
of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 795-809 (1984).
218. See the catalog of various claims for the "higher quality" of settlements in Marc Ga-
lanter, The Quality of Settlements, 1988 J. DIsP. RESOL. 55, 62-63.
The potential for greater flexibility and responsiveness in mediated settlements is easily illus-
trated. Such a settlement, for example, could provide the respondent with an extended period
in which to discharge the debt, at the same time providing the claimant with "a security inter-
est as a hedge against non-payment and as a means to raise the priority of the claim in the
event of bankruptcy," and providing both parties an agreed-upon dispute resolution method to
which they could resort "to iron out any future disputes without return to litigation." See
NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE 18
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it is suggested, disputants who have been through mediation are likely to feel
more "satisfaction," both with the quality of the outcome and with the expe-
rience of the process itself, than those undergoing alternative processes like
adjudication. 219
Whether this potential of mediation does in fact tend to be realized, in any
substantial proportion of mediation proceedings as actually conducted, can
hardly be demonstrated empirically. The case may ultimately rest on little
more than anecdote, intuition, or a priori inclination.220 But in any event, in
(1989). Another example is suggested by the mediation of an attorney-client fee dispute ob-
served by the author. A fee dispute can of course be "compromised" at a given dollar level
either by arbitrators or by the parties themselves. However, in mediation a "compromise" can
be fashioned by helping the parties to focus on particular charges that one or the other may
care about very much: Charges arising out of particular phone calls, for example, that the
client particularly resents ("Why should I have to pay anything at all to clarify this?") could
on the basis of such strong feelings be reduced or eliminated. In other processes, by contrast,
even a similar compromise in dollar terms seems more likely to come from elsewhere-either
from an unexplained, unrationalized desire for a middle ground between opposing contentions,
or from discrimination between claims that are stronger or weaker or more or less plausible in
terms of the prevailing law. See Sander, Family Mediation: Problems and Prospects, MEDIA-
TION Q., Dec. 1983, at 3, 6 (Mediation "involves a wide-ranging inquiry into what the inter-
ested parties want to talk about; it is not dominated by what the judge wants to hear about.").
219. See Stephen B. Goldberg & Jeanne M. Brett, Disputants' Perspectives on the Differ-
ences between Mediation and Arbitration, NEG. J., July 1990, at 249 (labor arbitration); see also
Stephen B. Goldberg, The Mediation of Grievances under a Collective Bargaining Contract: An
Alternative to Arbitration, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 270, 283-84 (1982).
A commonly-advanced corollary to the "satisfaction" argument is that the parties are more
likely to comply with settlements they have fashioned themselves rather than with imposed
solutions; this may be attributed to the "guarantees of personal honor" and assumption of
personal responsibility added by the fact of agreement, to the greater likelihood that consen-
sual agreements will entail "reciprocal obligations that provide powerful incentives for per-
forming in accordance with the agreement," or to "pressures toward cognitive consistency"
leading parties to "structure later behavior in accordance with prior commitments." Craig A.
McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance
through Consent, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 11, 40-45 (1984). But cf Neil Vidmar, Assessing the
Effects of Case Characteristics and Settlement Forum on Dispute Outcomes and Compliance, 21
LAW & Soc'y REV. 155 (1987) (arguing that "prehearing sense of obligation" and awareness
of partial liability might better explain compliance; in general, data of McEwen & Maiman are
inadequate to determine whether greater compliance in mediated cases "is a result of consen-
sual processes arising from case characteristics or from the forum itself"). See also Owen M.
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1086 n.35 (1984) (increased compliance with
consent decrees as opposed to adjudicated cases "may well be due to the fact that a consent
decree asks less of the defendant").
Superior outcome and participant satisfaction are not of course the only criteria by which
the "quality" of dispute resolution processes may be judged. One might readily identify other
possible goals of dispute processing that, it seems plausible to assume, are better advanced by
mediation than by adjudication. For example, value may be attached to the capacity of media-
tion to encourage personal growth on the part of the participants-growth that may further
their sense of competence or autonomy, or effect some personal transformation. See, e.g., Rob-
ert Baruch Bush, Defining Quality in Dispute Resolution: Taxonomies and Anti-Taxonomies of
Quality Arguments, 66 DENy. U. L. REV. 335, 347-48 (1989) (defining "quality" partly in
terms of whether processes "strengthen the capacity and increase the opportunity for disputing
parties to resolve their own problems" or "encourage individual disputants to experience per-
sonal change and growth, particularly in terms of becoming less self-centered and more re-
sponsive to others"); see also Baruch Bush, supra note 88, at 270 (power of mediation to evoke
"mutual recognition," in the interest of "escaping our alienated isolation and rediscovering our
common humanity"); infra note 236 and accompanying text.
220. See Galanter, supra note 218, at 59, 65-68 ("real life does not offer nicely matched
pairs of cases; there is no judicial counterpart of identical twin research"); Kenneth Kressel &
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the context of disputes between attorneys and clients over legal fees, any
such possible virtues seem particularly attenuated and likely to be out-
weighed by other considerations. The qualities that are most important to
people in determining their satisfaction with a dispute-resolution process
may, after all, turn out to be nothing more than these: having a chance to be
heard, having some "control over the processing or handling of the case,"
and receiving a careful, thorough, fair, and dignified attention to one's
claims. 221 Both mediated settlements and arbitration proceedings seem to
some degree capable of providing these essential elements. However, for the
client engaged in a dispute with an attorney over a fee, a preliminary stage of
mediation-without arbitration's guarantee of a final resolution-may ap-
pear to be just one more hurdle to jump, and an invitation to further delay.
Dean G. Pruitt, Themes in the Mediation of Social Conflict, 41 J. Soc. ISSUES 179, 184-85(1985) (among the "reasons for caution about the evidence favoring mediation," there is the
problem of self-selection and the "absence of controls for placebo effects"; "[p]eople often
draw benefit from a novel, intriguing, and enthusiastically administered form of treatment
when the treatment itself has no inherent merit"): Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:
Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1549 nn.8,9 (1991).
221. See E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS
OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 61-
66 (Rand 1989). By contrast, delay, litigation costs, and the parties' perceived opportunity to
participate in the proceedings, all appear to play relatively insignificant roles in determining
satisfaction with a dispute resolution process. "The findings do not reveal much interest on the
part of litigants in very informal, high-participative, simplified procedures." Id. at viii-x, 55-
57, 62, 75-76; see also id. at 21-22 (distinguishing "participation" from "control").
The force of these conclusions may be somewhat limited by the constraints of the study
design. The universe in this study was limited to personal injury cases, with awards of $35,000
or less, which were resolved following one of three third-party procedures-trial, court-an-
nexed arbitration, or judicial settlement conference. Most defendants in these cases were in-
sured, and therefore relatively indifferent to legal costs; plaintiffs were represented on a
contingent-fee basis and so their legal costs may have been hidden within a favorable outcome.
Id. at 57, 77. In almost all cases, the individual litigants had been excluded from actual partic-
ipation in the settlement conferences. Id. at 31-32.
But see, for very similar conclusions, LIND & TYLER, supra note 182. Lind & Tyler argue
that "(p]rocedures are viewed as fairer when they vest process control or voice [typically in the
'mere experience of an opportunity for expression'] in those affected by a decision." Id. at 86,
94-127, 208, 215-17. By contrast, some recent studies indicate that the power to control out-
comes (as occurs in mediation) does not appear to be the most powerful determinant of proce-
dural justice as perceived by most people; where, for example, disputants were allowed to
reject the decision of a third-party neutral in favor of the option of attempting to negotiate a
settlement, "the capacity to veto the decision maker's verdict had no substantial effect onjudgments of the fairness of the procedure, even when the judgment was quite unfavorable to
the subject." See id.; see also E. Allan Lind et al., Decision Control and Process Control Effects
on Procedural Fairness Judgments, 13 J. APP. SOC. PSYCH. 338 (1983) ("[t]he move to nonad-
versary mediation might result in a lessening of disputant acceptance of legal institutions.");
Houlden et al., Preference for Modes of Dispute Resolution as a Function of Process and Deci-
sion Control, 14 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 13, 16, 26 (1978) (in cases of "extreme
outcome conflict," disputants generally prefer procedures that place control over the presenta-
tion of evidence in their hands, but leave the final decision to a third party, since the sharing of
decision control between the parties would result in a "lack of settlement [which] might easily
be as unsatisfactory as an unfavorable solution"). Compare Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod,
Procedural Preference as a Function of Conflict Intensity 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
700, 709 (1986) (while disputants may indeed prefer arbitration in high-conflict situations, they
will prefer mediation in cases where there is a greater possibility of compromise, "for its assist-
ance with the definition of an appropriate settlement and for its assistance with concession
exchange free of the appearance of weakness").
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For the least hardy of claimants, discouragement and attrition would seem
inevitable.222 A balancing process may lead to the conclusion that such a
preliminary stage is not in fact worth the candle in fee cases, and this seems
particularly appropriate where arbitration itself to some extent may have the
ability to serve some of the same functions that are claimed for mediation.
It is, of course, a truism that many fee disputes will arise out of a failure of
"communication" between attorney and client over the nature and extent of
lawyering called for by the client's problem. 223 Most people, as Stewart Ma-
caulay has observed, "are not sure just what they want from a lawyer or
what a lawyer has to offer." '224 Unrealistic expectations may be formed with
regard to the client's objectives, and these may persist long after the initial
interviews; unrealistic expectations are particularly likely with respect to the
cost of achieving those objectives, 225 and attitudes of deference or depen-
dency may tend to discourage attempts by ordinary clients to clarify the
matter in advance-and are even more likely to discourage advance attempts
to limit or control costs. One might well think, then, that, with respect to
expectations concerning fees a process of assisted negotiation or mediation
might serve to clear up any such muddles at a stage where crossed signals
may have become apparent, but before they have hardened irrevocably into
222. Where the parties have failed to settle voluntarily, it is often thought undesirable for
the same neutral who had served as a mediator to go on to act as an arbitrator. It is natural to
be concerned that involvement in settlement discussions might impair the arbitrator's neutral-
ity, or appearance of neutrality, once he has to issue an award; to mediate while reserving the
power to render a binding decision entails a "confusion of roles" that is often criticized and
should probably be avoided. See MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 35, at 594-601; see
also Goldberg, supra note 219, at 284. In such cases, an additional layer of mediation may
appear even more cumbersome and time-consuming. See, e.g., the two-stage procedure of me-
diation followed by arbitration provided for in Travis County, supra note 215.
Goldberg argues that a preliminary stage of mediation is in fact likely to reduce the overall
system cost, since "the money saved in successful mediation [multiplied] by the proportion of
successful mediation efforts" is likely to exceed "the money lost in unsuccessful mediation
efforts multiplied by the proportion of unsuccessful mediation efforts." "Considerable empiri-
cal evidence exists that mediation resolves a sufficient proportion of grievances to achieve some
savings in time and money[.]" Goldberg, supra note 219, at 288, 290. This certainly seems
plausible in the context of grievance disputes under collective bargaining agreements, where an
increasingly formalized arbitration process is itself likely to entail considerable cost; in addi-
tion, the existence of a well-understood and institutionalized grievance procedure, and external
constraints on union discretion in the form of the duty of fair representation, mean that cases
not resolved in mediation will be routinely carried to the next stage of arbitration. The absence
of these elements in attorney-client fee disputes makes the cost calculus much less certain, and
makes the likelihood of attrition through delay and cost much more likely.
It is also true that even where the rate of unsuccessful mediation is high, overall efficiencies
might still result from the exchanges of information, partial resolution of issues, and sharpen-
ing of focus that the process often makes possible. See ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 218,
at 24. Unfortunately, this theoretical possibility may go unperceived by many weary
claimants.
223. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
224. STEWART MACAULAY, LAWYER-CLIENT INTERACTION: WHO CARES AND How
Do WE FIND OUT WHAT WE WANT TO KNOW? 16-17 (1984).
225. See William L. F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality
and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1460-61 (1992)
(clients "may expect more of the legal system than it can deliver under even the best of circum-
stances," and are "slow to understand the costs of achieving their objectives").
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adversarial positions. The process might then make possible an ongoing rep-
resentation that both attorney and client have an interest in continuing.
It does appear to be true that the post-conflict relations between dispu-
tants are more likely to survive a process of mediation than adjudication.
Traditionally, therefore, disputants have most often turned to consensual
settlement where they were parties to "multi-stranded social relation-
ships,"' 226 who have expectations of continued interaction in the future and
who are attempting to deal with a present dispute while preserving a rela-
tionship that adjudication might jeopardize. 227 However, in most cases of
attorney-client conflict, one suspects that once private discussions between
the parties have failed to resolve the matter, the likelihood that any substan-
tial incentive remains for a continued working relationship is extremely re-
mote. A lawyer with inadequate communication skills to resolve differences
about a bill directly with the client is unlikely to have any serious chance of
retaining him once third parties become involved. 228 In addition, attorneys
familiar with fee arbitration routinely claim that disputes between lawyers
and clients are in any event more likely to arise and to prove intractable in
cases that are "one-shot" transactions for the client, where in consequence
226. Sally E. Merry, Disputing Without Culture, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2057, 2061 (1987)
(reviewing STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985)).
227. This is usually attributed to the greater incentives, arising out of the relationship itself,
for problem-solving behavior and integrative bargaining-and to the correlative ability of pri-
vately-crafted settlements to focus on the future, make necessary trade-offs, and take account
of the complex needs of the ongoing relationship and of each party's real "interests, expecta-
tions, and emotions." It may also, however, be related to the attention paid in private
processes to communication, interpersonal recognition, and learning about how to deal with
future disputes, and, conversely, to the tendency of adjudication to promote escalation of con-
flict and "all or nothing" solutions. See P. H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 13-17 (1979); see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 55-64 (1991) (in the interests of "long-
term reciprocity of advantage," disputes arising from trespassing animals are settled "beyond
the shadow of the law"; "one might suspect that the norms of neighborliness include a norm
against the invocation of formal legal rights"); Bonn, supra note 90, at 574-75 (in textile indus-
try, a seller pursues arbitration "mainly against marginal firms with whom he enjoys only a
marginal business relationship and with whom he entertains poor prospects of future business
relationships," choosing instead to make some informal accommodations with buyers who
were "customers with good future business prospects"); Merry, supra note 226, at 2061 ("[I]f a
murder occurred between two Nuer tribesmen and their kinsmen lived nearby and expected to
see one another in the future, they would mediate the dispute and pay bloodwealth in cattle. If
they had few kin ties, however, and lived further apart, they would refuse to pay damages and
transform their relationship into a feud."); Josephine M. Zubek et al., Disputant and Mediator
Behaviors Affecting Short-Term Success in Mediation, 36 J. CONFLICT RES. 546, 549, 568
(1992); cf Kressel & Pruitt, supra note 220, at 183-84 ("the evidence in this regard appears
qualified"; "more serious, ongoing disputes between parties with a continuing relationship are
likely to be mediated, but they are also prone to agreement breakdowns and to further
problems between the parties after the mediation hearing").
228. Indeed, Merry & Silbey's study of disputing in neighborhoods suggests that in general
"by the time a conflict is serious enough to warrant an outsider's intervention," disputants
simply may not want what mediation may have to offer. At the point that they are willing to
turn to others for help in dealing with their problem, they are likely instead to want "vindica-
tion, protection of [their] rights ... or a third party who will uncover the 'truth' and declare
the other party wrong." Sally E. Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexam-
ining the Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 151, 153 (1984). This preference, they suggest,
may explain the low rate of "voluntary" usage (that is, not referred by the judicial system) of
alternative processes like mediation. Id. at 152-54.
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no ongoing attorney-client relationship was likely ever to have been contem-
plated by the parties in the first place.229 The paradigm is the divorce or
custody case, which in fact appears to be a fertile ground for fee disputes.230
229. In the New Jersey fee arbitration program, 40.5% of the fee disputes that lead to
formal arbitration proceedings arise out of Domestic Relations matters (including matrimo-
nial, support, and custody cases). Office of Attorney Ethics of the Sup. Ct. of N.J., Rep., supra
note 83, at 116. The state's Office of Attorney Ethics attributes this, however, to the "ex-
tremely emotional and often volatile nature of these matters." Id.
One can of course always imagine counter-examples which may in particular cases make
mediation seem appropriate. And even where there is indeed no serious prospect of any future
relationship between the disputants themselves, the attorney at least might have some interest
in a consensual solution that increased the chances of favorable word-of-mouth and future
referrals from the client. One also needs to take into account the effect of the dispute, and of
the dispute resolution process, on similar relationships that either attorney or client might have
in the future with similar parties: Will the fee dispute leave "a residue of mistrust and hostil-
ity" that may negatively affect later transactions by this client with other attorneys, or by this
attorney with other clients, generating "an environment of suspicion and hostility in which
both sides pay a considerable price in self-protective or aggressive efforts"? See Baruch Bush,
supra note 95, at 936-37 and 968-71.
Finally, in some cases mediation techniques may have a useful role in helping not to pre-
serve, but to bring an end to a representation, by untangling a long-standing relationship and
enabling the parties to go about their lives without further exposure. See, e.g., Lon C. Fuller,
Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 308 (1971) ("dramatically suc-
cessful" mediation that helped parties disengage from a long-term supply contract, a process
that required a period of "phasing out" and complicated financial adjustments); Charles A.
Bethel & Linda R. Singer, Mediation: A New Remedy for Cases of Domestic Violence, 7 VT. L.
REV. 15, 22-23 (1982) (in domestic violence cases, examples of mediated agreements that "for-
mally acknowledged the end of the relationship" and provided detailed rules governing out-
standing matters between the couple, such as the right to visit the children of the relationship
and the return of certain property); cf A.B.A., DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra
note I (mediation may be useful "where a lawyer has placed a lien on a client's file").
230. See supra note 229. Of our respondents whose firms did a majority of their work (i.e.,
accounting for half or more of their gross revenues) in family law (including divorce and cus-
tody matters), 64.7% reported having had a fee dispute over the past five years; of these,
37.3% reported having had five or more such disputes. This figure was not in fact significantly
different from the results for firms doing a majority of their work in personal injury defense
work (61.6% reported fee disputes) or criminal law (64%). It was, however, significantly
higher than for firms devoting most of their practice to wills and estates (only 52% reported
fee disputes), real estate (51.7%), administrative and governmental practice (53.7%), and per-
sonal injury work for plaintiffs (52.6%). (In all cases sig. = 0.00.) The relatively low figure
for plaintiff-oriented personal injury firms is presumably explained at least in part by the uni-
versal practice of reducing contingent fee agreements to writing. See MODEL RULES PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(c) (1983). Firms that received most of their revenues from
commercial practice (including corporate, banking and tax) reported a surprisingly high inci-
dence of disputes (74.6% reported having had a fee dispute), but this seems to be largely a
function of firm size. It is natural to expect that larger firms with a larger client base will be
relatively more likely to experience a fee dispute. See supra note 7. After controlling for firm
size, the higher incidence of disputes for commercial firms turned out to be not significant at
all. 59.8% of our respondents specializing in family law were single practitioners, and no firm
doing more than half of its work in family law had more than 10 lawyers; only 19.6% of
respondents specializing in commercial law were solo practitioners. Id.
We also asked firms to indicate "the frequency with which fee disputes have occurred over
the past five years in each" of a number of legal areas. On a scale of "1" to "5," with "1" the
lowest frequency of disputing and "5" the highest, firms that engaged in some family law
practice (i.e., accounting for more than 1% of their gross revenues) reported a mean frequency
rating of 2.54 for disputes arising out of a family law representation. This was considerably
higher than for any other field of practice. For example, respondent firms engaging in some
degree (more than 1%) of commercial practice reported a mean frequency rating of 1.90 for
disputes arising out of a commercial representation (significantly different using a 95% confi-
dence interval). In addition, of firms with some degree of family law practice, 55.3% reported
1993] 2069
SMU LAW REVIEW
In addition, while some mediated settlements may indeed be crafted so as
to take into account the particular interests and strongly-felt concerns of the
parties,231 it would seem that in these largely zero-sum disputes over money,
the opportunities for true integrative solutions (as opposed to mere dollar
"compromise") are not extensive--certainly far less extensive than would be
the case in more complex or multi-issue disputes.232 In many cases, too, the
existence of integrative potential is in practice unlikely to be exploited by any
except the most imaginative of negotiators and mediators - and those who
in addition are privileged to operate in the absence of constraints imposed by
time and expense. 233 (Those familiar with the quality of mass-produced me-
diation in local "settlement weeks" will immediately see the force of this
that any fee disputes would "sometimes" or "almost always" arise out of a family law repre-
sentation (only 19.5% reported that it "never" would). By contrast, only 22.2% of firms en-
gaged in some commercial practice reported that any fee disputes would "sometimes" or
"almost always" arise out of representation in a commercial matter - while 46. 7% of these
samefirms reported that disputes would "sometimes" or "almost always" arise out of a family
law representation.
231. See supra note 217-18 and accompanying text.
232. See Donald G. Gifford, A Context Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Leal Negotia-
tion, 46 OnIO ST. L.J. 41, 56-57 (1985) (arguing that integrative bargaining is "less useful
when the parties disagree only about a single issue and the parties' interests are inherently
opposed"). The locus classicus of the literature on integrative settlements is DEAN G. PRUITT,
NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR (1981) (integrative agreements can be achieved by "logrolling," i.e.,
trading off concessions on different issues of different priorities to the parties; by developing "a
new option ... that satisfies both parties' most significant needs"- e.g., "a husband and wife
who both need to get to work at an early hour might have two basins installed in their bath-
room"-or by cutting one party's costs or compensating one party for costs incurred). Id. at
137-62.
Menkel-Meadow argues that "true zero-sum games are empirically quite rare." Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 217, at 784-88. Even where a case seems to involve nothing more than
the payment of money there will be additional issues, such as timing, to which the parties
attach different values and which therefore render the game less zero-sum. Id. at 97-103
("converting a single-factor to a multiple-factor contract"); Gary T. Lowenthal, A General
Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy, and Behavior, 31 KAN. L. REV. 69, 79, 96 (1982)
(adding considerations such as timing, tax advantages, and interest rates may make "the share
bargaining on the primary agenda item slightly less competitive"). It is always important to be
reminded of this theoretical possibility - while at the same time bearing in mind that in the
nature of many cases this potential for expanding the pie is likely to be quite marginal. See
Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey Rice, Jury-Determined Settlements and Summary Jury Trials. Observa-
tions About Alternative Dispute Resolution in an Adversary Culture, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89,
92-93, 93 n.19 (1991) (suggesting that enthusiasm for mediation may cause proponents to
"downplay the large number of instances where a binary decision is probably appropriate,"
including cases where a "single issue overrides other considerations").
233. See Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine.' An
Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237, 253 (1981) (study of mediation in small claims
courts; "[c]ontrary to the expectation that flexible and creative settlements would occur, few
mediation agreements ... involved any conditions besides payment"; with few exceptions non-
monetary issues "were converted into dollars and cents for purposes of the agreement"); cf
SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND
SETTLEMENT COERCION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS IT RELATES TO THE COURTS (1990)
(possible risks of mandated participation; in "mediation programs particularly, narrowly fo-
cused procedures and briefer, more formulaic sessions seem likely to resolve a narrower range
of issues and thus not meet the broader needs of the parties"); Howard S. Erlanger et al.,
Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes.- Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21
LAW & SoC'Y REV. 585, 602 (1987) (study of 25 informally-settled divorce cases; "[t]here is
settlement-but not agreement-when contentious parties sign unsatisfactory stipulations out
of impatience, frustration, or emotional distress").
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observation.) And it should not be forgotten that one occasionally sees arbi-
trators too who, far more often than judges in traditional litigation, are able
to fashion creative and innovative remedies-remedies, for example, that
may be particularly efficient in exploiting the ability of one party to provide
compensation at a lesser cost than would be entailed by a mere monetary
transfer. 234 Consider, for example, the arbitrator in a Montana fee dispute
who awarded an attorney the amount of $356.25, "to be paid with no more
than 12 hairstylings." 235
Finally, it might well be conceded that the mediation process can often be
quite effective in creating a certain "atmosphere of mutual recognition and
empathy" 236 among the disputants. A process where the parties are en-
couraged to speak directly to each other, and to discuss their feelings about
each other, the argument goes, is likely to contribute to an understanding of
and a sympathy with the other's position. Closure and "a kind of psycholog-
ical healing" may result;237 at the same time, such a process of "interparty
translation" 238 may lead the parties to redefine their goals, forming a differ-
ent image of just what it is that they want to take away from a resolution of
the dispute.239 Here, too, however, it may not be fanciful to suggest that
234. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 217, at 787-88 ("If, in a personal injury case,
the plaintiff wants money to buy a new car, the defendant might be able to provide such a car
directly to the plaintiff at a lower cost than the market price of a new car which defendant
would have to pay in settlement."). One striking example of such a remedy fashioned in arbi-
tration is David Co. v. Jim W. Miller Constr., Inc., 444 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1989). In this case
a contractor had agreed to build several luxury townhouses for a developer, but extensive
construction defects were discovered after completion. The unsold units became unmarket-
able, and in addition the owners of the sold units made claims against the developer for rescis-
sion. Although the developer had initially sought only monetary damages, the arbitrators
devised what the reviewing court termed an "innovative" and "novel" remedy: Their award
ordered the builder-who was himself a real estate developer-to purchase the townhouses
and the land on which they were built from the plaintiff. Id. at 840.
235. Abstract of Fee Arbitration Decisions, State Bar of Montana, File No. 137, decided
September 19, 1988. If the client was in fact a hairstylist, this is surely an efficient settlement,
reducing the cost of settlement "with the same net gain to plaintiff at a lower cost to the
defendant." Cf Menkel-Meadow, supra note 217, at 788 n.125. Of course, such a conclusion
assumes that the value of the services to the attorney was not diminished by the risk of some-
thing less than enthusiastic and dedicated compliance on the part of a client who had earlier
found reason to complain about the lawyer's fee.
236. Baruch Bush, supra note 95, at 982; see also id. at 963, 993, 1030 n.289; Baruch Bush,
supra note 88, at 269-70; Burns, The Appropriateness of Mediation: A Case Study and Reflec-
tion on Fuller and Fiss, 4 OHIO ST. J. Disp. RESOL. 129, 135 (1989). See also note 219 and
accompanying text.
237. LEONARD RISKIN & JAMES WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 232
(1987).
238. Baruch Bush, supra note 95, at 963, 993.
239. See Dean E. Peachey, What People Want from Mediation, in MEDIATION RESEARCH
300, 312-18 (1989) (victims of crime who are able to attribute offending behavior to external or
temporary causes will be less likely to seek retribution in preference to "other forms of justice"
like restitution or forgiveness; they will be more likely to favor retribution "when they cannot
understand why the event happened, or if they cannot understand why the perpetrator acted as
he or she did").
As with the potential for integrative settlements (see supra note 233 and accompanying text),
it seems likely that this capability of mediation will often go unrealized in practice-particu-
larly where the mediator adopts a style that leans heavily toward the coordination of bargain-
ing and the orchestration of mutual concessions, at the expense of a more "therapeutic"
approach in which the parties "are encouraged to engage in a full expression of their feelings
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some of the same effects might to some extent be achieved in an informal
arbitration proceeding. An arbitration hearing, after all, is likely to be struc-
tured so that there are few if any restraints on what each side is permitted to
say, with each encouraged to voice whatever concerns he may have without
the ritualization imposed by rules of evidence and procedure 24° - in gen-
eral, it is designed to keep the disputants within "the world of ordinary dis-
course." 24 1 In such a setting there may be abundant opportunity for the
open expression of emotions, the venting and dissipation of anger, and the
insights gained through face-to-face explanations; 242 such possibilities are
only enhanced where, in the interest of accommodating the unrepresented
client, the already relaxed format of arbitration is made even more accessible
and comprehensible. Of course, arbitrators can hardly be expected to work
consciously at the human relations goal of mutual understanding. 243 How-
and attitudes." See Susan S. Sibey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW &
POL'Y 7 (1986). It is my impression that attorney-mediators in court-ordered or officially-
sponsored mediation programs are particularly likely to adopt the former style, often in one of
its more directive or heavy-handed variants. See James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hash-
ing It Out: Is This the End of "Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 66-75 (1991)(court-ordered mediation, conducted by attorneys, in Florida; study notes extensive use of
caucuses and, once settlement offers are on the table, "a mad dash for the middle").
240. Austin Sarat, Alternatives in Dispute Processing: Litigation in a Small Claims Court,
10 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 339, 354-55 (1976) (contrasting alternatives of adjudication and arbi-
tration in New York City Small Claims Court; in the latter, parties "are permitted, if not
encouraged, to tell their stories in their own way"). As to the relative "informality" of proce-
dure in arbitration, see generally supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text; MURRAY, RAU &
SHERMAN, supra note 35, at 555-65; ALASKA STATE BAR RULES Rules 40(n) ("Any relevant
evidence will be admitted if it is the sort of evidence on which reasonable persons are accus-
tomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs, regardless of the existence of any common law
or statutory rule to the contrary."); see also Dallas Bar Association, Twenty Questions and
Answers About Fee Disputes no. 13 ("[The hearing] is usually conducted at about 5:00 p.m. on
a weekday evening in the office of one of the attorneys on the panel... It is a serious business
meeting, of course, but it is not as formal as a court hearing. You may tell your story any way
you wish.... Although it is certainly not necessary, you may have a friend, relative, or some
other attorney with you to help you make your statement, or just to lend moral support.").
241. Lempert, supra note 197, at 353-54 (one of the "keys to informal justice" is a proce-
dure in which the participants "are allowed to and tend to follow the rules of ordinary conver-
sation and storytelling").
242. Cf McEwen & Maiman, supra note 227, at 256. The authors' comparative study of
mediation and adjudication in a Maine small claims court found that while half the litigants
studied had reported getting angry or upset during their trial or mediation, "40.3% of the
angry litigants in mediation reported feeling much less upset at the end of the session com-
pared to 26.1% of litigants in adjudication". In addition, 30% of disputants in mediation
reported that the process "increased their understanding of the other party's side of the dis-
pute," compared to a rate of only 14% in adjudication. Id. The authors concluded that the
"informality and far greater tolerance for emotional outbursts in mediation creates a greater
potential for reducing anger," as well as a greater likelihood that a litigant "would come to
comprehend the other party's point of view." Id.
243. See Baruch Bush, supra note 95, at 992-94, who distinguishes between the "informal-
ity" of arbitration procedure-which reduces hostility by reducing opportunities for "direct
party confrontation" in the form of evidentiary and procedural contentions-and procedure in
mediation, which instead is aimed directly at facilitating mutual recognition and sympathy.
This distinction must of course be a matter of degree. Baruch Bush recognizes that the effect
of "interparty translation" may indeed be achieved to some extent "merely by contact between
the parties in an aggression-neutralized atmosphere," but argues that it is more likely to be
achieved, and to a greater degree, "by process elements consciously adapted to this end-such
as the adoption of a translating and reconciliatory function by the neutral third party." Id. at
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ever, the informality and openness of arbitration procedure should at the
very least serve an educational function: It should help to educate the client
as to the norms and demands of legal practice ("cooling off" the client might
be a more pointed way of expressing the same idea), and at the same time
help to educate the attorney with respect to possible danger signs and areas
of exposure in client relations. And it must be at least an open question
whether for the parties, the promise of a final resolution of the fee dispute
may not outweigh any shortcomings of arbitration relative to alternative
processes in promoting such understanding.
What is perhaps the most problematical aspect of the mediation of fee
disputes is the danger that the process may lead to inadequate settlements,
entered into by clients without a full understanding of the structure of legal
fees or the professional rules regulating attorney behavior. In addition to a
natural imbalance of information, there may be imbalances of negotiation
skills, rhetorical ability, stamina, or tolerance for conflict that will only be
accentuated if (as is likely to be the case) the client has not hired a second
attorney to represent him.244 In these circumstances a client may be particu-
larly vulnerable to a mediator intent on achieving a settlement and who can
create pressure for agreement by stressing the need for "compromise," the
desirability of an end to a protracted dispute, and the costs and pressures of
continuing it.245 "Reality testing" by mediators can, here and elsewhere, be
a euphemism for this particularly directive form of "arm twisting. '246
993. This latter task is rarely part of the job description of arbitrators, who lack the necessary
skills and who may also be concerned that it may appear to compromise their neutrality.
244. The relatively small amount in controversy in most fee disputes means that it will
rarely make economic sense for a client to retain another attorney to represent him. See supra
note 38. The director of the Oregon State Bar's fee arbitration program "encourages" clients to
participate in the arbitration without retaining another attorney, because of the added expense;
she estimates that attorneys represent clients in no more than one in six of the fee arbitrations
conducted. Personal communication, Liz Denecke, Administrator, Ore. State Bar Attorneys'
Fee Arbitration Program. The Florida Bar's "Consumer Guide" to the state's fee arbitration
program notes that the purpose of arbitration is to resolve fee disputes "quickly and inexpen-
sively without having to hire an attorney to represent you," although consumers are told they
have the right to be represented by an attorney at the hearing "should you question your
ability to represent yourself." FLORIDA STATE BAR ASS'N, CONSUMER GUIDE TO THE
LEGAL FEE ARBITRATION PROGRAM (1992). See also Marino, 480 N.E.2d at 290. (Massa-
chusetts arbitration program; in conversations with the program staff prior to the hearing, "it
was stressed to [the client] that she did not need an attorney to represent her, since the hearing
was 'informal.' ").
245. Such an appeal is of course especially powerful where a final stage of arbitration is not
available or is not made mandatory for the attorney, so that a mediated settlement can readily
be sold to the client as a means of "avoiding litigation and having to pay for another lawyer."
But the appeal is still not without force in circumstances where mediation is seen as a prelimi-
nary hurdle that must first be traversed before the process of arbitration can even be set in
motion.
Cf Erlanger et al., supra note 233, at 591-96 (divorce settlements; "when a settlement is
perceived as the only exit from the dispute process," one party may feel substantial pressure-
financial or emotional pressure, or pressure from lawyers and judges-to settle informally;
"severe dissatisfaction" with the imposed outcome is a frequent consequence).
246. Kressel & Pruitt, supra note 220, at 193. See generally id. at 192-94 (While
"[a]ssertive tactics are usually viewed as alien to good mediation," several studies have por-
trayed mediators "as much more assertive actors," particularly with respect to substantive
interventions aimed at bringing about a settlement; such tactics "often (but by no means al-
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"When the client attends without counsel, the momentum of the mediation
conference may seem hard to resist"; 247 as a consequence, a client may reluc-
tantly be led to an agreement without ever having had a neutral and objec-
tive look at the "merits" of the dispute.
III. CONCLUSION
That some satisfactory method of processing fee disputes now needs to be
put in place, in the interest of both attorneys and clients, seems clear. In
cases where negotiation fails, or where the process of private ordering be-
comes little more than a euphemism for capitulation or resigned acquies-
cence, 248 there may otherwise be little practical alternative to "lumping" any
claim involving a fee.
Mandatory arbitration of fee disputes is of course hardly a panacea. The
1974 prediction of the ABA's Special Committee on Resolution of Fee Dis-
putes, that there was "little likelihood" mandatory arbitration could gain the
necessary support to be enacted, 249 has proven at least in some jurisdictions
to be overstated. Nevertheless, the fact remains that proposals for
mandatory arbitration are likely to meet with widespread and intense oppo-
sition on the part of the bar.2 50 Such opposition may be grounded in a sim-
ple distrust of clients, in concerns with respect to possible client abuse of the
arbitration process, 25' or in hostility to any form of expanded state regula-
tion of the profession. It may also rest on certain a priori assumptions con-
ways) have a somewhat coercive quality."). See also Honeyman, Patterns of Bias in Mediation,
1985 J. DIsp. RESOL. 141, 146 ("the well-known definition of a mediator as someone who
listens to and reasons politely with both parties only until he is sure which is weaker, and then
jumps on that one with both feet"); McEwen & Maiman, supra note 233, at 260 (in longer
mediations, 38.6% of disputants in successful mediations and 64% in unsuccessful mediations
"remembered that the mediator had pressured them to accept a settlement"; mediators "would
suggest a settlement figure of their own, note the time already expended, and observe that
court decisions are unpredictable"); see also supra note 241.
247. ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 218, at 24.
248. See supra notes 43-44, 115-118 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
250. When asked for their reaction to "a proposal by which all attorneys in Texas must
submit to binding arbitration of any fee dispute at the initiative of the client," 33.3% of our
attorney-respondents answered that they would "oppose," and another 33.5% answered that
they would "strongly oppose," such a proposal. This opposition did not seem to vary signifi-
cantly depending on the location or size of the firm in which the attorney practiced or the type
of practice engaged in.
251. This was a common theme in the comments volunteered by our respondents:
"A mandatory system would only serve to increase disputes; clients would be able to refuse
to pay fees and threaten mandatory arbitration. Most attorneys would write off or reduce just
fees in order to avoid the expense (i.e., lost time)."
"Making it mandatory may lead to 'unnecessary' arbitration and require attorneys to face
senseless, wasted time in the process. Clients would use it to their advantage-Legal blackmail
against attorney."
"Good clients will never invoke the process. Squirrelly clients will use it to save a few
bucks."
"Business persons-with few exceptions-question the fee. They believe it a prudent busi-
ness activity. I could double my fee and receive about the same complaints. I could reduce
them by one-half and receive the same complaints."
"In the 10+ year existence of our firm, we have experienced few fee disputes. What we
have experienced, however, indicates that most fee disputes are based on a client's desire to
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cerning the arbitration process, such as the supposed tendency of arbitrators
to indulge in compromise awards. 252 Opposition to mandatory arbitration
may rest in part on the willingness of attorneys to believe (or at least to
assert) that any mandatory process is simply unnecessary, since their peers
can be counted on to share what they think of as their own high standards of
ethics and of reasonable behavior. 253 And it is likely also to reflect a concern
that a mandatory arbitration process would be unable to protect the attorney
against a second bite at the apple by clients in the form of possible subse-
quent suits for malpractice. 254 In any event, opposition to mandatory arbi-
tration is likely in many jurisdictions to be an effective barrier to a reform of
this nature.
Arbitration has an obvious value for clients confronted with what they
believe to be an excessive legal fee: To suggest that mandatory arbitration is
likely to "encourage" or lead to an increase in fee disputes 25 5 may be just a
tendentious way of recognizing that the process might provide clients with
their first realistic alternative for the assertion of any grievances over a fee.
However, the process may well merit a closer look by attorneys as well. In
general, every attorney may be seen as having some stake in the public per-
ception of the profession, and thus some stake in minimizing both the extent
of billing abuse and the extent of client dissatisfaction with existing means of
redress. More pragmatically, where a dispute has arisen over a fee the ethi-
cal attorney who is quite convinced of the propriety of the claimed fee may
wish to hold out to the client the availability of a process that provides an
opportunity for a disinterested look at the controversy and a rapid and final
disposition of it. Encouraging client participation in the process in this way
may well increase the ultimate chances of resolution and payment; it may
also reduce the likelihood of the escalation of conflict that often leads to
malpractice litigation-and reduce as well the likelihood of strategic behav-
ior by clients in the form of appeals to the grievance mechanism. 256
The attorney may naturally wish to initiate arbitration where all of the
claimed fee has not yet been paid and a balance remains due; there are, how-
ever, circumstances in which the client, also, may conceivably find it in his
avoid paying or achieve a windfall rather than a legitimate concern over the reasonableness of
the fee."
252. Of those respondents who would "oppose" or "strongly oppose" a proposal for
mandatory arbitration, 34.1% agreed with the proposition that arbitrators would "tend to
'split the baby in half without regard to the merits of the dispute." See supra notes 188-90 and
accompanying text.
253. Of those respondents who would "oppose" or "strongly oppose" a proposal for
mandatory arbitration, 53.7% agreed with the proposition that "mandatory arbitration is not
necessary since most fee disputes can be amicably negotiated with the client"; 40.3% agreed
with the proposition that a mandatory program is not necessary "since most lawyers would
agree to voluntary arbitration or mediation."
254. Of those respondents who would "oppose" or "strongly oppose" a proposal for
mandatory arbitration, 67.6% agreed with the proposition that the proposal would be "unfair
as long as the client remains free to bring a separate action against the attorney for damages
(e.g., malpractice claims) at a later date." This was by a considerable margin the most com-
mon reason given for opposition. See also supra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 251.
256. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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interest to set the process in motion even though the attorney is still claiming
payment: Not only may the client see arbitration as one means of putting
the dispute behind him forever, but, more importantly, the client may wish
to invoke a right to arbitration in order to stay a threatened lawsuit by the
attorney for collection of the fee. 2 57 In such a case the attorney who acqui-
esces (or who is obliged to acquiesce) in arbitration may obtain at the end of
the process a fee award that will be binding on the client and routinely en-
forceable, since it will benefit from the same presumptions of validity and
limited review as do other arbitration awards. 258
It is interesting to note that opposition to mandatory arbitration, however
intense, need not always translate into an unwillingness to participate in the
process on a voluntary basis. Among our attorney-respondents who re-
ported that they would "oppose" or "strongly oppose" any proposal for
mandatory binding arbitration, 30% would nevertheless "always" or "al-
most always" favor their firm's participation in "a process for the voluntary
resolution of fee disputes through binding arbitration" set up under bar aus-
pices. An additional 56.3% "would consider participating" in voluntary ar-
bitration, "depend[ing] on the circumstances. '259
257. See supra note 191; N.J. R. GEN. APLIC. Rule 1:20A-6 (required notice by attorney to
client of the client's right to arbitration before the attorney may file suit to collect a fee). The
Director of New Jersey's mandatory program estimates that 20-30% of the fee arbitration
proceedings in that state have resulted from the client's motion for a stay after receiving such a
pre-action notice. Personal communication, David Johnson, Director, New Jersey Office of
Legal Ethics (Jan. 4, 1993).
258. See supra notes 205-14 and accompanying text. Even greater assurances of payment
might be provided where clients seeking to initiate arbitration are required first to deposit with
the program all or a substantial portion of the claimed fees that remain unpaid; any fees
awarded the attorney by the arbitrators could be paid directly out of the deposit in accordance
with the terms of the award.
In addition, requiring a small filing fee for clients who wish to initiate arbitration need not
unduly burden client access to the process, but might provide some reassurance with respect to
client "abuse" of the right to arbitration as well as defraying some of the administrative costs
of the program. At the present time it seems that only a small number of existing arbitration
programs require such filing fees. See HALT SURVEY, supra note 38 (as of 1987, only five
statewide programs required a filing fee); see, e.g., MASS. BAR ASS'N, RULES OF THE LEGAL
FEE ARBITRATION BOARD Rule 111(c) ($25 filing fee for "disputes involving legal fees of
$5000 or less," thereafter rising with amount of disputed fee to a maximum of $250); FLA.
BAR Ass'N, CONSUMER GUIDE TO THE LEGAL FEE ARBITRATION PROGRAM (1991) (appli-
cant and respondent will each pay a filing fee of $15). In the program administered by the Los
Angeles County Bar Association, the filing fee is 5% of the amount in dispute, with a mini-
mum of $50 and a maximum of $3500. During 1990-91, 106 claimants requested a waiver of
this fee on the ground of inability to pay; the fee was reduced in 69 cases and completely
waived in the remaining 37. L.A. COUNTY BAR ASS'N, DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES,
ARBITRATION COMMITTEE ANN. REP. (1990-91).
259. Further questions were asked of this latter group to probe for just what "circum-
stances" might lead these respondents to favor their firm's participation in voluntary arbitra-
tion. Not surprisingly, the most important factor appeared to be the prospect of "increas[ing]
the likelihood of payment in cases where the client has not yet paid the fee"; this was consid-
ered an "important" or "very important" factor by 74.4% of those respondents who opposed
mandatory arbitration, but who would nevertheless "consider" participating in voluntary arbi-
tration. By far the least important factor for this group appeared to be the prospect that
participating in arbitration might increase the "likelihood of maintaining a future relationship
with the client." Only 38.5% of these respondents considered this an "important" or "very
important" factor that might lead them to favor their firm's participation, and 22.8% re-
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Finally, the attorney might also wish to give some thought to efforts aimed
at insuring in advance that the client too would be obligated to participate in
any arbitration proceeding. Achieving this symmetry in dispute resolution
might bring with it the considerable advantages of allowing control over the
format, the forum, and the identity of the decision-maker. 260 Such a result
can only be accomplished, of course, through careful planning and drafting
at the stage of contract formation, and even where the attorney does not
actually leave himself open to imputations of overreaching, pre-dispute arbi-
tration clauses may not be permissible where a rigid view is taken of ethical
restrictions on transactions with clients. 26 1 Where such clauses are permit-
sponded that it was "not important at all." Cf supra notes 96-99, 228-30 and accompanying
text.
260. See MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 35, at 392-93 (fee agreement drafted by
prominent Houston attorney provided that any "malpractice or fee dispute would be arbitrated
by the Dean of the University of Texas School of Law, [the attorney's] alma mater"). A pre-
dispute arbitration clause was enforced in McGuire, Cornwell & Blakey v. Grider, 765 F.
Supp. 1048 (D. Colo. 1991). The clause there was striking in that far from merely achieving
symmetry, it operated unilaterally; the client, a "successful and sophisticated businessman,"
was required to submit to binding arbitration "any fee disputes ... and claims by you regard-
ing [the firm's] handling of your matter," but the clause expressly "does not bar [the firm] from
collecting amounts due to it in other ways, including litigation." Grider, 765 F. Supp. at 1049.
261. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 211 (1990) (agreements requiring arbi-
tration of malpractice or fee disputes are not permitted "unless the client is in fact counseled
by another attorney"; "it is unrealistic to expect lawyers to provide enough information about
arbitration to a prospective client ... so that the client can make an informed consent to a
mandatory arbitration provision," and equally unrealistic to conclude that "limited disclosure
coupled with the advice to seek independent legal counsel" will be adequate); Md. State Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 90-12 (1989) (same; "an agreement to submit all disputes arising
out of the attorney-client relationship to arbitration constitutes an effort prospectively to limit
the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice" under Rule 1.8(h) of the MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT).
A tentative draft of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers took a similar position.
A comment suggested that pre-dispute arbitration clauses covering fee matters should be unen-
forceable "[e]xcept when the client is sophisticated in legal matters or is represented by in-
dependent counsel": "Were the rule otherwise, a lawyer could obtain the client's consent to a
forum favorable to the lawyer when the client did not foresee possible disadvantages of trial
there." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 43, § 54,
cmt. b, iv. However, the ALI membership later voted to delete this comment, relying on the
Supreme Court's recent approval of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in a number of other areas
where adhesion contracts also implicated matters of public concern. See 60 U.S.L.W. 2729
(May 26, 1992); supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
At the present time the situation in many jurisdictions remains muddied. At least where
malpractice claims are concerned, California apparently takes a permissive view, resorting to
the familiar rhetorical device to the effect that pre-dispute arbitration clauses are not the same
thing as "limiting liability," since a "standard arbitration provision . . . merely selects the
forum in which liability will be determined," Calif. State Bar, Formal Op. 1989-116 (1989); cf
supra note 127 and accompanying text. But this opinion explicitly cautions that it does not
address the propriety of provisions requiring arbitration of fee disputes. Calif. State Bar, For-
mal Op. 1989-116 (1989) at n.6. Curiously, other California opinions indicate that agreements
binding the client to arbitrate fee disputes are thought to be impermissible as somehow incon-
sistent with the statute making fee arbitration "voluntary for a client and ... mandatory for an
attorney," since such clauses could "vitiate any probability of voluntary acquiescence." See
Calif. State Bar, Formal Op. 1981-56 (1981) (attorney may not require as a condition of em-
ployment that a client accept binding arbitration in advance of a dispute over fees; attorney
and client may voluntarily agree to arbitrate a fee dispute only after the dispute occurs). In
other jurisdictions similar results may be dictated, not by rules regulating attorney-client con-
tracts, but by local variations in the general arbitration statute. See e.g., Texas General Arbi-
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ted by positive law, the attorney's contractual planning might even extend
beyond claims over the amount of a fee to include claims of malpractice as
well: Attorneys might find that the feared effects of making the process for
asserting claims more accessible, and thus the actual assertion of claims
more likely, could well be outweighed by the attractions of a non-jury forum
and the powerful advantage of sweeping all potential claims into the same
proceeding. 262
tration Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 224 (Vernon 1991) (in a contract in which an
individual acquires "services" for a consideration of $50,000 or less, pre-dispute arbitration
agreement must be signed "by the parties to such agreement and their attorneys" in order to be
enforceable); cf Gerdes v. Tygrett, 584 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no
writ) (parties submitted existing fee dispute to bar association arbitration; award in favor of
attorney was upheld despite lack of required signatures on the submission).
262. See supra notes 149-59 and accompanying text. Such considerations may also suggest
submitting to the arbitration of malpractice claims even after a dispute arises. See supra note
157 and accompanying text.
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